Papers by Will Hornett
Philosophical Explorations, 2024
Deflationists about negative actions say that omissions and refrainments do not exist; Neo-Davids... more Deflationists about negative actions say that omissions and refrainments do not exist; Neo-Davidsonians say that they do. In this paper, I defend Deflationism against Payton's (2021) claim that it fails to account for the purported fact that negative actions are perceptible, and that Neo-Davidsonianism is preferable because it succeeds in doing so. I argue that, insofar we are engaging in arguments from perception, they actually tell against Neo-Davidsonianism.
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
When I fiddle with my hair, or adjust my posture, it is plausible that these activities fall well... more When I fiddle with my hair, or adjust my posture, it is plausible that these activities fall well below my cognitive radar. Some have argued that these are examples of 'subintentional actions', actions which are not intentional under any description at all. If true, they are direct counterexamples to the dominant view on which the difference between actions and other events is their intentionality. In this paper, I argue that the case for subintentional actions fails. Firstly, I show that the main argument for the sub-intentionality of these actions has a structural fault. Secondly, I argue that two apparently natural ways to remedy this fail. Thirdly, I argue that one of the main arguments for thinking of the phenomena as actions undermines thinking of them as sub-intentional. Finally, I argue that a natural defensive move for the defender of sub-intentional actions actually undermines the theoretical significance of the view. Ultimately, my aim is to show that although the case for sub-intentional actions seemed both simple and compelling, it is in fact deeply troubled.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
Habits figure in action-explanations because of their distinctive force. But what is the force of... more Habits figure in action-explanations because of their distinctive force. But what is the force of habit, and how does it motivate us? In this paper, I argue that the force of habit is the feeling of familiarity one has with the familiar course of action, where this feeling reveals a distinctive reason for acting in the usual way. I do this by considering and rejecting a popular account of habit's force in terms of habit's apparent automaticity, by arguing that one can do something out of habit and from deliberation, before going on to defend The Familiarity View.
[This is the pre-print. Please only cite the published version which can be found here: https://w... more [This is the pre-print. Please only cite the published version which can be found here: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315186436-22/habit-formation-perspective-hornett]
Some of the most famous and influential parts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2012) 1 are the passages in which he discusses habit. In them, he makes two related claims: 1) Forming a habit constitutively involves a change in the habit-bearer's perspective; 2) There are two perspectival changes constitutive of habit-formation: (a) new opportunities for action are both made available to, and salient for, the habit-bearer; (b) the items the habit-bearer is habituated to using become incorporated into their body schema.
Synthese, 2021
In this paper, I defend a new theory of the nature and individuation of perceptual capacities. I ... more In this paper, I defend a new theory of the nature and individuation of perceptual capacities. I argue that we need a theory of perceptual capacities to explain modal facts about what sorts of perceptual phenomenal states one can be in. I defend my view by arguing for three adequacy constraints on a theory of perceptual capacities: perceptual capacities must be individuated at least partly in terms of their place in a hierarchy of capacities, where these capacities include the senses themselves; an adequate account of perceptual capacities must be sensitive to empirical considerations; and an adequate account should accommodate the nature of the capacity to perceive. I arrive at these constraints by considering how Schellenberg's view fails, before defending and developing my alternative in line with the constraints. I defend a view on which there are few, coarse-grained perceptual capacities which can fulfil complex explanatory roles because they are evaluatively gradable on many axes. Finally, on my view, perceptual capacities bear a particularly close relation to the sensory modalities themselves.
Book Reviews by Will Hornett
The Philosophical Quarterlu, 2022
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Papers by Will Hornett
Some of the most famous and influential parts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2012) 1 are the passages in which he discusses habit. In them, he makes two related claims: 1) Forming a habit constitutively involves a change in the habit-bearer's perspective; 2) There are two perspectival changes constitutive of habit-formation: (a) new opportunities for action are both made available to, and salient for, the habit-bearer; (b) the items the habit-bearer is habituated to using become incorporated into their body schema.
Book Reviews by Will Hornett