Haider A Khan

Georgia Institute of Technology, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Graduate Student

Bangladesh University of Engineering & Technology, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Alumnus

Politecnico di Torino, Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Alumnus

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, Alumnus

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I am a PhD student in Electrical and Computer Engineering in Georgia Institute of Technology, advised by Professor Alenka Zajic. Currently I am working on extracting useful information from unintentional electromagnetic emanation by computing devices such as IoT devices, mobile devices etc. for intrusion detection and identifying potential breach of security. My research interest includes machine learning, digital signal processing, computer vision and image processing.

I graduated from Bangladesh University of Engineering & Technology on Electrical and Electronic Engineering, and completed Erasmus Mundus Master of Science in Research on Information and Communication Technologies (MERIT) from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany. I also worked at Fraunhofer Institute for Medical Image Computing (MEVIS), Germany, as a student researcher, and GrameenPhone Bangladesh as Deputy Superintendent Engineer.
Supervisors: Alenka Zajic

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Emma

Establishing trust for an execution environment is an important problem, and practical solutions ... more Establishing trust for an execution environment is an important problem, and practical solutions for it rely on attestation, where an untrusted system (prover) computes a response to a challenge sent by the trusted system (verifier). The response typically is a checksum of the prover's program, which the verifier checks against expected values for a "clean" (trustworthy) system. The main challenge in attestation is that, in addition to checking the response, the verifier also needs to verify the integrity of the response computation. On higher-end processors, this integrity is verified cryptographically, using dedicated trusted hardware. On embedded systems, however, constraints prevent the use of such hardware support. Instead, a popular approach is to use the request-to-response time as a way to establish confidence. However, the overall requestto-response time provides only one coarse-grained measurement from which the integrity of the attestation is to be inferred, and even that is noisy because it includes the network latency and/or variations due to micro-architectural events. Thus, the attestation is vulnerable to attacks where the adversary has tampered with response computation, but the resulting additional computation time is small relative to the overall request-to-response time. In this paper, we make a key observation that execution-time measurement is only one example of using externally measurable side-channel information, and that other side-channels, some of which can provide much finer-grain information about the computation, can be used. As a proof of concept, we propose EMMA, a novel method for attestation that leverages electromagnetic side-channel signals that are emanated by the system during response computation, to confirm that the device has, upon receiving the challenge, actually computed the response using the valid program code for that computation. This new approach requires physical proximity, but imposes no overhead to the system, and provides accurate monitoring during the attestation. We implement EMMA on a popular embedded system, Arduino UNO, and evaluate our system with a wide range of attacks on attestation integrity. Our results show that EMMA can successfully detect these attacks with high accuracy. We compare our method with the existing methods and show how EMMA outperforms them in terms of security guarantees, scalability, and robustness.

Haider A Khan

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