Table 1. Nonlinear CPR experiments with and without monitoring and punishment
Notes: All studies reviewed here use lab experiments with students. The ratio of Nash/Pareto tokens determines the size of the externality (Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud, 2006; Cason and
Gangadharan, 2015).
Table 3. Descriptive statistics by network
Figure 2. Appropriation and beliefs about others’ appropriation.
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. LSE London School of Economics, on 10 Dec 2019 at 09:55:42, subject to the Cambridg
Core terms of use, available at httos://www.cambridae.ora/core/terms. httos://doi.ora/10.1017/S1355770X19000457
Table 4. Average outcomes across networks
Figure 4. Punishment by deviation from Pareto optimal appropriation.
Table 5. Types of punishment given across networks
aK
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01. Omitted category = CN.
aK
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01. Omitted category = CN.
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. LSE London School of Economics, on 10 Dec 2019 at 09:55:42, subject to the Cambrid
Core terms of use, available at httos://www.cambridae.ora/core/terms. https://doi.ora/10.1017/S1355770X19000457
