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However, if we expand the European comparison to include Russia, the picture is dramatically different. During the period 2000-2017, there were 406 deadly attacks by extreme-right perpetrators in Russia, resulting in 458 people killed.”

Figure 7 However, if we expand the European comparison to include Russia, the picture is dramatically different. During the period 2000-2017, there were 406 deadly attacks by extreme-right perpetrators in Russia, resulting in 458 people killed.”

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Figure 1. Originally developed by Berntzen (2018), revised in collaboration with Bj@rgo and Ravndal, and conceptually based on Mudde (2002) and Teitelbaum (2017)
Figure 1. Originally developed by Berntzen (2018), revised in collaboration with Bj@rgo and Ravndal, and conceptually based on Mudde (2002) and Teitelbaum (2017)
The above distinction between three far right “families” enables a more nuanced perspective on those groups and individuals most likely to use violence. These are primarily to be found within the extreme-right. Within this current, violence is considered as a legitimate, necessary, and often laudable course of action. Adherents of racial nationalism, such as neo-Nazis, fascists, and white supremacists, figure high among perpetrators of extreme-right violence.’ The term extreme-right violence covers a broader range of attacks than “extreme-right terrorism”. All violent attacks whose target selection is based on extreme-right beliefs anc corresponding enemy categories—immigrants, minorities, political opponents, o1 governments—dqualify as right-wing violence. This could also include vandalism anc spontaneous violence. To be considered as terrorism, an attack must be premeditated anc intended to instil fear in a wider population to affect a political outcome.®
The above distinction between three far right “families” enables a more nuanced perspective on those groups and individuals most likely to use violence. These are primarily to be found within the extreme-right. Within this current, violence is considered as a legitimate, necessary, and often laudable course of action. Adherents of racial nationalism, such as neo-Nazis, fascists, and white supremacists, figure high among perpetrators of extreme-right violence.’ The term extreme-right violence covers a broader range of attacks than “extreme-right terrorism”. All violent attacks whose target selection is based on extreme-right beliefs anc corresponding enemy categories—immigrants, minorities, political opponents, o1 governments—dqualify as right-wing violence. This could also include vandalism anc spontaneous violence. To be considered as terrorism, an attack must be premeditated anc intended to instil fear in a wider population to affect a political outcome.®
To complicate matters further, we can include a third—and partly overlapping—category: hate crime. Hate crimes may include incidents that qualify as extreme-right violence or terrorism but also includes acts that are non-violent, such as racial harassment and hate speech. Hate crimes are defined by national legislation. Generally, they are crimes motivated by bias or hatred against certain categories of people, such as religious, racial, or sexual minorities or people with disabilities. However, the categories of people protected by hate crime legislation vary considerably between different countries and legislations.° For example, in most countries, including in Norway, homosexuals are specifically protected by hate crime legislation, but strangely, hateful acts against transgendered people are not, probably by mistake. In 23 out of 49 European countries, sexual orientations are not protected by hate crime legislation’°—and that is probably not by mistake. Thus, what is legally defined as “hate crime” varies considerably between countries, and political winds play a major role in deciding what kinds of target groups that are included."
To complicate matters further, we can include a third—and partly overlapping—category: hate crime. Hate crimes may include incidents that qualify as extreme-right violence or terrorism but also includes acts that are non-violent, such as racial harassment and hate speech. Hate crimes are defined by national legislation. Generally, they are crimes motivated by bias or hatred against certain categories of people, such as religious, racial, or sexual minorities or people with disabilities. However, the categories of people protected by hate crime legislation vary considerably between different countries and legislations.° For example, in most countries, including in Norway, homosexuals are specifically protected by hate crime legislation, but strangely, hateful acts against transgendered people are not, probably by mistake. In 23 out of 49 European countries, sexual orientations are not protected by hate crime legislation’°—and that is probably not by mistake. Thus, what is legally defined as “hate crime” varies considerably between countries, and political winds play a major role in deciding what kinds of target groups that are included."
Some scholars have made important advances in producing more reliable and comparable datasets on right-wing extremist violence and terrorism, using consistent definitions across countries. Jacob Aasland Ravndal developed a database on right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) in Western Europe, including reliable records of deadly events, which are less likely to go unreported than less serious attacks. “4 Johannes Due Enstad used the same coding criteria and method to make a database of deadly right-wing violence in Russia.° An even more extensive database covering lethal attacks motivated by extreme-right beliefs in the United States, but also non-lethal attacks as well as attacks motivated by Islamist and animals right/environmental beliefs, has been developed by group of American colleagues (Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014). Such comparable data sets make it possible to assess trends over time and differences between countries or groups of countries. Western Europe had a peak of deadly right-wing attacks in the first half of the 1990s, and again around the turn of the millennium, but the general trend has been slightly downward. In 2014, there were no fatal right-wing attacks in Europe, and in 2015 there was only one, but it raised to ten deadly attacks in 2016, probably related to the refugee crises. The downward trend continued in 2017 and 2018, which include fewer attacks than the average for the whole period. The trends are quite similar in the US, with a slightly higher number of attacks in the extensive database covering lethal attacks motivated by extreme-right beliefs in the United
Some scholars have made important advances in producing more reliable and comparable datasets on right-wing extremist violence and terrorism, using consistent definitions across countries. Jacob Aasland Ravndal developed a database on right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) in Western Europe, including reliable records of deadly events, which are less likely to go unreported than less serious attacks. “4 Johannes Due Enstad used the same coding criteria and method to make a database of deadly right-wing violence in Russia.° An even more extensive database covering lethal attacks motivated by extreme-right beliefs in the United States, but also non-lethal attacks as well as attacks motivated by Islamist and animals right/environmental beliefs, has been developed by group of American colleagues (Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014). Such comparable data sets make it possible to assess trends over time and differences between countries or groups of countries. Western Europe had a peak of deadly right-wing attacks in the first half of the 1990s, and again around the turn of the millennium, but the general trend has been slightly downward. In 2014, there were no fatal right-wing attacks in Europe, and in 2015 there was only one, but it raised to ten deadly attacks in 2016, probably related to the refugee crises. The downward trend continued in 2017 and 2018, which include fewer attacks than the average for the whole period. The trends are quite similar in the US, with a slightly higher number of attacks in the extensive database covering lethal attacks motivated by extreme-right beliefs in the United
These figures relate to deadly attacks only. We do not know exactly to what extent these trends correspond with the annual numbers of hate crimes or less severe right-wing violent attacks, where registration is far less reliable or non-existent in many countries. We know, fo! instance, that there was a remarkable spike of arson attacks on homes for refugees ir countries like Germany (see figure 5 below) and Sweden in 2015-16. However, people were rarely injured in these cases as houses were often set ablaze before refugees moved in. These attacks were clearly incidents of hate crime and extreme-right violence, but many do not reach the threshold to be considered terrorism. Preliminary figures for Western Europe (from the RVT database) indicate that during the refugee crisis there was an increase in deadly attack: as well. Islamist and extreme-right violence compared Available data also shows that right-wing violence and terrorism differs significantly from attacks by Islamist extremists in terms of frequency and intensity. Between the 9/11 attacks and 2016, Islamist extremists killed 119 people in 31 deadly attacks in the US, while right-wing extremists killed 158 people in 89 deadly attacks.’” During the same period (2001-2016) in Western Europe, Islamist extremists killed 539 people in 17 deadly attacks, while right-wing These figures relate to deadly attacks only. We do not know exactly to what extent these
These figures relate to deadly attacks only. We do not know exactly to what extent these trends correspond with the annual numbers of hate crimes or less severe right-wing violent attacks, where registration is far less reliable or non-existent in many countries. We know, fo! instance, that there was a remarkable spike of arson attacks on homes for refugees ir countries like Germany (see figure 5 below) and Sweden in 2015-16. However, people were rarely injured in these cases as houses were often set ablaze before refugees moved in. These attacks were clearly incidents of hate crime and extreme-right violence, but many do not reach the threshold to be considered terrorism. Preliminary figures for Western Europe (from the RVT database) indicate that during the refugee crisis there was an increase in deadly attack: as well. Islamist and extreme-right violence compared Available data also shows that right-wing violence and terrorism differs significantly from attacks by Islamist extremists in terms of frequency and intensity. Between the 9/11 attacks and 2016, Islamist extremists killed 119 people in 31 deadly attacks in the US, while right-wing extremists killed 158 people in 89 deadly attacks.’” During the same period (2001-2016) in Western Europe, Islamist extremists killed 539 people in 17 deadly attacks, while right-wing These figures relate to deadly attacks only. We do not know exactly to what extent these
23 Figures from the RTV database, see Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV dataset,” Perspectives on Terrorism Vol. 10, No. 3 (June 2016) When considering the incidence rate by population size in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015, Sweden has had the highest number of deadly extreme right attacks per million inhabitants, followed by Germany (note that countries with small populations, such as Norway and Ireland, will receive a relatively high score on this particular measure with only a handful of deadly attacks). Other European countries with a high number of deadly attacks include the UK and Spain.??
23 Figures from the RTV database, see Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV dataset,” Perspectives on Terrorism Vol. 10, No. 3 (June 2016) When considering the incidence rate by population size in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015, Sweden has had the highest number of deadly extreme right attacks per million inhabitants, followed by Germany (note that countries with small populations, such as Norway and Ireland, will receive a relatively high score on this particular measure with only a handful of deadly attacks). Other European countries with a high number of deadly attacks include the UK and Spain.??
Data on extreme-right violence in Europe
Data on extreme-right violence in Europe
Figure 7. Deadly right-wing extremist events by per million inhabitants per year (Graph: Enstad 2018)
Figure 7. Deadly right-wing extremist events by per million inhabitants per year (Graph: Enstad 2018)
Developments in the European far-right As noted (see figure 5), there has been a considerable decrease in the number of lethal attacks carried out by extreme-right perpetrators in Western Europe since the 1990s. One possible explanation is a change in perpetrator types. As noted (see figure 5), there has been a considerable decrease in the number of lethal attacks
Developments in the European far-right As noted (see figure 5), there has been a considerable decrease in the number of lethal attacks carried out by extreme-right perpetrators in Western Europe since the 1990s. One possible explanation is a change in perpetrator types. As noted (see figure 5), there has been a considerable decrease in the number of lethal attacks
Although jihadi terrorism is considered the most severe terrorist threat facing Europe, there may have been a tendency to underestimate the terrorist threat from the extreme right—at times with severe consequences. As the following paragraphs illustrate, the saying that “the police is blind in the right eye” sometimes has truth to it. Although jihadi terrorism is considered the most severe terrorist threat facing Europe, there The most severe example of this took place in Russia between 2006 and 2010, when racist skinhead gangs and other extreme-right groups, year-after-year continued to murder large numbers of immigrants as well as others considered as enemies by the Russian extreme-right scene. The Russian police literally turned their backs on these killings, and were reluctant to intervene. A forceful response did not happen until the government and the police leadership decided that this violence had to stop and ordered the police to crack down on the activist networks. The police eventually did so, and from 2009 onwards leaders and perpetrators were arrested and received long prison sentences. As a result, the number of killings dropped dramatically.?” Responses to extreme right violence and terrorism numbers of immigrants as well as others considered as enemies by the Russian extreme-right
Although jihadi terrorism is considered the most severe terrorist threat facing Europe, there may have been a tendency to underestimate the terrorist threat from the extreme right—at times with severe consequences. As the following paragraphs illustrate, the saying that “the police is blind in the right eye” sometimes has truth to it. Although jihadi terrorism is considered the most severe terrorist threat facing Europe, there The most severe example of this took place in Russia between 2006 and 2010, when racist skinhead gangs and other extreme-right groups, year-after-year continued to murder large numbers of immigrants as well as others considered as enemies by the Russian extreme-right scene. The Russian police literally turned their backs on these killings, and were reluctant to intervene. A forceful response did not happen until the government and the police leadership decided that this violence had to stop and ordered the police to crack down on the activist networks. The police eventually did so, and from 2009 onwards leaders and perpetrators were arrested and received long prison sentences. As a result, the number of killings dropped dramatically.?” Responses to extreme right violence and terrorism numbers of immigrants as well as others considered as enemies by the Russian extreme-right
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TerrorismPolitical Science
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