Journal Articles by Jerome Drevon
Mediterranean Politics, 2025
Jihadis differentiate themselves from other Muslims by their demand for an Islamic state based on... more Jihadis differentiate themselves from other Muslims by their demand for an Islamic state based on their interpretation of Islamic law as well as their legitimization of violence against Muslim domestic regimes and, occasionally, Western countries for supporting them. Over the past decade, they have increasingly governed civilians with harsh governance featuring physical punishments and discriminatory measures against women and religious minorities. But this is not always the case. In Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former affiliate of Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra, took on a very different governing role in the northwest of the country. In contrast to other Jihadis, HTS has distanced itself from its Jihadi legacy after seizing power. As the group relocalised, it has established new structures of governance that are more technocratic than ideological though they feature religion too. This paper analyses HTS's policies, from its rejection of its Jihadi legacy to the group's understanding of Islamic law and interactions with local communities, including religious minorities. This article is based on extensive research conducted in northwest Syria, including numerous interviews with the HTS leadership, its supported government, other armed groups, and civil society organizations.
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2024
The role of ideology in civil wars is particularly contentious, especially when it comes to Jihad... more The role of ideology in civil wars is particularly contentious, especially when it comes to Jihadi insurgents. Ideology is one of these groups’ defining characteristic, which questions what happens when Jihadis’ ideological commitments contradicts their strategic interests. This article explores these tensions with a particular focus on the issue of foreign support for the Syrian insurgency after 2011. The article argues that ideology matters and has contributed to division and infighting between Syrian insurgents for most of the conflict. But this research also contends that armed groups – including Jihadis – can adapt their ideological positions in line with their strategic interests as long as they manage to implement such changes without jeopardizing their internal cohesion. This careful balance explains the operational strategies of numerous armed groups in competitive environments such as Syria’s. The article draws on extensive interviews with Syrian insurgents over the past few years, including leaders and commanders of Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra as it transformed into HTS.
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2022
The globalization of jihad has proceeded in several stages from the mobilization against the Sovi... more The globalization of jihad has proceeded in several stages from the mobilization against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s to Islamic State’s current campaign. The end of global jihad is nonetheless less understood, including the conditions in which jihadi groups could reject al-Qaeda (AQ) or Islamic State (IS). This article examines this question through the trajectory of a former AQ franchise, jabhat al-nusra (JaN), that became hay’at tahrir al-sham (HTS) in 2017. This article argues that global jihad is not absolute. Global jihad exists on a spectrum of four inter-connected dimensions that can be disaggregated. In Syria, JaN was only partially globalist when it emerged. JaN’s rejection of IS and AQ resulted from its opposition to their strategic objectives against the backdrop of the evolution of the Syrian conflict, which eroded JaN’s globalism and made it particularly costly. This article is based on extensive field research and interviews with HTS’s leadership in Idlib and other insurgents that have interacted with the group over the years.
Third World Thematics
Most research on jihadi groups examines their violent radicalisation.
Insurgents that politicise ... more Most research on jihadi groups examines their violent radicalisation.
Insurgents that politicise in civil wars and become more pragmatic
without renouncing violence are less understood. This article
defines jihadi groups’ politicisation as the development of realistic
tactical and strategic objectives, durable alliances with other actors
including foreign states and non-state armed groups, and normal
isation of their interactions with the population. This article argues
that politicisation is not merely the outcome of armed groups’
independent ideological revisions. Politicisation results from
a combination of several factors that restrain jihadi insurgents in
civil wars. In Syria, the empirical analysis of Ahrar al-Sham demon
strates that the group was restrained by (1) its decentralised orga
nisational structures and (2) interactions with other actors including
other insurgents, the population, and foreign states. This article is
based on extensive field research conducted in Syria and Turkey
with Syrian insurgents across the spectrum.
This article analyses the evolution of the jihadi social movement (JSM) in changing environmental... more This article analyses the evolution of the jihadi social movement (JSM) in changing environmental and factional circumstances. The author argues that internationalist groups like al-Qaida and Islamic State seek to become hegemonic in the JSM vis-à-vis nationally focused jihadis. Yet hegemony is associated with changing modes of organisation that can weaken centralised organisational control and exacerbate internal divisions. Moreover, the post-2011 expansion of Islamist local governance presents new expectations that jihadi groups set up local structures of governance, which can alter their internal dynamics and cannot endure as long as their allegiance to internationalist groups remains. This analysis illustrates the prospective choices of the components of the JSM after 2017.
This research analyses the comparative institutionalization of the strategies of three major comp... more This research analyses the comparative institutionalization of the strategies of three major components of the Egyptian Islamist social movement family: the jihadis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the salafis. It uses historical institutionalism to amend rational choice paradigms and to investigate the constraints and opportunities posed by these actors' past trajectories on their subsequent strategic choices. This article argues that 1981 and 2011 were two critical junctures that have shaped these actors' ideational and organizational construction through path-dependent causal mechanisms regulating their mobilization and socialization processes. It contends that these mechanisms have shaped these groups' evolution and mediated the institutionalization of their strategies.
This article investigates the adoption of Salafi jihadism by young Egyptians and its repercussion... more This article investigates the adoption of Salafi jihadism by young Egyptians and its repercussions on their mobilization in the Syrian jihad after 2011. This research demonstrates that Salafi jihadis mostly were raised in religious families and argues that the post-9/11 US-led wars triggered the exploration of an alternative to non-jihadi Salafism. This exploration was facilitated by: (1) the inability of mainstream Salafism to face the post-9/11 challenge; (2) the absence of local militant groups; (3) the availability of an alternative literature on the Internet; and (4) the shared religious creed of jihadi and mainstream Salafism. This research contends that online socialization created an internally diverse Salafi jihadi milieu that regulated these youths’ mobilization in the Syrian jihad after 2011.
Following the overthrow of Husni Mubarak, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya and members of Egyptian Islamic ... more Following the overthrow of Husni Mubarak, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya and members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad created two political parties. This article investigates these groups’ organizational dynamics and internal dialogues in order to
uncover the rationale of their political participation after the January 2011 uprising and its internal ideational legitimization. Based on interviews with leaders and members of these two groups and their political parties, this article argues that these formerly violent insurgent groups embraced nonviolent participation in democratic politics through an internal reassessment of the political opportunities afforded to them by Egypt’s brief political opening.
Democracy and Islamist Violence: Lessons from Post-Mubarak Egypt
Digest of Middle East Studies
This article explores the contentious relation between the absence of democracy in the Middle Eas... more This article explores the contentious relation between the absence of democracy in the Middle East and the use of armed violence by Islamist groups in light of the Arab Spring. Its main objective is to decipher the evolving positions of former and current groups who used or promoted violence and to relate them to broader academic debates on violence and democracy on the one hand, and deradicalization on the other. This research demonstrates that the large majority of former Islamist militants in Egypt reject any sort of violence in post-Mubarak Egypt, even if they have not all renounced their religious legitimization of violence in the past. Second, it reveals that even if they maintain a religious opposition to democracy in Egypt, the opening of political opportunities and their progressive joining of the political process has favorably led most of them to accept democratic practices in reality. Third, it adds that the voice of those currently promoting violence in Egypt has been marginalized and that their main alternative has been the promotion of armed violence in Syria; and last, it stresses two potential security threats unrelated to the opening of political opportunities in post-Mubarak Egypt and to the general debate on democracy and violence. First, local grievances in Sinai have led to violence in the past and are still to be dealt with. Second, the current political deadlock can potentially lead to localized and specific armed activities that could start a cycle of violence. This research is based on field research in Egypt and uses repeated interviews of leaders and members of the two main former militant groups, al-Jama῾ah al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) and Jama῾ al-Jihad (the Jihad Group) as well as interviews with militants of the salafi jihadi trend and their supporters in Cairo.
Book Chapters by Jerome Drevon
Edinburgh University Press, 2021
The Syrian Salafi armed group Ahrar al-Sham epitomises the most prominent case of politicisation.... more The Syrian Salafi armed group Ahrar al-Sham epitomises the most prominent case of politicisation. By 2014, Ahrar al-Sham was the leading insurgent group in Syria, with the largest number of soldiers, presence throughout Syrian opposition-held areas, and relatively strong ties with foreign countries including Turkey and Qatar. Ahrar al-Sham explicitly rejected al-Qaida’s legacy and developed a more inclusive approach to other groups and the population. This chapter traces the group’s emergence and development to demonstrate how pre-war developments and a de-centralised alliance-based expansion underpinned its politicisation over the years. This case study also contends that politicisation was sustained by the group’s internal institutionalisation, which ultimately explains its successes and failures during the conflict. This chapter is based on extensive field research interviews in Turkey and north-west Syria in 2019 with an array of leaders and members of Ahrar al-Sham, armed opposition groups, and independent Syrian Islamists.
Book chapter from "Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings", 2018
This chapter argues that the 2011 Egyptian uprising and the 2013 military coup have destabilised ... more This chapter argues that the 2011 Egyptian uprising and the 2013 military coup have destabilised the Egyptian Islamist SMF in contrasting ways. The liberalisation of the political process after 2011 stimulated the institutionalisation of loosely organised movements, challenged the organisational cohesion of established Islamist groups, and empowered Islamist constituencies through the development of new repertoires of contention. The subsequent removal of President Mohamed Morsi from the MB has marginalised established Islamist groups, challenged their organisational control over their constituencies, and impeded the development of political alternatives to armed violence.
This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of the Salafi radical milieu in Egypt. This... more This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of the Salafi radical milieu in Egypt. This is defined as the social structures composed of supporters and sympathisers of the militant groups, providing them with both logistic and moral support. This chapter establishes that the Egyptian Salafi radical milieu has been constructed in two successive phases. The first takes place between the 1970s and the 1990s. During this time, milieu-construction is better understood through meso-level study of its composite networks and organisations, since these had a virtual monopoly on the relational diffusion of frames and on micro-mobilisation. The second phase is set in the 2000s, with non-relational diffusion of radical frames through new means of communication fundamentally affecting the expansion of its milieu, and informing its development as internally more diverse and individualised. This came to subsequently shape the post-2011 developments. This study is based on eighteen months of intensive field research, undertaken in Cairo between 2011 and 2014. The research includes a prolonged political ethnography with diverse groups of Salafi jihadi supporters in Egypt, as well as semi-structured interviews with leaders and members of two former militant groups in Egypt: the Islamic Group and the Jihad Group, and of their political parties.
Op-eds and Short Articles by Jerome Drevon
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), 2020
In northwest Syria, HTS considers the consolidation of a technocratic government that preserves i... more In northwest Syria, HTS considers the consolidation of a technocratic government that preserves internal stability while fostering tacit Turkish and Western acceptance as key to its survival. Non-ideological governance is paradoxically the most appropriate choice for a group that stems from jihadi Salafism to emphasise its singularity, especially vis-à-vis AQ and IS. The trajectory of HTS seems to demonstrate that the insurgent-held province will not be a radical emirate or a safe haven that could serve as a launch pad for foreign attacks. The HTS-supported SSG has accordingly implemented an array of religious and security policies to maintain internal order and substantiate the group’s commitments internationally. While the longevity of the group and its supported government is contingent on regional developments, as recognised by HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani himself, such a trajectory could encourage other jihadi insurgents to make similar choices. This research is based on multiple research trips undertaken in Idlib in 2019-2020. We have interviewed the political, religious, and military leaders of HTS, other groups, and an array of ministers that have served in successive iterations of the SSG.
Muhammad Omar Abd al-Rahman is the eldest son of Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman, the blind shaykh who ... more Muhammad Omar Abd al-Rahman is the eldest son of Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman, the blind shaykh who led the Egyptian former militant Group al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) before his arrest in 1993 in the United States. Muhammad spent most of his life outside of Egypt and shared the journey of many figures of contemporary Islamic militancy. He joined the Afghan jihad in 1988 before moving to Sudan in 1992 and returning to Afghanistan in 1996. Until 2001, he lived in Afghanistan with members of the Islamic Group and al-Qaeda. In 2001, he survived the U.S. invasion before his arrest in Pakistan in 2003. Eventually, Muhammad was subjected to the American rendition program and sent to jail in Egypt. He was finally released in 2010, a few months before the Egyptian revolution. He discusses his background here with Jérôme Drevon, PhD Candidate at Durham University.
A Return of Violent Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?
How Syria’s War Is Dividing the Egyptian Jihadi Movement
Book Reviews by Jerome Drevon
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2024
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New Middle Eastern Studies
Thesis by Jerome Drevon
This research theorises militant groups' meso-level evolution from their emergence to their poten... more This research theorises militant groups' meso-level evolution from their emergence to their potential non-violent transformation. The central argument of this thesis is that the timing of militant groups' adoption of violence in semi-authoritarian regimes is crucial in accounting for their subsequent ideational and organisational evolution, according to a path-dependent model. When a militant group predates its legitimisation of armed violence, the time period preceding the latter encourages low-risk activism mobilising patterns, which are defined as safer modes of mobilisation that are not directly opposed by the state and therefore do not entail high individual costs. These mobilising patterns facilitate the creation of strong horizontal ties between the group's leaders and the development of collective group identity shared by its leaders and members. These three factors collectively ease the internal legitimisation of shared horizontal and vertical organisational norms, which respectively refer to the norms uniting the leaders of the group and the norms uniting the leaders to their followers. Theses norms include the normalisation of the prerogatives of the group's leadership, an internal culture of consensus and shared decision making processes. These factors subsequently shape the group's evolution, whose possible non-violent transformation becomes contingent on the ability of its leadership to exploit external macro stimuli or internal learning processes, and to draw on the group's collective identity to internally legitimise a new strategic direction. Conversely, the second type of militant group is defined by its members' immediate engagement in high-risk activism forms of mobilisation, defined by their high individual cost caused by their intrinsically violent nature (e.g. staging a military coup). The combination of early ideational justifications of violence and its associated mobilising patterns fuel internal factionalism and hinder the legitimisation of internal norms of decision making and the consolidation of a controlled collective group identity. This mobilising pattern often sparks splits over any new tactical and strategic issues which may arise overtime, and eventually impedes the successful consensual transformation of this type of group in changing macro circumstances. This theorisation of militant groups' evolution is applied to the Egyptian Islamic and Jihad Groups. This thesis is based on a social movement theory framework. It is a qualitative small-n comparative case-study research using field research and interviews with numerous leaders and members of these two groups.
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Journal Articles by Jerome Drevon
Insurgents that politicise in civil wars and become more pragmatic
without renouncing violence are less understood. This article
defines jihadi groups’ politicisation as the development of realistic
tactical and strategic objectives, durable alliances with other actors
including foreign states and non-state armed groups, and normal
isation of their interactions with the population. This article argues
that politicisation is not merely the outcome of armed groups’
independent ideological revisions. Politicisation results from
a combination of several factors that restrain jihadi insurgents in
civil wars. In Syria, the empirical analysis of Ahrar al-Sham demon
strates that the group was restrained by (1) its decentralised orga
nisational structures and (2) interactions with other actors including
other insurgents, the population, and foreign states. This article is
based on extensive field research conducted in Syria and Turkey
with Syrian insurgents across the spectrum.
uncover the rationale of their political participation after the January 2011 uprising and its internal ideational legitimization. Based on interviews with leaders and members of these two groups and their political parties, this article argues that these formerly violent insurgent groups embraced nonviolent participation in democratic politics through an internal reassessment of the political opportunities afforded to them by Egypt’s brief political opening.
Book Chapters by Jerome Drevon
Op-eds and Short Articles by Jerome Drevon
Book Reviews by Jerome Drevon
Thesis by Jerome Drevon