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Fig. 5. Relative dominance of rule-based versus family resemblance-based judgments of categories for the same cognitive task. European-American, Asian-American, and East Asian university students were tested by Norenzayan et al, 2002; the herders, fishermen, and farmers of Turkey’s Black Sea coast were tested by Uskul et al, 2008. Positive scores indicate a relative bias towards rule-based judgments, whereas negative scores indicate a relative bias towards family-resemblance based judgments. It can be seen that European American students show the most pronounced bias towards rule-based judgments, and are outliers in terms of absolute deviation from zero. Adapted from Norenzayan et al, 2002, and Uskul et al 2008.

Figure 5 Relative dominance of rule-based versus family resemblance-based judgments of categories for the same cognitive task. European-American, Asian-American, and East Asian university students were tested by Norenzayan et al, 2002; the herders, fishermen, and farmers of Turkey’s Black Sea coast were tested by Uskul et al, 2008. Positive scores indicate a relative bias towards rule-based judgments, whereas negative scores indicate a relative bias towards family-resemblance based judgments. It can be seen that European American students show the most pronounced bias towards rule-based judgments, and are outliers in terms of absolute deviation from zero. Adapted from Norenzayan et al, 2002, and Uskul et al 2008.

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Figure 2: Mueller-Lyer Results for Segall et. al.'s cross-cultural project. PSE is the percentage that segment ‘a’ must be longer than ‘b’ before individuals perceive them as equal. Children were sampled in the 5 to 11 age range.
Figure 2: Mueller-Lyer Results for Segall et. al.'s cross-cultural project. PSE is the percentage that segment ‘a’ must be longer than ‘b’ before individuals perceive them as equal. Children were sampled in the 5 to 11 age range.
o concisely present these diverse empirical finding, we show results only from the Ultimatum ind Dictator Games in Phase II. The Dictator Game is the same as the Ultimatum Game except hat the second player cannot reject the offer. If subjects are motivated purely by self-interest, hey would offer zero in the Dictator Game. Thus, Dictator Game offers yield a measure of fairness” (equal divisions) among two anonymous people. By contrast, Ultimatum Game offer: ‘ield a measure of fairness combined with an assessment of the likelihood of rejection punishment). Rejections of offers in the Ultimatum Game provide a measure of people’s villingness to punish unfairness.
o concisely present these diverse empirical finding, we show results only from the Ultimatum ind Dictator Games in Phase II. The Dictator Game is the same as the Ultimatum Game except hat the second player cannot reject the offer. If subjects are motivated purely by self-interest, hey would offer zero in the Dictator Game. Thus, Dictator Game offers yield a measure of fairness” (equal divisions) among two anonymous people. By contrast, Ultimatum Game offer: ‘ield a measure of fairness combined with an assessment of the likelihood of rejection punishment). Rejections of offers in the Ultimatum Game provide a measure of people’s villingness to punish unfairness.
Fig. 4. Mean punishment expenditures from each sample for a given deviation from the punisher’s contribution to the publi good. The deviations of the punished subject’s contribution from the punisher’s contribution are grouped into five intervals where [-20,-11] indicates that the punished subjects contributed between 11 and 20 less than the punishing subject; [0] indicates that the punished subject contributed exactly the same amount as the punishing subject and [1,10] ([11,20)] indicates that the punished subject contributed between 1 and 10 (11 and 20) more than the punishing subject. Adapted from Herrmann et. al. (2008).
Fig. 4. Mean punishment expenditures from each sample for a given deviation from the punisher’s contribution to the publi good. The deviations of the punished subject’s contribution from the punisher’s contribution are grouped into five intervals where [-20,-11] indicates that the punished subjects contributed between 11 and 20 less than the punishing subject; [0] indicates that the punished subject contributed exactly the same amount as the punishing subject and [1,10] ([11,20)] indicates that the punished subject contributed between 1 and 10 (11 and 20) more than the punishing subject. Adapted from Herrmann et. al. (2008).
Related topics:
Cognitive ScienceEvolutionary PsychologyPerceptionBehavioral SciencesDecision MakingBehavioral EconomicsCross-Cultural ComparisonCross Cultural Research
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