David Enoch

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Philosophy and law, Faculty Member

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Shameless Liberalism: A Vision

10 March 2025, 6:00 pm–8:00 pm typewriter keyboard with the word liberalism typed out A talk in ... more 10 March 2025, 6:00 pm–8:00 pm

typewriter keyboard with the word liberalism typed out
A talk in the John Austin Seminar Series

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UCL Laws
laws-events@ucl.ac.uk
John Austin Seminars - Shameless Liberalism: A Vision
Speaker: David Enoch, Professor of Philosophy of Law, University of Oxford

Chair: George Letsas, Professor of Philosophy of Law, UCL Laws

About the Seminar:
Despite everything, liberalism remains the one true political philosophy. Liberal principles – something about liberty and autonomy, something about equality, perhaps some universalist and rationalist assumptions – are still the right fundamental principles for political philosophy.

But this doesn’t mean – nor did you think – that there are no more troubles for liberalism. The most dominant version of liberalism (in English-speaking political philosophy) over the past half century is weak and confused, philosophically and politically. We should do better. And there are many other problems – new and old – to face.

The liberalism that we need to defend (not just theoretically) is robust and self-confident intellectually, but very realistic and careful politically. It is in no way skeptical or relativistic, but it is pragmatically flexible. It is philosophically uncompromising, but politically willing to compromise about pretty much everything.

This paper is a broad-brush-stroke presentation and defense of this shameless kind of liberalism.

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A (somewhat) Unified Theory of Flawed Consent

Consent, of course, is a big deal. There is no plausible way of doing moral and political philoso... more Consent, of course, is a big deal. There is no plausible way of doing moral and political philosophy without assigning a major role for consent. Consent, however, is also problematic. And there are many cases in which it is flawed, perhaps less than fully valid. These include cases of consent under coercive threats, manipulation, nudging, exploitation, false consciousness, misinformation, and perhaps other cases as well.

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Why Isn't (Purely) Epistemic Autonomy of Value

With some practical decisions, it is important to make them oneself rather than outsource to othe... more With some practical decisions, it is important to make them oneself rather than outsource to others, even if others are somewhat more likely to make the decision that is better (including for oneself). When it comes to forming beliefs, though, this doesn’t seem to be the case – it’s never epistemically justified to insist on forming the belief using only one’s own devices, while acknowledging that relying on another is much more likely to get one to the truth. What best explain this difference – arguably, when it comes to the value of autonomy – between the practical and the epistemic domain? Answering this question, it turns out, is not only of interest in itself. It also helps in teaching general lessons about autonomy.

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False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences

The Philosophical Review, Apr 1, 2020

You may have your worries about consent-perhaps it's not as magical as some people seem to think-... more You may have your worries about consent-perhaps it's not as magical as some people seem to think-and some of the worries about consent are precisely the topic of this article. But the starting point has to be that consent-sometimes, at least in nonproblematic cases-is extremely important. This is true in the private as well as the political sphere. Even if not entirely magical, still consent (or something in its very close vicinity) "turns a rape into love-making, a kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a battery into a football tackle, a theft into a gift, and a trespass into a dinner party" (Hurd 1996: 122). My consent-or perhaps my free, autonomous, informed consent-affects, for instance, what it's morally permissible for you to do to me. It also affects what the law should say of our interaction, and often, what it does say. Consent is a big deal. 1 Natalie Stoljar has been extremely helpful both in introducing me to some of the relevant literature and in correspondence, when I tried some of my initial ideas on her. For discussions and comments on earlier versions I am grateful to

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II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2016

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There is no such thing as doxastic wrongdoing

Draft-feel free to quote but please check to see if there are changes in a (hopefully) published ... more Draft-feel free to quote but please check to see if there are changes in a (hopefully) published version.] You've been battling a drinking problem, and-in the last few months-successfully. At a departmental reception, you show strength of will and again drink nothing, but a colleague accidentally spills some wine on your sleeve. When you're back home, your partner-smelling the alcohol-believes you're drinking again. Naturally, you are offended: Not necessarily by something your partner does or says, or will do, or is even disposed to do, but by their belief about you, it's their belief that hurts you, that you may resent, that you may be expecting an apology for .

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Just Because It’s a Phobia Doesn’t Mean You Shouldn’t Be Afraid

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019

Political Philosophy and Epistemology: The Case of Public Reason

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

Public reason theorists routinely make seemingly epistemological claims. They talk about justifyi... more Public reason theorists routinely make seemingly epistemological claims. They talk about justifying principles to others 1 , about the uncertainty with which we should hold our evaluative commitments 2 , about reasonable persons and comprehensive doctrines 3 , about a morallypolitically motivated higher epistemic standard 4 , about intellectual modesty 5 , and of course, about the burdens of judgment: that is, Rawls's suggested explanations for the widespread moral and political disagreement we see, even among the reasonable 6. It certainly seems like epistemological claims are being made here. What exactly are they, then? How are they related to contemporary discussions in epistemology proper, so to speak? Most importantly, can the epistemological commitments of the public reason tradition in political philosophy-whatever exactly they are-withstand criticism? Unfortunately, and for reasons that are not entirely clear to me, public reason theorists do very little to explain-let alone defend-their epistemological commitments 7. In this paper I do some of this work for them, though with a critical twist. I try to understand what the 8 This qualification is important. It may be argued (it has been, by Raz, 1998) that all justification is by its nature accessible to all. If so, the accessibility requirement is always trivially satisfied. Public reason accounts are characterized by a non-trivial accessibility requirement. 9 For characterizations of the public reason tradition, see Quong (2013), Vallier and D'agostino (2013). See also my "Against Public Reason" (forthcoming). 10 There is here an important distinction between the public-reason requirement as applied to state action, perhaps as a necessary condition for legitimacy, and the requirement addressed at reasonable citizens, not to rely in the public sphere on "private", or non-accessible considerations. Leland and van Wietmarschen (2012, 724, footnote 5) are clear about the distinction, and emphasize that they only discuss the latter. I will discuss both, returning to the explicit distinction between them when needed.

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Comment on Yaffe's Attempts

Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, 2012

How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else): A comment on Allen

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020

In responding to Prof. Allen's paper, I make several general methodological points: about the use... more In responding to Prof. Allen's paper, I make several general methodological points: about the use of hypothetical cases, about the point of theorizing, and about the role of idealization. Then I make some more specific points about his claims about (and against) previous work on statistical evidence.

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Precis of Taking Morality Seriously

Social Science Research Network, May 16, 2015

How Principles Ground

Specific moral facts (like the fact that you ought to send the paper by that deadline) seem to be... more Specific moral facts (like the fact that you ought to send the paper by that deadline) seem to be grounded in relevant natural facts (that you promised), together with relevant moral principles (that you ought to keep your promises). This picture—according to which moral principles play a role in grounding specific moral facts—is a very natural one, and it may be especially attractive to non-naturalist, robust realists. A recent challenge from Selim Berker threatens this picture, though. Moral principles themselves seem to incorporate grounding claims, and it’s not clear that this can be reconciled with according the principles a grounding role. This chapter responds to Berker’s Challenge, utilizing a (moderate) grounding pluralism. In particular, it argues that distinguishing between normative and metaphysical grounding is the key to saving the natural picture. It also shows how such a distinction is one that you have a reason to endorse independently of this challenge, as it does ...

Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding

Philosophical Issues, 2021

study of epistemology 1 . This is understandable, of course: The law in general, and evidence law... more study of epistemology 1 . This is understandable, of course: The law in general, and evidence law in particular, seems to be employing the same natural-language terms epistemologists are (or are at least supposed to be) interested in ("knew or should have known", "reasonable doubt", "evidence", "presumption" (of innocence), and so on) 2 . Perhaps for this reason, an interest in legal epistemology has been there long before the current explosion 3 . Still, the extent of attention paid by epistemologists to legal epistemology seems unprecedented (whether this interest is reciprocated by legal theorists, let alone legal practitioners, is of course another matter). In this paper we want to argue that a large part of this project is based on a mistake, roughly analogous to the mistake involved in thinking of studies of intelligence as relevant to the understanding of military intelligence. With qualifications shortly to emerge, epistemology is not, we think, intrinsically and directly relevant to normative evidence law theory, at least, that is, as long as the relevant perspective is that of designing the evidence law regime. When it comes to the conscientious fact-finder, things may be -we're not sure about this -importantly different. Now, many things go by the name "legal epistemology", and it's not as if we think all are based on a mistake. It makes perfect sense to ask how different standards of proof are best understood, or -in * For comments on earlier versions we thank Matt Kotzen and Sarah Moss. Earlier versions of this paper were given as talks at the Social (Distance) Epistemology Virtual Event Series, in June 2020, and at the "Emerging Trends in Criminal Justice: Writers' Workshop" at Osgoode Hall Law School. We thank the participants of both occasions.

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In Defense of Procedural Rights (Or Anyway, Procedural Duties): A Response to Wellman

Legal Theory, 2018

ABSTRACTIn a recent paper Christopher Heath Wellman argues that—with some important qualification... more ABSTRACTIn a recent paper Christopher Heath Wellman argues that—with some important qualifications—there are no procedural rights. And it's not as if he is squeamish about his examples: even someone who is “convicted” and “punished” by lottery is not wronged—their rights are not violated—if in fact they are guilty of the relevant crime. I respond, rejecting Wellman's conclusion and argument. I also show how the discussion has important wider implications.

Statistical Resentment: Or, What’s Wrong with Acting, Blaming, and Believing on the Basis of Statistics Alone

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021

Statistical evidence-say, that 95% of your co-workers badmouth each other-can never render resent... more Statistical evidence-say, that 95% of your co-workers badmouth each other-can never render resenting your colleague appropriate, in the way that other evidence (say, the testimony of a reliable friend) can. The problem of statistical resentment is to explain why. We put the problem of statistical resentment in several wider contexts: The context of the problem of statistical evidence in legal theory; the epistemological context-with problems like the lottery paradox for knowledge, epistemic impurism and doxastic wrongdoing; and the context of a wider set of examples of responses and attitudes that seem not to be appropriately groundable in statistical evidence. Regrettably, we do not come up with a fully general, fully adequate, fully unified account of all the phenomena discussed. But we give reasons to believe that no such account is forthcoming, and we sketch a somewhat messier account that may be the best that can be had here.

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Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable

Philosophical Studies, 2020

This paper responds to a recently popular objection to non-naturalist, robust moral realism. The ... more This paper responds to a recently popular objection to non-naturalist, robust moral realism. The objection is that moral realism is morally objectionable, because realists are committed to taking evidence about the distribution (or non-existence) of non-natural properties to be relevant to their first-order moral commitments. I argue that such objections fail. The moral realist is indeed committed to conditionals such as “If there are no non-natural properties, then no action is wrong.” But the realist is not committed to using this conditional in a modus-ponens inference upon coming to believe its antecedent. Placing the discussion in a wider epistemological discussion—here, that of “junk-knowledge”, and of how background knowledge determines the relevance of purported evidence—shows that this objection does not exert a price from the realist.

Sensitivity, Safety, and the Law: A Reply to Pardo

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019

A belief or judgment is sensitive if and only if, roughly, had it been false, the relevant person... more A belief or judgment is sensitive if and only if, roughly, had it been false, the relevant person would not have believed it. A belief or judgment is safe if and only if, roughly, the relevant person would not have held it without it being true. Both conditions -Sensitivity and Safety -seem to capture something important, at least epistemically and perhaps also legally. The best way to see this is to consider Sensitivity-and Safetyfailures, and see how disturbing they are. Usually, forming the belief that the table in front of you is red based on just perception seems perfectly fine. But if we find out that the table would have looked red to you even had it been some other color (say, because of lighting conditions in the room) -or, in possible worlds lingo (of which a little more below), if we find out that in the closest world (or enough of the closest possible worlds) in which it's not red you still believe it is -this seems to count against the evidential credentials of your belief. In this example, Insensitivity seems to undermine knowledge. 1 Usually, forming a belief about the time based on a quick look at a clock seems fine. But if we then find out that in circumstances not too radically different from the actual ones that clock would have shown the wrong time -or, in possible worlds lingo, if we find out that in sufficiently close worlds in which you still rely on the clock your belief about the time is false -this seems to undermine your knowledge of the time. In this example, Unsafety seems to undermine knowledge (though in this example Insensitivity may also be doing work).  For helpful discussions and comments on earlier versions we thank Tali Fisher and two anonymous readers for Legal Theory. 1 This knowledge impediment might continue to hold even if the worlds where the table is not red -say, because unbeknownst to us there is a law forbidding other colored tables under red lighting -are far enough from the actual world to render your belief Safe. If so, this belief would be safe but insensitive. These were non-legal examples, but legal examples are not harder to construct. Thus, a factual finding is at the very least rendered problematic if it is insensitive 2 -that is, if, even though the finding is true, the court would have still found as it did, even had it been false. And a legal procedure that can too easily lead us astray -that is unsafe -seems at the very least initially suspicious, precisely because even if it actually leads to a true conclusion, if the circumstances had been slightly different it would have led to a false one. 3 In his recent "Safety vs. Sensitivity" 4 , however, Michael Pardo argues that Sensitivity in fact plays no role in guiding or explaining legal doctrine, nor should it. En route to this conclusion, he also criticizes our attempt to utilize Sensitivity in order to shed light on the problem of statistical evidence 5 . This paper is, to a considerable extent, a reply to Pardo. But it is, we hope, also of wider interest. Pardo's discussion -of our previous work, and more generally -serves also as a good opportunity to revisit issues at the intersection of law and epistemology, both in specific terms (like the legal role, if any, of Sensitivity and Safety, or what to say of statistical evidence), and more generally (about how, if at all, legal theory should incorporate epistemological discussions). We happily take advantage of this opportunity, then, offering both specific critiques of and replies to Pardo's discussion, and more general points that are of interest also independently of our exchange. In section 1 we detail our view about Sensitivity and statistical evidence; then we defend both an epistemological and a legal role for Sensitivity (in section 2); then, in section 3, we discuss Safety, offering a 2 Throughout, we apply Sensitivity and Safety to beliefs, findings, evidence, verdicts, and so on. In some contexts it may be important to be stricter on what it is that Sensitivity and Safety are meant to apply to, but not in ours, we think: We think that the most basic cases is that of sensitive (or insensitive) and safe (or unsafe) evidence. But all the other cases can be understood in the natural way -a belief is sensitive iff it is based on sensitive evidence, and so on. We acknowledge that this "natural way" may not be simple, and that complication may arise, but not ones, we think, that are crucial for our discussion here. 3 Note that both Safety and Sensitivity are factive conditions: If your belief is safe or sensitive, it is true. Otherwise the closest world in which your belief is false is the actual world (and presumably it is also false in most of the closest worlds where you believe that it is true). 4 Pardo (2018). All page references are to this paper, unless otherwise stated.

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Constitutivism: On Rabbits, Hats, and Holy Grails

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019

Industries rely on digital transformation and emergent technologies in order to reach processes e... more Industries rely on digital transformation and emergent technologies in order to reach processes efficiency and flexibility. Cyber-physical systems are currently proposed as an answer to this fourth industrial revolution. In this context, the use of drones can offer new opportunities in manufacturing shop floors. However, the adoption of such technologies requires the development of integrated interfaces to solve interoperability issues between the different components of the global production system. This paper addresses the problem of interfacing through a conceptual interface model representing the exchanged data flows between drones and a given production system. It is instantiated on a real experimental 4.0 platform combing production modules and drones. This model aims to support communication between the related logical and software components. This work is a required step in order to later address the interoperability issues.

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Playing the Hand You're Dealt: How Moral Luck Is Different from Morally Significant Plain Luck (And Probably Doesn’t Exist)

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019

What you ought to do is sensitive to circumstances that are not under your control, or to luck. S... more What you ought to do is sensitive to circumstances that are not under your control, or to luck. So plain luck is often morally significant. Still, some of us think that there's no moral luck - that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are not sensitive to luck. What explains this asymmetry between the luck-sensitivity of ought-judgments and the luck-insensitivity of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness judgments? In this paper I suggest an explanation, relying heavily on the analogy between rational luck and moral luck. I argue that some rational assessments - like how well one plays the hand one's dealt - are luck-insensitive; that we have reason to believe some moral evaluations are closely analogous to such luck-insensitive rational assessments, and furthermore that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness judgments are probably precisely those luck-insensitive moral evaluations. I also draw an implication regarding agent-regret.

Impartiality and Realism: Reply to Mancuso

Topoi, 2017

In Chapter 2 of Taking Morality Seriously, I put forward an argument for morality's objectivi... more In Chapter 2 of Taking Morality Seriously, I put forward an argument for morality's objectivity that is based on the (purported) first-order implications of denying such objectivity. In her contribution to this volume, Mancuso criticizes that argument. This paper is a response to some of her main points.

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