Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Volume 122, Issue 2, November 2013, Pages 266-279
When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence
Introduction
In a wide variety of domains, individuals believe they are better than others, even when they are not (for reviews, see Alicke & Govorun, 2005 and Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). Yet research has documented numerous costs of this overconfidence. For example, falsely believing one is more capable than others leads entrepreneurs to risk too much in new ventures (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999), CEOs to engage in too many acquisitions of other firms (Malmendier & Tate, 2005), and nations to initiate too many military confrontations (Johnson, 2004).
Why is overconfidence so common if it incurs such high costs? Anderson et al. (2012) recently found that overconfident individuals attain higher social status, or respect and influence, in groups. Their findings lent support to a status-enhancement theory of overconfidence, which posits that overconfidence pervades human self-judgment because it helps individuals attain higher social status. That is, overconfidence is rewarded with higher status; the prospect of higher status can encourage displays of confidence.
However, an important limitation of those initial findings is that they were observed primarily in contexts where overconfident individuals had little chance of being discovered by others—namely, in short-lived laboratory interactions in which people were unlikely to detect each other’s actual abilities. This limitation is important because in many real-world contexts, including many organizations, people can ascertain each other’s actual levels of ability, and hence, learn when others are overconfident. For example, salespeople often learn of each other’s quarterly performance, allowing them to compare each other’s level of confidence to actual performance.
What happens to individuals if others recognize their overconfidence? If people punish the overconfident (Paulhus, 1998), overconfidence entails risks. For example, arrogant group members might be demoted in the status hierarchy. Accordingly, the status-related costs incurred after being exposed as overconfident might negate the status benefits those individuals initially enjoyed. Such a finding would undercut a status-enhancement explanation for overconfidence.
The current research thus focused on this key question: how do groups respond to overconfident members when those members’ actual task abilities are revealed? We tested whether overconfidence incurs status penalties once it is revealed to others, and if so, whether those penalties outweigh the initial status benefits of being overconfident. We conducted three studies that examined overconfidence both naturalistically in task groups and through experimental manipulation. We used self-ratings of competence to measure confidence and objective indices of actual performance to measure ability; we then examined their effects on group-, peer-, and observer-derived measures of status.
Overconfidence is the possession of inaccurate, overly positive perceptions of one’s abilities or knowledge (for a review, see Moore & Healy, 2008). Overconfidence is measured by comparing individuals’ self-perceptions of ability to objective, operational criteria such as actual task performance and test scores (e.g., Krueger and Mueller, 2002, Kruger and Dunning, 1999, Larrick et al., 2007). Individuals are overconfident when they believe they are better than objective measures indicate.
Scholars have long documented the many costs of overconfidence. For example, overconfident people fail to recognize their limitations and set unrealistic goals (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003), engage in contests they are likely to lose (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999), and select negotiation strategies that promote failure (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). The persistence of overconfidence is therefore puzzling because being able to accurately place one’s abilities relative to those of others is clearly useful (e.g., Alicke, 1985, Dunning et al., 2004, Larrick et al., 2007).
To help explain the puzzling pervasiveness of overconfidence, Anderson et al. (2012) proposed that higher confidence helps individuals attain higher social status. Status is respect, prominence, and influence accorded to individuals by their social groups (Anderson et al., 2001, Bales et al., 1951, Berger et al., 1972). Higher social status comes with a host of benefits including control over group decisions and access to scarce resources (Berger et al., 1972, Blau, 1964). Accordingly, the desire for high status is a fundamental and powerful motive (Maslow, 1943, Tay and Diener, 2011).
According to Anderson et al. (2012), when individuals are more confident in their abilities, others also perceive them as more competent (also see Bass, 2008, De Cremer and van Knippenberg, 2004, Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001, Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). Confidence is compelling to observers because, in the absence of information to the contrary, observers assume it reflects superior ability (Tenney and Spellman, 2010, Tenney et al., 2008).
In turn, once individuals are perceived to possess greater competence, they are likely to be afforded higher status. A primary and consistent predictor of status in groups is perceived competence (e.g., Berger et al., 1972, Driskell and Mullen, 1990, Lord et al., 1986). In general, groups confer higher status on individuals who exhibit abilities that help the group succeed (Berger et al., 1972, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989, Emerson, 1962, Goldhamer and Shils, 1939). Because competent individuals can provide important contributions to the group’s success, they tend to be given higher status.
It is important to note that being perceived to possess these valued characteristics is the key to attaining higher status; it is not necessary to actually possess these characteristics (Berger et al., 1972). For example, much research has documented that groups often mistakenly perceive individuals with certain demographic characteristics to be more competent and, as a result, groups accord those individuals higher status, even when they are actually no more competent than others (Berger et al., 1972). Perceptions of valued characteristics, not actual possession of these characteristics, drive status conferral.
A critical tenet of the status-enhancement theory is that higher confidence will lead to higher status, regardless of the individual’s actual ability. Observers often cannot distinguish between justifiably confident and unjustifiably confident (i.e., overconfident) individuals because both exhibit similar behaviors while their actual levels of task ability are hidden within them (Anderson and Kilduff, 2009, Anderson et al., 2012, Campbell et al., 2004, McNulty and Swann, 1994, Swann, 2005). Justified confidence and overconfidence thus often appear indistinguishable to observers in the absence of objective data regarding task performance. Accordingly, even unjustified confidence can help individuals attain higher status.
In support of these arguments, Anderson et al. (2012) found that confident individuals were perceived as more competent by others and attained higher status. Moreover, this effect emerged even when individuals’ confidence was not justified by actual ability – that is, even when those individuals were in fact no more competent than others.
An important limitation of the aforementioned Anderson et al. (2012) findings is that they were set in contexts in which overconfident individuals had little chance of being discovered as overconfident. In groups that worked together for short periods of time and in which individuals’ actual abilities were never revealed, unwarranted confidence (i.e., overconfidence) is likely to yield only status benefits for the individual because others have little reason to question the person’s high level of confidence. When overconfidence is unlikely to be discovered, the risk of social punishment is small.
In reality, however, groups sometimes learn about members’ actual characteristics and abilities as they work together. For example, group members more accurately discern each other’s competence, personalities, and attitudes as they work together over time (Harrison et al., 2002, Kenny, 1991, Littlepage et al., 1997, Paulhus and Bruce, 1992, Peltokorpi, 2008). In these contexts, it is possible that overconfident individuals will be discovered as being overconfident. Accordingly, those individuals might be penalized for their perceived hubris (Paulhus, 1998, Tenney and Spellman, 2010, Tenney et al., 2008).
But are individuals punished when others learn of their overconfidence? In the following sections we describe the arguments for and against the idea that groups penalize overconfident individuals once they detect the individuals’ actual levels of task performance.
Functionalist theories of status suggest that groups would penalize confident individuals with lower status if they were to discover that the individuals’ confidence is unwarranted. Groups accord lower social status to individuals who hinder the group’s success (e.g., Blau, 1964, Ridgeway and Diekema, 1989). Groups might thus penalize overconfident individuals because overconfidence jeopardizes task performance (Barber and Odean, 2000, Klein and Kunda, 1994, Metcalfe, 1998, Paese and Kinnaly, 1993, Vancouver et al., 2002).
Moreover, groups might view individuals with unwarranted confidence as more selfish and less committed to the group’s success, and thereby accord them lower status (Willer, 2009). In laboratory experiments, groups ostracized individuals who claimed more status than the group believed them to deserve and paid them less for their work (Anderson et al., 2008, Anderson et al., 2006). Taken together, these findings suggest groups might penalize overconfident members with lower status. In other words, groups might accord overconfident individuals a lower level of status than that accorded to others with the same level of competence but more accurate self-perceptions of ability.
The above arguments notwithstanding, we propose that groups will not penalize overconfident individuals, even after discovering that those individuals’ confidence is unwarranted. Indirect evidence cited below suggests that high levels of confidence might create positive peer-perceptions that remain even after actual task performance is revealed to others.
These resilient positive peer-perceptions may take two forms. First, confident individuals might appear more socially skilled to others, even when their confidence is unwarranted by actual task abilities. Groups accord higher status to those with perceived social skills (Bass, 2008, Lord et al., 1986, Stogdill, 1948). Social skills contribute to a group by helping to coordinate other members’ activities, solve conflicts, and motivate others while maintaining cohesion within the group (Bass, 2008, Fragale, 2006, Mann, 1959, Van Vugt, 2006). Individuals who are confident may appear socially skilled by acting more engaged, speaking more often, and participating actively. Communication is a key aspect of social skill (Hall, 1979, Riggio, 1986) and individuals who communicate more are often seen as more skilled (Breland and Jones, 1984, Littlepage and Mueller, 1997, Littlepage et al., 1995). Consequently, these individuals receive attributions of greater leadership ability (Mullen et al., 1989, Sorrentino and Boutillier, 1975, Sorrentino and Field, 1986).
In addition to increasing quantity of communication, confidence may also reduce anxiety about participating in the task. This may result in more fluid, clear, concise speech and smoother social interactions. Past studies have found that lower anxiety relates to higher performance on a variety of tasks, from academic tests to interpersonal interactions (Brooks and Schweitzer, 2001, Glass et al., 1982, Littlepage et al., 1991, Osborne, 2001, Plaks and Stecher, 2007, Steele, 1997). With less anxiety, confident individuals, even when their confidence is unjustified by actual task ability, may be more articulate and attentive to others. The combination of more frequent participation and more fluid social interaction may lead to impressions that confident individuals possess superior social skill.
Second, high levels of confidence might create positive perceptions of task ability that persist even in the face of contradicting evidence. First impressions exert lasting influence on interpersonal judgments (Benassi, 1982, Jones et al., 1968, McAndrew, 1981, Mussweiler, 2003, Steiner and Rain, 1989, Zenker et al., 1982). Impressions of task ability might not completely adjust to account for the objective feedback provided. Therefore, even when objective information on task performance contradicts initial impressions, group members may perceive confident individuals to possess higher task ability.
If confidence creates persistent peer impressions of social skill or task ability, groups may not penalize confident individuals with lower status, even after discovering these individuals’ confidence is unjustified by their actual task skills. Instead, upon discovering that individuals are overconfident in their task abilities, groups might simply accord those individuals the status they appear to deserve based on their true task performance or perceived social skills.
Central to the current research is whether the status benefits of overconfidence outweigh the potential status costs if one’s overconfidence is revealed to others. If so, this helps further support the status enhancement account of overconfidence. One way to test whether the status benefits outweigh the costs is to examine whether overconfidence yields a “net” positive status outcome for the individual on average. To illustrate in a simplistic way, if being overconfident led an individual to gain an “extra” 3 status points when her overconfidence was unknown to others, but to then lose 5 status points when her actual task performance was revealed, overconfidence could be considered to have a negative net value. Averaging across the two situations, overconfidence would have a net status value of -1. However, if being overconfident led an individual to gain 3 status points when it went undetected, but to then lose only 1 status point when his actual task performance was revealed, overconfidence could be considered to have a net status value of +1 (i.e., a positive net value). We assessed net status outcomes in the current studies and predicted that confidence would yield net status benefits, even when the confidence was unjustified by actual ability.
Section snippets
Overview
The design of Study 1 built upon previous research (e.g., Anderson et al., 2012; Bass, 2009; Berger et al., 1972, Ridgeway, 1987). Participants first worked individually in groups on a judgment task. We assessed participants’ actual task performance and confidence in their task abilities based on their individual work. We then assessed their status and peer-perceptions from their work in the group. We will refer to this phase of the study procedure, which mirrored previous study designs, as
Study 2
We had three primary aims in Study 2. First, we made it easier for participants to identify overconfidence in others. The design of Study 1 sought to mimic the temporal processes of some real-world groups: Phase 1 mimicked the initial stages of group interaction when objective performance data are lacking, and Phase 2 mimicked contexts in which group members might, over time, obtain objective information about each other’s actual levels of task performance. While this approach might resemble
Study 3
Study 3 extended knowledge from the previous studies in two primary ways. First, Studies 1 and 2 examined the status implications of naturally occurring overconfidence, thus precluding strong inferences of causality. Although Study 2 used a quasi-experimental design in assigning participants to different conditions, the targets they viewed on videotape were naturally overconfident, accurate self-perceivers, or underconfident. Study 3 thus manipulated confidence and actual ability with the goal
Summary of findings
Across three studies, we consistently found that overconfidence had a net positive effect on a person’s social status. Individuals who displayed confidence were afforded higher status when others were unaware that the confidence was unjustified by actual task ability. Even after groups gained clear, objective information about individuals’ actual task performance, they did not penalize overconfident individuals with lower status—that is, overconfidence did not lead to lower status in the group.
Conclusions
These results suggest that overconfidence confers higher social status. When individuals’ actual task performance was unknown to others, overconfident individuals were accorded higher social status. Moreover, even when groups received clear, objective data about true task performance, overconfident individuals did not suffer lower status and were in fact still viewed positively. Thus, on net, overconfidence led to status benefits. Our results are consistent with the status-enhancement account
Acknowledgments
This research was supported in part by research grants from the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley. We are grateful for this financial support as well as for the research assistance of Anjali Joy, Arianna Benedetti, Caitlin Cuan, Dane Johnston, Holly Singer, Irene Chen, Linda Li, and Sharon Holmes, and for the help of our actors, Benjamin Calabrese and Rebecca Whitney.
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