Papers by Mathew McCubbins
Rich (henceforth S&R) provide a valuable review of attempts to change selected rules of the U.S. ... more Rich (henceforth S&R) provide a valuable review of attempts to change selected rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, interpreting their findings against the backdrop of two theoretical approaches--one that emphasizes the role of the majority party in structuring House decisions 1994), one that emphasizes the importance of cross-party alliances, hence of the House as a whole, in setting the structure of decision-making. 1 They view their findings as partly supporting the partisan model but stress that "changes in House rules are likely to occur when the balance of forces on the floor changes, even if the majority party caucus median remains unchanged" (p. 2). In this response we indicate how we differ both in our understanding of the partisan model and (relatedly) in our interpretation of the evidence.
Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003328 5 _____ Agenda Power in th... more Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003328 5 _____ Agenda Power in the US House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986 GARY W. COX AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS 1 Introduction ...
The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process
... The logic of delegation: Congressional parties and the appropriations process / D. Roderick K... more ... The logic of delegation: Congressional parties and the appropriations process / D. Roderick Kiewiet ... There are always contingencies foreseen and unforeseen, both unanticipated disas-ters and fortuitous ... According to Fisher (1985), however, the nature of the delegation it-self ...
Changing Tracks? The Prospect for California Pension Reform
California Journal of Politics and Policy, 2010
All Centrality is Local: The Importance of Understanding Actors' Information for Network-Analysis
... Enemark, Daniel, Mathew McCubbins, Mohan Paturi, and Nicholas Weller. 2010. ―Good Edge, Bad E... more ... Enemark, Daniel, Mathew McCubbins, Mohan Paturi, and Nicholas Weller. 2010. ―Good Edge, Bad Edge: How Network Structure Affects a Group's Ability to Coordinate.‖ Working paper presented at the Harvard Networks in Political Science Conference. ...
Game theoretic predictions about equilibrium behavior depend upon assumptions of inflexibility of... more Game theoretic predictions about equilibrium behavior depend upon assumptions of inflexibility of belief, of accord between belief and choice, and of choice across situations that share a game-theoretic structure. However, researchers rarely possess any knowledge of the actual beliefs of subjects, and rarely compare how a subject behaves in settings that share game-theoretic structure but that differ in other respects. Our within-subject experiments utilize a belief elicitation mechanism, roughly similar to a prediction market, in a laboratory setting to identify subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices and beliefs. These experiments additionally allow us to compare choices in different settings that have similar game-theoretic structure. We find first, as have others, that subjects’ choices in the Trust and related games are significantly different from the strategies that derive from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium principles. We show that, for individual subjects, there i...
Classical rationality as accepted by game theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment h... more Classical rationality as accepted by game theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment has consistent preferences and beliefs and that actions result consistently from those preferences and beliefs, and moreover that these preferences, beliefs, and actions remain the same across equal choice moments. Since, as is widely found in prior experiments, subjects do not follow the predictions of classical rationality, behavioral game theorists have assumed consistent deviations from classical rationality by assigning to subjects certain dispositions — risk preference, cognitive abilities, social norms, etc. All of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, making claims about how individual human minds work when choosing. All of them are fundamentally wrong in assuming one kind of consistency or another. Or at least, all of the proposals for consistency in belief, preference, and action with which we are aware turn out to be wrong when tested experimentally
A game-theoretic model of the appropriations process
Congressional Oversight Over-looked: Police Patrol versus Fire Alarms
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms* Mathew D. McCubbins, Thoma... more Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms* Mathew D. McCubbins, Thomas Schwartz, University of Texas at Austin Scholars have often remarked that Congress neglects its oversight responsibility. We argue that Congress does no such ...
When Does the Ballot Box Limit the Budget? Politics and Spending Limits in California, Colorado, Utah, and Washington
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy, 2008
... Mathew D. McCubbins is the Chancellor's Associates Chair and Distinguished Professor of ... more ... Mathew D. McCubbins is the Chancellor's Associates Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Thad Kousser is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, and Kaj Rozga is a ... existing literature (Howard, 1989; Cox and Lowery, 1990; Stansel, 1994; Rueben, 1995; ...
For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending? For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?
... Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego Mathew D. McCubbins, University of Californ... more ... Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego Mathew D. McCubbins, University of California, San Diego Ellen Moule, University of ... For example, Cox and Lowery (1990), updated in King-Meadows and Lowery (1996), conduct regression analysis individually on three TEL ...
Presidents, parliaments, and policy
... 2. Comparative government. 3. Economic policy. I. Haggard, Stephan. II. McCubbins, MathewD.(M... more ... 2. Comparative government. 3. Economic policy. I. Haggard, Stephan. II. McCubbins, MathewD.(Mathew Daniel) 1956-III. Series. JF255. P75 2000 330.9dc21 00-029247 1sbn o 521 77304 o hardback 1sbn o 521 77485 3 paperback Page 9. ...
Elements of Reason: Cognition
The "Rule of Law" is a venerable concept, but, on closer inspection, it is a complex admixture of... more The "Rule of Law" is a venerable concept, but, on closer inspection, it is a complex admixture of positive assumptions, inchoate political and legal theory, and occasionally wishful thinking. Although enormous investments have been made in rule of law reformism throughout the world, advocates of transplanting American-style legal and political institutions to developed and developing countries are often unclear about what they are transplanting and why they are doing so. The concept of rule of law has become unplugged from theories of law. Scholars clearly have more work to do in understanding the rule of law and designing institutions to realize the objectives for which this grand project is intended.
Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in theHouse. Berkeley
Coordination is a core concern in social science. Problems as diverse as trying to decide where t... more Coordination is a core concern in social science. Problems as diverse as trying to decide where to go to dinner, what political candidate to support or which regulatory policy to adopt all contain coordination as a core element. Most coordination problems arise among actors connected in a network, and these connections can both improve and impede a group's ability to achieve coordination. To model how links influence coordination we distinguish between "constraining edges" that make coordination harder by reducing the number of equilibrium outcomes, and "redundant edges" that make coordination easier by merely increasing communication without affecting the number of equilibria. We show experimentally that the addition of constraining edges reduces coordination, while redundant edges improve subjects' ability to solve a coordination problem.
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Papers by Mathew McCubbins