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Figure 2: Comparison Shroud Impact for December 2012 (Red) and February 2016 (Yellow) Launch

Figure 2 Comparison Shroud Impact for December 2012 (Red) and February 2016 (Yellow) Launch

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Table1: Details of North Korean space launches ~ All the authors are faculty members, International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India. They can be reached at chandrashekar.schandra[at]gmail.com, narayan.ramani[at]gmail.com and arun_summerhill[at]yahoo.com. Cover Image taken from You Tube video grab of the Kwangmyongsong-4 launch on the Unha-3. * Details of the payload carried in the July 2006 launch are not available. South Korea claimed that the missile flew for seven minutes after it veered off its course 42 seconds into the flight, "N. Korea May Try Launching Another Long-Range Missile," Chosunllbo, July 6, 2006, available at North Korea has so far conducted (See Table 1) six space launches. The last two launches conducted in December 2012 and the recent February 2016 launch have been successful in placing small remote sensing satellites into “more difficult to reach” sun synchronous orbits.
Table1: Details of North Korean space launches ~ All the authors are faculty members, International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India. They can be reached at chandrashekar.schandra[at]gmail.com, narayan.ramani[at]gmail.com and arun_summerhill[at]yahoo.com. Cover Image taken from You Tube video grab of the Kwangmyongsong-4 launch on the Unha-3. * Details of the payload carried in the July 2006 launch are not available. South Korea claimed that the missile flew for seven minutes after it veered off its course 42 seconds into the flight, "N. Korea May Try Launching Another Long-Range Missile," Chosunllbo, July 6, 2006, available at North Korea has so far conducted (See Table 1) six space launches. The last two launches conducted in December 2012 and the recent February 2016 launch have been successful in placing small remote sensing satellites into “more difficult to reach” sun synchronous orbits.
Table 2: Nominal Impact Points February 2016 & December 2012 Unha 3 launches As we can see from Table 2 the mid-points of the First and the Second Stage impact zones in the case of the February 2016 launch occur earlier and closer to the launch site as compared to the mid points of the December 2012 launch. This would suggest that the Lift off Weight (LOW) of the February Launch is slightly more than the LOW of the December 2012 launch. Most probably the third stage of the February 2016 launch is slightly heavier than the third stage of the 2012 launch. Table 2 below provides the mid points of the impact zones for the first stage, the shroud as well as the second stage for both the 2012 and 2016 launches. The nominal impact point for normal performance of the launcher would be the mid points of the impact zones. A comparison therefore provides some indicators of how the two launch missions could differ from each other.
Table 2: Nominal Impact Points February 2016 & December 2012 Unha 3 launches As we can see from Table 2 the mid-points of the First and the Second Stage impact zones in the case of the February 2016 launch occur earlier and closer to the launch site as compared to the mid points of the December 2012 launch. This would suggest that the Lift off Weight (LOW) of the February Launch is slightly more than the LOW of the December 2012 launch. Most probably the third stage of the February 2016 launch is slightly heavier than the third stage of the 2012 launch. Table 2 below provides the mid points of the impact zones for the first stage, the shroud as well as the second stage for both the 2012 and 2016 launches. The nominal impact point for normal performance of the launcher would be the mid points of the impact zones. A comparison therefore provides some indicators of how the two launch missions could differ from each other.
Figure 1: First Stage Impact for December 2012 (Red) and February 2016 (Yellow) Launch
Figure 1: First Stage Impact for December 2012 (Red) and February 2016 (Yellow) Launch
Figure 3: Comparison for Second Stage Impact for December 2012 (Red) and February 2016 (Yellow) Launch The differences in the nominal impact points of the first and second stages for the December 2012 and the February 2016 launches could be due to two reasons. It is possible that North Korea was planning to put a slightly heavier satellite into orbit as compared to the 100 Kg satellite that it put into orbit in December 2012. The other reason could be that the North Koreans decided to load more propellant in the third stage of the launcher.
Figure 3: Comparison for Second Stage Impact for December 2012 (Red) and February 2016 (Yellow) Launch The differences in the nominal impact points of the first and second stages for the December 2012 and the February 2016 launches could be due to two reasons. It is possible that North Korea was planning to put a slightly heavier satellite into orbit as compared to the 100 Kg satellite that it put into orbit in December 2012. The other reason could be that the North Koreans decided to load more propellant in the third stage of the launcher.
Figure 4: Four NoDong engines used in Unha Launch Vehicle The third stage uses an advanced propellant oxidizer combination of UDMH and Nitrogen Tetroxide. The realization of this stage is also a significant departure from the earlier Scud based technology used by North Korea. Choosing the Baseline Configuration for Analysis of the 2016 Launch
Figure 4: Four NoDong engines used in Unha Launch Vehicle The third stage uses an advanced propellant oxidizer combination of UDMH and Nitrogen Tetroxide. The realization of this stage is also a significant departure from the earlier Scud based technology used by North Korea. Choosing the Baseline Configuration for Analysis of the 2016 Launch
Figure 5: Launch of Unha3 Dec 2012 (Left) and February 2016 (Right) Analysis of the images and the video put out by the DPRK as well as the performance of the vehicle establishes the point that the Unha-3 launch vehicle used in the February 2016 space launch was very similar to the vehicle which put the satellite into orbit in December 2012.” The images of the December 2012 and the February 2016 Unha-3 vehicles are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Launch of Unha3 Dec 2012 (Left) and February 2016 (Right) Analysis of the images and the video put out by the DPRK as well as the performance of the vehicle establishes the point that the Unha-3 launch vehicle used in the February 2016 space launch was very similar to the vehicle which put the satellite into orbit in December 2012.” The images of the December 2012 and the February 2016 Unha-3 vehicles are shown in Figure 5.
Details of the February 2016 North Korean Space Launch The statement released by the DPRK's National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) following the February 2016 launch, claimed that the satellite was put into a Sun Synchronous Orbit with a period of 94 minutes and 24 seconds. The statement claimed that the satellite had a perigee of 494.6 km, an apogee of 500 Km with an inclination of 97.4 degrees."
Details of the February 2016 North Korean Space Launch The statement released by the DPRK's National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) following the February 2016 launch, claimed that the satellite was put into a Sun Synchronous Orbit with a period of 94 minutes and 24 seconds. The statement claimed that the satellite had a perigee of 494.6 km, an apogee of 500 Km with an inclination of 97.4 degrees."
Figure 6: Comparison of recovered 2012 and 2016 Unha-3 First stages comparing the recovered first stages following the December 2012 and the February 2016 launches depicting the greater damage suffered by the recovered stage in the later launch.’” Analysis of the 2016 North Korean Launch
Figure 6: Comparison of recovered 2012 and 2016 Unha-3 First stages comparing the recovered first stages following the December 2012 and the February 2016 launches depicting the greater damage suffered by the recovered stage in the later launch.’” Analysis of the 2016 North Korean Launch
Table 7: Comparison of Orbit Parameters — 2012 & 2016 Launches The available evidence suggests that North Korea wanted to achieve a 500 Km sun synchronous orbit in both cases. The orbital parameters show that the 2016 orbit represents an improvement over the orbit achieved in 2012. Whether this happened by accident or by intent is still debatable. For the third stage there is a fair degree of match between the two reconstructions. The 2016 launcher carried a little bit more propellant than the 2012 launch. It also has a slightly higher performance third stage engine most probably based on a UDMH and Nitrogen tetroxide fuel and oxidizer combination. This has a thrust of about nine tonnes and a specific impulse of about 290 seconds. Table 7 compares the achieved orbits of the December 2012 and January 2016 satellite launchings.
Table 7: Comparison of Orbit Parameters — 2012 & 2016 Launches The available evidence suggests that North Korea wanted to achieve a 500 Km sun synchronous orbit in both cases. The orbital parameters show that the 2016 orbit represents an improvement over the orbit achieved in 2012. Whether this happened by accident or by intent is still debatable. For the third stage there is a fair degree of match between the two reconstructions. The 2016 launcher carried a little bit more propellant than the 2012 launch. It also has a slightly higher performance third stage engine most probably based on a UDMH and Nitrogen tetroxide fuel and oxidizer combination. This has a thrust of about nine tonnes and a specific impulse of about 290 seconds. Table 7 compares the achieved orbits of the December 2012 and January 2016 satellite launchings.
Figure 7: Unha-3 Feb 2016 Launch Trajectory Successful mastery of these difficult technologies and a complex mission indicates the progress in rocket and missile technology that the North Koreans have achieved since their first failed launch in April 2012. The launch trajectory and the initial orbits of the February 2016 launch of the Unha-3 as computed by the Quo Vadis software is depicted in Figure 7 below.
Figure 7: Unha-3 Feb 2016 Launch Trajectory Successful mastery of these difficult technologies and a complex mission indicates the progress in rocket and missile technology that the North Koreans have achieved since their first failed launch in April 2012. The launch trajectory and the initial orbits of the February 2016 launch of the Unha-3 as computed by the Quo Vadis software is depicted in Figure 7 below.
Figure 8: Range of Unha-3 as a long range Ballistic Missile Though the Unha-3 is primarily designed for a space mission, it can be modified into a long range ballistic missile. Trajectory analysis using the NIAS trajectory modeling software — Quc Vadis — shows that a due North East launch (25° azimuth) of the Unha from a suitable location with a 1000kg payload (sufficient to carry a nuclear warhead) can reach all of Alaska and some parts of northern Canada. As indicated in an earlier ISSSP, NIAS report, if North Korea manages to reduce the payload mass to 800kg it will be able to successfully deliver a nuclear warhead on parts of western coast of the continental United States including the states of Washington, Oregon and northern parts of California.”’ Figure 8 provides a visual representation of the range of the Unha 3 launcher if it is deployed as a long range missile.
Figure 8: Range of Unha-3 as a long range Ballistic Missile Though the Unha-3 is primarily designed for a space mission, it can be modified into a long range ballistic missile. Trajectory analysis using the NIAS trajectory modeling software — Quc Vadis — shows that a due North East launch (25° azimuth) of the Unha from a suitable location with a 1000kg payload (sufficient to carry a nuclear warhead) can reach all of Alaska and some parts of northern Canada. As indicated in an earlier ISSSP, NIAS report, if North Korea manages to reduce the payload mass to 800kg it will be able to successfully deliver a nuclear warhead on parts of western coast of the continental United States including the states of Washington, Oregon and northern parts of California.”’ Figure 8 provides a visual representation of the range of the Unha 3 launcher if it is deployed as a long range missile.
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