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The information presented in Table 5.1 reveals that there is a general lack of knowledge about the technologies that are being used by the state to abridge digital rights and by non-state actors to protect these rights. It als reveals that the government is far ahead of the country’s civil society in the deployment of technologies. As a result, civil society actors most likely lack the technological capacity to put government activities under watch. To measure up, CSOs will need to upgrade their technologies as well. They wil pe more effective in protecting the digital rights of Nigerians if they have superior technologies that can detect government surveillance and protec themselves and others from it. CSOs and individual Nigerians utilise a wide range of off-the-shelf applications for gathering data. CSOs at times do develop and customise data-mining software to address their specific needs. Nevertheless, an obvious gap exists in their ability to resoond to a case of internet shutdow should it happen in Nigeria. Nigerian digital actors depend mostly on consultation and formal requests, hashtag trending, online protests and petitions, and legal procedures to hold the government accountable. Witt the Covid-19 lockdown measures fully implemented in Abuja, the country’s capital, where the headquarters of government ministries, departments, and agencies are located, traditional access to government information became constrained. Only digital access remained open.

Table 5 The information presented in Table 5.1 reveals that there is a general lack of knowledge about the technologies that are being used by the state to abridge digital rights and by non-state actors to protect these rights. It als reveals that the government is far ahead of the country’s civil society in the deployment of technologies. As a result, civil society actors most likely lack the technological capacity to put government activities under watch. To measure up, CSOs will need to upgrade their technologies as well. They wil pe more effective in protecting the digital rights of Nigerians if they have superior technologies that can detect government surveillance and protec themselves and others from it. CSOs and individual Nigerians utilise a wide range of off-the-shelf applications for gathering data. CSOs at times do develop and customise data-mining software to address their specific needs. Nevertheless, an obvious gap exists in their ability to resoond to a case of internet shutdow should it happen in Nigeria. Nigerian digital actors depend mostly on consultation and formal requests, hashtag trending, online protests and petitions, and legal procedures to hold the government accountable. Witt the Covid-19 lockdown measures fully implemented in Abuja, the country’s capital, where the headquarters of government ministries, departments, and agencies are located, traditional access to government information became constrained. Only digital access remained open.

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Digital openings of civic space — 65 examples presented in 10 categories Note: IMSI = International mobile subscriber identity; VPN = virtual private network
Digital openings of civic space — 65 examples presented in 10 categories Note: IMSI = International mobile subscriber identity; VPN = virtual private network
Source: Adapted from Internet World Stats“ Figure 4.1 Growth in internet access
Source: Adapted from Internet World Stats“ Figure 4.1 Growth in internet access
Digital closings of civic space — 115 examples presented in 12 categories
Digital closings of civic space — 115 examples presented in 12 categories
Table 4.4 Openings and responses
Table 4.4 Openings and responses
Table 4.5 Recommendations Country key: CM = Cameroon; EG = Egypt; ET = Ethiopia; KE = Kenya; NG = Nigeria; SA = South Africa; SD = Sudan; UG = Uganda; ZM = Zambia; ZW = Zimbabwe
Table 4.5 Recommendations Country key: CM = Cameroon; EG = Egypt; ET = Ethiopia; KE = Kenya; NG = Nigeria; SA = South Africa; SD = Sudan; UG = Uganda; ZM = Zambia; ZW = Zimbabwe
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000-19
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000-19
Table 4.1 Technology crackdown
Table 4.1 Technology crackdown
Note: ADRN — African Digital Rights Network. Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000-19'
Note: ADRN — African Digital Rights Network. Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000-19'
Source: Based on data from Freedom House (2020) Figure 5.1 Sudan's Freedom on the Net Index score, 2013-19
Source: Based on data from Freedom House (2020) Figure 5.1 Sudan's Freedom on the Net Index score, 2013-19
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000-197
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000-197
Unlike other African countries, South A designed to deregister or cut funding has been an upward trend in restrictio Smidt 2018). Although freedom of exp protected in the South African Constit rights is often limited by restrictive and frica has not experienced laws to civil society registration, but there ns and various forms of harassment ression and peaceful assembly are ution, the ability to exercise these violent measures by the state to curt peaceful demonstrations (CIVICUS 2016).
Unlike other African countries, South A designed to deregister or cut funding has been an upward trend in restrictio Smidt 2018). Although freedom of exp protected in the South African Constit rights is often limited by restrictive and frica has not experienced laws to civil society registration, but there ns and various forms of harassment ression and peaceful assembly are ution, the ability to exercise these violent measures by the state to curt peaceful demonstrations (CIVICUS 2016).
Table 4.2 Mobile (GSM) internet subscribers
Table 4.2 Mobile (GSM) internet subscribers
The number of internet users in Nigeria as presented by ITU is far lower than O@ re based on te ractice in Nige subscribers. ITU and thus give a ommission (NC ven by the country’s communications body, the C -— see Table 4.2). This is understandable because NCC data ecommu ria -— and data are more realistic picture of internet pe shown in Figure 4.1, individ of the population in 2000, to 11.5 per cent in 2010, and to 42 per cent in 2019 Therefore, although approximately 60 per cent of nications services subscri neither do they account modelled based on indivi ual internet users in Nigeri igerian Communications bers. As a result, the data a do not exclude cases of multiple subscriptions by individuals — a common p for business and corporate duals using the internet netration in the country. As a rose from 0.064 per cent igerians remained without internet access in 2019, one could say that it has been a near-steady climb. Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with internet access in Nigeria
The number of internet users in Nigeria as presented by ITU is far lower than O@ re based on te ractice in Nige subscribers. ITU and thus give a ommission (NC ven by the country’s communications body, the C -— see Table 4.2). This is understandable because NCC data ecommu ria -— and data are more realistic picture of internet pe shown in Figure 4.1, individ of the population in 2000, to 11.5 per cent in 2010, and to 42 per cent in 2019 Therefore, although approximately 60 per cent of nications services subscri neither do they account modelled based on indivi ual internet users in Nigeri igerian Communications bers. As a result, the data a do not exclude cases of multiple subscriptions by individuals — a common p for business and corporate duals using the internet netration in the country. As a rose from 0.064 per cent igerians remained without internet access in 2019, one could say that it has been a near-steady climb. Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with internet access in Nigeria
Table 4.4 Key digital hashtag campaigns and actors Individuals and groups in Nigeria have come to depend on social media for public engagement. The development is not out of place as Nigerian political leaders have also become largely visible on the various social media platforms. Facebook, with a 5957 per cent penetration of the country’s total internet users, ranks first among the social media platforms that Nigerians use for public discourse. It is followed by Twitter with a 24.54 per cent penetration ¢ internet users (GlobalStats 2020). Both Facebook and Twitter have contribute: significantly to the opening of online civic spaces in Nigeria. Users have alway: been on alert to protest any attempt by the government to restrict access to the platforms or to silence critical voices. Between 2012, when #OccupyNigeric trended on Twitter and Facebook, to the present, offline protests have become risky as a result of the frequent police brutalisation of protesters. Nigerians have taken to social media as alternative platforms for voicing their dissatisfaction with the government and for demanding accountability.
Table 4.4 Key digital hashtag campaigns and actors Individuals and groups in Nigeria have come to depend on social media for public engagement. The development is not out of place as Nigerian political leaders have also become largely visible on the various social media platforms. Facebook, with a 5957 per cent penetration of the country’s total internet users, ranks first among the social media platforms that Nigerians use for public discourse. It is followed by Twitter with a 24.54 per cent penetration ¢ internet users (GlobalStats 2020). Both Facebook and Twitter have contribute: significantly to the opening of online civic spaces in Nigeria. Users have alway: been on alert to protest any attempt by the government to restrict access to the platforms or to silence critical voices. Between 2012, when #OccupyNigeric trended on Twitter and Facebook, to the present, offline protests have become risky as a result of the frequent police brutalisation of protesters. Nigerians have taken to social media as alternative platforms for voicing their dissatisfaction with the government and for demanding accountability.
Figure 2.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000-15
Figure 2.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000-15
Figure 2.2 Kenya's Freedom Index score, 2000-18° This ranking improved dramatically in 2002 after the opposition won the general election, but dec subsequent votes in 2013 and 201 2002 ended the 40-year hort-lived period of ushered | Nas freedoms. But to limit election ress f ined once again after the 2007 election and 7. The surprisingly peaceful election in enya African National Union (KANU) regime and tremendous growth in political and social this was quickly compromised by the return of past practices reedom and individ by notable instances of media int itself ual rights. The 2007 election was precedec timidation and state-led violence, while th marked the worst of electoral violence, which left at least 1,50( people dead and another 100,000 displaced (Nyabola 2018).
Figure 2.2 Kenya's Freedom Index score, 2000-18° This ranking improved dramatically in 2002 after the opposition won the general election, but dec subsequent votes in 2013 and 201 2002 ended the 40-year hort-lived period of ushered | Nas freedoms. But to limit election ress f ined once again after the 2007 election and 7. The surprisingly peaceful election in enya African National Union (KANU) regime and tremendous growth in political and social this was quickly compromised by the return of past practices reedom and individ by notable instances of media int itself ual rights. The 2007 election was precedec timidation and state-led violence, while th marked the worst of electoral violence, which left at least 1,50( people dead and another 100,000 displaced (Nyabola 2018).
Sources: Authors’ own, based on Gagliardone (2014): Stremlau (2011); Mulualem (2019); Chala (2015): Bach (2011).
Sources: Authors’ own, based on Gagliardone (2014): Stremlau (2011); Mulualem (2019); Chala (2015): Bach (2011).
Sources: Authors’ own, based on Chala (2019); 2018; Mulualem (2019); Marchant and Stremlau (2020) Gagliardone (2013); Skjerdal (2011); Gagliardone (2016). The campaign was especially active during the initial months of imprisonment and was promoted by international human rights and freedom of speech organisations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights Watch, Global Voices, the Media Legal Defence Initiative, Electronic Frontier Foundation and Reporters Without Borders. After tens of delayed court hearings and over 500 days in prison without charge, the Zone? bloggers were finally acquitted of terrorism charges in October 2015 (BBC News 2015).
Sources: Authors’ own, based on Chala (2019); 2018; Mulualem (2019); Marchant and Stremlau (2020) Gagliardone (2013); Skjerdal (2011); Gagliardone (2016). The campaign was especially active during the initial months of imprisonment and was promoted by international human rights and freedom of speech organisations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights Watch, Global Voices, the Media Legal Defence Initiative, Electronic Frontier Foundation and Reporters Without Borders. After tens of delayed court hearings and over 500 days in prison without charge, the Zone? bloggers were finally acquitted of terrorism charges in October 2015 (BBC News 2015).
Figure 4.1 Egypt's Freedom on the Net Index score, 2009-192 Source: Based on data from Freedom House (2020)
Figure 4.1 Egypt's Freedom on the Net Index score, 2009-192 Source: Based on data from Freedom House (2020)
Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with internet access in Cameroon
Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with internet access in Cameroon
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