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9, Conclusion Conflicts of Interest

Table 8 9, Conclusion Conflicts of Interest

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Figure 1: Cloud, fog, and end-device architecture.
Figure 1: Cloud, fog, and end-device architecture.
Ficure 2: Hyperelliptic curve with genus =2 [65].
Ficure 2: Hyperelliptic curve with genus =2 [65].
TABLE 1: Notations of the proposed scheme. resident fog proxy server without revealing any secret in- formation about the K, and K,.
TABLE 1: Notations of the proposed scheme. resident fog proxy server without revealing any secret in- formation about the K, and K,.
4.5. Encryption. In this phase, when a user wants to out- source a file F on the fog node, first, he divides the file F into z blocks, and each block has a constant size of d bits except the last block. To achieve confidentiality, the user encrypts each block using his public key Py, The following condition should be satisfied while dividing the file F into z blocks as follows:
4.5. Encryption. In this phase, when a user wants to out- source a file F on the fog node, first, he divides the file F into z blocks, and each block has a constant size of d bits except the last block. To achieve confidentiality, the user encrypts each block using his public key Py, The following condition should be satisfied while dividing the file F into z blocks as follows:
FicurE 3: Proposed scheme architecture for secure data sharing in fog computing. 5. Incremental Block Modification
FicurE 3: Proposed scheme architecture for secure data sharing in fog computing. 5. Incremental Block Modification
Figure 4: Workflow of the incremental cryptographic scheme [66]. the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. In fact, to get the level-1 encryption sender private key, the intruder will have to solve the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem three times, which is not feasible. applies the hash function on each data block and then applies final hash on the concatenated hash value shown as follows.
Figure 4: Workflow of the incremental cryptographic scheme [66]. the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. In fact, to get the level-1 encryption sender private key, the intruder will have to solve the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem three times, which is not feasible. applies the hash function on each data block and then applies final hash on the concatenated hash value shown as follows.
TABLE 2: Parameters for all scenarios. previously proposed schemes by Guo et al. [51], Khan et al. [21], Khan cryption sc et al. [56], and Bhatia et al. [64]. Proxy re-en- heme proposed in [51] does not use the incre- mental cryptographic technique; therefore, it encrypts, decrypts, and computes the hash value for a complete file from scratc h. The schemes in [21, 56] use the bilinear paring technique which uses a 256-bit key, and [64] uses the elliptic curve technique with 160-bit key. Our certificate-based incrementa the hyperel proxy re-encryption scheme (CB-PReS) uses iptic curve technique with 80-bit key.
TABLE 2: Parameters for all scenarios. previously proposed schemes by Guo et al. [51], Khan et al. [21], Khan cryption sc et al. [56], and Bhatia et al. [64]. Proxy re-en- heme proposed in [51] does not use the incre- mental cryptographic technique; therefore, it encrypts, decrypts, and computes the hash value for a complete file from scratc h. The schemes in [21, 56] use the bilinear paring technique which uses a 256-bit key, and [64] uses the elliptic curve technique with 160-bit key. Our certificate-based incrementa the hyperel proxy re-encryption scheme (CB-PReS) uses iptic curve technique with 80-bit key.
Ficure 5: One block modification.
Ficure 5: One block modification.
Ficure 7: Three blocks modification.
Ficure 7: Three blocks modification.
Ficure 6: Two-block modification.
Ficure 6: Two-block modification.
TaBLE 3: Hardware and software specification.
TaBLE 3: Hardware and software specification.
TABLE 4: Cryptographic major operation cost in millisecond.
TABLE 4: Cryptographic major operation cost in millisecond.
Ficure 8: Four blocks modification.
Ficure 8: Four blocks modification.
TABLE 5: Result improvements of the proposed scheme in block(s) modification operations as compared to [51]. TABLE 6: Result improvements of proposed scheme in block (s) modification operations as compared to [21, 56]
TABLE 5: Result improvements of the proposed scheme in block(s) modification operations as compared to [51]. TABLE 6: Result improvements of proposed scheme in block (s) modification operations as compared to [21, 56]
TaBLe 7: Result improvements of proposed scheme in block(s) modification operations as compared to [64].
TaBLe 7: Result improvements of proposed scheme in block(s) modification operations as compared to [64].
TaBLe 8: Communication cost in bits.
TaBLe 8: Communication cost in bits.
Related topics:
Computer ScienceDistributed ComputingProxy Re-Encryption
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