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In the same, February 1934, meeting it becomes evident that a flying boat base would represent only a part of the DLH Bathurst facility. Now, an aerodrome for land planes was required as well. This makes an important point about the continuous and rapid development of aircraft during this period and DLH’s kaizen -like approach to evolving its air routes. Bertram proposed that DLH be allowed to utilise the aerodrome in Cape St. Mary operated by the Royal West African Frontier Force. This led to a reopening of the question as to exactly what type of service DLH was truly envisioning. Bertram clarified for the Governor the next day, stating:

Figure 8 In the same, February 1934, meeting it becomes evident that a flying boat base would represent only a part of the DLH Bathurst facility. Now, an aerodrome for land planes was required as well. This makes an important point about the continuous and rapid development of aircraft during this period and DLH’s kaizen -like approach to evolving its air routes. Bertram proposed that DLH be allowed to utilise the aerodrome in Cape St. Mary operated by the Royal West African Frontier Force. This led to a reopening of the question as to exactly what type of service DLH was truly envisioning. Bertram clarified for the Governor the next day, stating:

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The British, in the form of Imperial Airways (IA), were very active in developing African air routes. But those routes were down the east-central corridor of the continent, essentially from Cairo to Cape Town. IA were running test flights to South Africa in the early 1930s and had established their first scheduled weekly London to Cape Town (see Figure 2) on 20 January 1932 (Ref. 6). That first trip took 11 days. Over the ensuing five years, IA added to the frequency of its service and cut the travel time from eleven to eight days (Ref. 7). Clearly, the British were accomplished air route developers in Africa throughout this period. As it turns out, though, the levels of British commerce with West Africa did not offer sufficient opportunity for long north/south air mail routes — even assuming that some European mail traffic might be carried to improve the overall economics. Shipment of goods was adequately provided by Britain’s substantial fleet of Elder Dempster ships and a comparable number of competitive, international vessels (Ref. 8). Passenger traffic was modest and the mails alone apparently could not justify diverting capital to establish a
The British, in the form of Imperial Airways (IA), were very active in developing African air routes. But those routes were down the east-central corridor of the continent, essentially from Cairo to Cape Town. IA were running test flights to South Africa in the early 1930s and had established their first scheduled weekly London to Cape Town (see Figure 2) on 20 January 1932 (Ref. 6). That first trip took 11 days. Over the ensuing five years, IA added to the frequency of its service and cut the travel time from eleven to eight days (Ref. 7). Clearly, the British were accomplished air route developers in Africa throughout this period. As it turns out, though, the levels of British commerce with West Africa did not offer sufficient opportunity for long north/south air mail routes — even assuming that some European mail traffic might be carried to improve the overall economics. Shipment of goods was adequately provided by Britain’s substantial fleet of Elder Dempster ships and a comparable number of competitive, international vessels (Ref. 8). Passenger traffic was modest and the mails alone apparently could not justify diverting capital to establish a
The transatlantic link was planned to be in two stages, utilising a catapult ship and second seaplane to compensate for the limited seaplane range. But even in 1933 DLH were anticipating that the rate ot technological innovation would eliminate the need for mid-ocean refueling in the near future (Ref. 17) DLH had conducted test flights in 1931 and again in 1933. There were three trials in the June of 1933. Philatelists, never far from a first flight opportunity, were able to get some mail aboard these catapult test flights, the first on 2 June, as illustrated in Figure 3. The second test flight was conducted on 4-6 June, a: illustrated in Figure 4. This cover was cancelled Bathurst on the 3rd, and travelled to Natal via the catapull ship Westfalen. The last of the June test flights (Figure 5) originated in Natal and went via Westfalen anc Bathurst onward to Germany.
The transatlantic link was planned to be in two stages, utilising a catapult ship and second seaplane to compensate for the limited seaplane range. But even in 1933 DLH were anticipating that the rate ot technological innovation would eliminate the need for mid-ocean refueling in the near future (Ref. 17) DLH had conducted test flights in 1931 and again in 1933. There were three trials in the June of 1933. Philatelists, never far from a first flight opportunity, were able to get some mail aboard these catapult test flights, the first on 2 June, as illustrated in Figure 3. The second test flight was conducted on 4-6 June, a: illustrated in Figure 4. This cover was cancelled Bathurst on the 3rd, and travelled to Natal via the catapull ship Westfalen. The last of the June test flights (Figure 5) originated in Natal and went via Westfalen anc Bathurst onward to Germany.
The importance of experimental flights is, perhaps, sometimes oversimplified. More than mapping routes and determining the effectiveness of particular aircraft for a route leg, the totality of route logistics needs to be determined. In this instance, the experimental flights established that the originally configured wireless communications approach (aboard a ship near the DLH facility and supplemented by the regular Bathurst wireless station) was insufficient. Specifically the Bathurst wireless was both too sporadic in its operation and had too weak a transmitter for the requirements of the DLH flights. Prince Bismarck thus issued an application for a dedicated wireless station to be constructed at the site of the DLH aerodrome (Ref. 20).
The importance of experimental flights is, perhaps, sometimes oversimplified. More than mapping routes and determining the effectiveness of particular aircraft for a route leg, the totality of route logistics needs to be determined. In this instance, the experimental flights established that the originally configured wireless communications approach (aboard a ship near the DLH facility and supplemented by the regular Bathurst wireless station) was insufficient. Specifically the Bathurst wireless was both too sporadic in its operation and had too weak a transmitter for the requirements of the DLH flights. Prince Bismarck thus issued an application for a dedicated wireless station to be constructed at the site of the DLH aerodrome (Ref. 20).
A particularly interesting sidelight relates to the handling of mail from within Gambia to European destinations. DLH’s Commander Bertram offered to transport a bag of Gambian mail (along with DLH’s regular trans-shipment of South American mails) to Germany for forwarding to a post office in London. As of May 1934, no agreement between the German and British postal administrations had been reached for Gambian mails. Thus the Governor’s office was specifically enjoined from accepting Bertram’s offer (Ref. 25). What makes this Gambia-centric prohibition all the more interesting is that the British and German post offices had concluded an agreement for the through transit of mail between the UK and South America, but failed to include mail to or from Gambia itself. Figure 6 illustrates a First Acceptance cover mailed from London on 13 April arriving Berlin the same day and Montevideo. Uruguay, on 25 April. But the post office in Gambia was anxious to take advantage of DLH’s presence and sought to formalis carriage between Bathurst and Berlin for onward transmission to London (Ref. 26) and elsewhere. Th reply from DHL in Berlin was to offer logistics for sealed postal bags through ‘Postamt Stuttgart 9” fc transmission “by the quickest possible means’ and further stated that ‘...the air mail charges will not b increased’ (Ref. 27). The reply did stipulate, however, that the Gambian post office needed to negotiat directly with DLH for the costs of carrying the sealed mailbags. This stipulation, absent an agreemet between the two post offices, would have mandated that Bathurst be responsible for sorting a// mail regardless of destination — into individual sealed bags at Gambia, an impractical solution. Thus, it woul await the agreement between the two postal authorities in August before a practical solution for mail tc from Gambia could be achieved. Subsequently, very lengthy and difficult negotiations directly with DL! were conducted, fees agreed upon and a contract was drawn between DLH and the Gambian Post Offic (dated 24 August, but effective several weeks previous - Ref. 28). A correspondence from the Receive General (Ref. 29) notes that the first mail to Gambia from London carried via DLH arrived on 30 July. . total of 75 letters were carnied, 69 of which were from philatelists. Figure 7 illustrates one of those philateli covers.
A particularly interesting sidelight relates to the handling of mail from within Gambia to European destinations. DLH’s Commander Bertram offered to transport a bag of Gambian mail (along with DLH’s regular trans-shipment of South American mails) to Germany for forwarding to a post office in London. As of May 1934, no agreement between the German and British postal administrations had been reached for Gambian mails. Thus the Governor’s office was specifically enjoined from accepting Bertram’s offer (Ref. 25). What makes this Gambia-centric prohibition all the more interesting is that the British and German post offices had concluded an agreement for the through transit of mail between the UK and South America, but failed to include mail to or from Gambia itself. Figure 6 illustrates a First Acceptance cover mailed from London on 13 April arriving Berlin the same day and Montevideo. Uruguay, on 25 April. But the post office in Gambia was anxious to take advantage of DLH’s presence and sought to formalis carriage between Bathurst and Berlin for onward transmission to London (Ref. 26) and elsewhere. Th reply from DHL in Berlin was to offer logistics for sealed postal bags through ‘Postamt Stuttgart 9” fc transmission “by the quickest possible means’ and further stated that ‘...the air mail charges will not b increased’ (Ref. 27). The reply did stipulate, however, that the Gambian post office needed to negotiat directly with DLH for the costs of carrying the sealed mailbags. This stipulation, absent an agreemet between the two post offices, would have mandated that Bathurst be responsible for sorting a// mail regardless of destination — into individual sealed bags at Gambia, an impractical solution. Thus, it woul await the agreement between the two postal authorities in August before a practical solution for mail tc from Gambia could be achieved. Subsequently, very lengthy and difficult negotiations directly with DL! were conducted, fees agreed upon and a contract was drawn between DLH and the Gambian Post Offic (dated 24 August, but effective several weeks previous - Ref. 28). A correspondence from the Receive General (Ref. 29) notes that the first mail to Gambia from London carried via DLH arrived on 30 July. . total of 75 letters were carnied, 69 of which were from philatelists. Figure 7 illustrates one of those philateli covers.
To further underscore the operational uncertainties surrounding the Bathurst facilities, in May of 1935 DLH applied to Gambian authorities for an extension and enhancement to the Jeshwang aerodrome (Ref. 36). As well considered as the original design may have been, modifications were already called for. By this time, Captain Klaube was the German Resident Agent of DLH in Bathurst. He informed local authorities that both the rainy season and normal wind conditions suggested that the runway be reoriented in the direction of prevailing winds and paved with asphalt (Ref. 37). Such improvements would facilitate night-time landings as well as year round operations. The latter was a significant issue, as unpaved landing sites were completely unusable during the Gambian rainy season. Concurrently, and as a clear inducement to obtain the desired approvals, Klaube inquired of the Secretary whether he would be interested in having the improved aerodrome at the disposal of the Government for military and government aeroplanes ‘free of costs and free of charge’. DLH became involved in such
To further underscore the operational uncertainties surrounding the Bathurst facilities, in May of 1935 DLH applied to Gambian authorities for an extension and enhancement to the Jeshwang aerodrome (Ref. 36). As well considered as the original design may have been, modifications were already called for. By this time, Captain Klaube was the German Resident Agent of DLH in Bathurst. He informed local authorities that both the rainy season and normal wind conditions suggested that the runway be reoriented in the direction of prevailing winds and paved with asphalt (Ref. 37). Such improvements would facilitate night-time landings as well as year round operations. The latter was a significant issue, as unpaved landing sites were completely unusable during the Gambian rainy season. Concurrently, and as a clear inducement to obtain the desired approvals, Klaube inquired of the Secretary whether he would be interested in having the improved aerodrome at the disposal of the Government for military and government aeroplanes ‘free of costs and free of charge’. DLH became involved in such
The dynamics of DLH’s Bathurst bases notwithstanding, the resulting air mail service was clearly successful. During 1934, DLH completed a total of 47 flights (south- and northbound) and an additional 79 flights in 1935 (Ref. 40 - these excluding flights of t Bathurst). After the initial two months, the volume o trip on the southbound and perhaps two-thirds of t perspective, if the average letter weighed 5 grams — individual letters!) While postal historians attribu significant commercial use of the DLH service was the single-rate weight — with simply recording individual flight origins and d estinations with covers, creative registered cover in Figure 11 was sent to a person not in Bathurst Gambian boxed straight-line instructional markings ‘Not applied for’ and ‘Return to senders’. The covet left Vienna on 18 October, left Stuttgart on the 20th, arrived in Bathurst on t Stuttgart. The sender, not surprisingly, was the Austrian Aero Philatelic Association. he Graf Zeppelin, some of which transferred mails in f air mail ranged from between 100kg and 250kg per hat volume on the northbound trips. (To put this in hen 100kg contained 20,000 e much mail to contemporaneous philatelists, the apparent. Philatelists, for their part, were not content abels and cancellations. The in order to acquire the rare he 22nd and then returned to
The dynamics of DLH’s Bathurst bases notwithstanding, the resulting air mail service was clearly successful. During 1934, DLH completed a total of 47 flights (south- and northbound) and an additional 79 flights in 1935 (Ref. 40 - these excluding flights of t Bathurst). After the initial two months, the volume o trip on the southbound and perhaps two-thirds of t perspective, if the average letter weighed 5 grams — individual letters!) While postal historians attribu significant commercial use of the DLH service was the single-rate weight — with simply recording individual flight origins and d estinations with covers, creative registered cover in Figure 11 was sent to a person not in Bathurst Gambian boxed straight-line instructional markings ‘Not applied for’ and ‘Return to senders’. The covet left Vienna on 18 October, left Stuttgart on the 20th, arrived in Bathurst on t Stuttgart. The sender, not surprisingly, was the Austrian Aero Philatelic Association. he Graf Zeppelin, some of which transferred mails in f air mail ranged from between 100kg and 250kg per hat volume on the northbound trips. (To put this in hen 100kg contained 20,000 e much mail to contemporaneous philatelists, the apparent. Philatelists, for their part, were not content abels and cancellations. The in order to acquire the rare he 22nd and then returned to
23S Oe siawer ON = ee NF DLH route map from 1935 (Courtesy of Ken Lawrence)
23S Oe siawer ON = ee NF DLH route map from 1935 (Courtesy of Ken Lawrence)
Throughout the entire period that DLH operated in Bathurst, British authorities very tightly controlled the landing authorities granted to DLH. Every flight needed to be scheduled; every substitution or addition of equipment required approval of the tail number (Ref. 43). Thus, the Air Ministry in London stated that it would have ‘no objection in principle’ to such a flag change ‘provided that the Brazilian Government would agree to grant reciprocal facilities for a British service to or in Brazil...’(Ref. 44), effectively quashing the request, which was officially communicated to Klaube (Ref. 45) on 29 November.
Throughout the entire period that DLH operated in Bathurst, British authorities very tightly controlled the landing authorities granted to DLH. Every flight needed to be scheduled; every substitution or addition of equipment required approval of the tail number (Ref. 43). Thus, the Air Ministry in London stated that it would have ‘no objection in principle’ to such a flag change ‘provided that the Brazilian Government would agree to grant reciprocal facilities for a British service to or in Brazil...’(Ref. 44), effectively quashing the request, which was officially communicated to Klaube (Ref. 45) on 29 November.
30 October 1934 Montevideo to Genoa via DLH to Stuttgart Author’s collection
30 October 1934 Montevideo to Genoa via DLH to Stuttgart Author’s collection
Right on schedule, on 1 June 1939, Colonial Secretary Oke notified DLH that their license to operate the aerodrome at Jeshwang had been renewed (Ref. 47). He made a point of noting that the terms of the lease were identical to those of the lease that had expired the prior day. The war stirrings in Europe notwithstanding, the mails carried by DLH (and the French service too, for that matter) continued throughout the spring and early summer of 1939. But Germany’s mobilisation was apparent and — even before the First of September invasion of Poland — it was clear that the end was near.
Right on schedule, on 1 June 1939, Colonial Secretary Oke notified DLH that their license to operate the aerodrome at Jeshwang had been renewed (Ref. 47). He made a point of noting that the terms of the lease were identical to those of the lease that had expired the prior day. The war stirrings in Europe notwithstanding, the mails carried by DLH (and the French service too, for that matter) continued throughout the spring and early summer of 1939. But Germany’s mobilisation was apparent and — even before the First of September invasion of Poland — it was clear that the end was near.
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