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Table 4: Participants’ experiences of and attitudes towards corruption The correlations between the participant’s perceptions of how common bribery and

Table 4 Participants’ experiences of and attitudes towards corruption The correlations between the participant’s perceptions of how common bribery and

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Table 1: Experimental Design: Sessions and Treatments acceptable bribe for each of the others.'*
Table 1: Experimental Design: Sessions and Treatments acceptable bribe for each of the others.'*
Table 2: Participant characteristics
Table 2: Participant characteristics
Source: List of countries and frequencies derived from authors' own dataset. The measure ‘corruption 2004' is equal to 10 minus Transparency International's corruption index for each of the countries. Table 3: Corruption in the participants’ home countries
Source: List of countries and frequencies derived from authors' own dataset. The measure ‘corruption 2004' is equal to 10 minus Transparency International's corruption index for each of the countries. Table 3: Corruption in the participants’ home countries
Figure 1: Bribes offered by ‘private citizens’ in the bribery game reference to the level of corruption prevailing in the participants’ home countries. 4.1 Experimental data 2.2. Then, we turn to the issue of whether we can predict behaviour within the game with
Figure 1: Bribes offered by ‘private citizens’ in the bribery game reference to the level of corruption prevailing in the participants’ home countries. 4.1 Experimental data 2.2. Then, we turn to the issue of whether we can predict behaviour within the game with
Table 5: Treatment effects in the bribery game
Table 5: Treatment effects in the bribery game
data, and is not significant according to a non-parametric, rank-sum test. one tailed t-test, the power of which may be questionable given the non-normality of our
data, and is not significant according to a non-parametric, rank-sum test. one tailed t-test, the power of which may be questionable given the non-normality of our
In Figure 3 and the fifth and sixth columns of Table 5 the data on bribe offering
In Figure 3 and the fifth and sixth columns of Table 5 the data on bribe offering
Figure 3: The effect of framing on bribes offered
Figure 3: The effect of framing on bribes offered
Figure 4: ‘Public servants’ minimum acceptable bribes in the bribery game parametric, rank-sum test.
Figure 4: ‘Public servants’ minimum acceptable bribes in the bribery game parametric, rank-sum test.
Figure 5: The effect of negative externalities on minimum acceptable bribes harmful to society.
Figure 5: The effect of negative externalities on minimum acceptable bribes harmful to society.
Figure 6: The effect of framing on minimum acceptable bribes second prediction, but is not statistically significant. one of the possible bribes, when the negative externality was increased concurs with the In Figure 6 and the fifth and sixth columns of Table 5 the data on MABs has been
Figure 6: The effect of framing on minimum acceptable bribes second prediction, but is not statistically significant. one of the possible bribes, when the negative externality was increased concurs with the In Figure 6 and the fifth and sixth columns of Table 5 the data on MABs has been
Dependent variable = 1 if participant offered a bribe Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) are robust and have been adjusted to account for clustering within sessions. We report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from zero to one in the case of dichotomous variables. *** - sig at 1% level, ** sig. at 5% level.
Dependent variable = 1 if participant offered a bribe Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) are robust and have been adjusted to account for clustering within sessions. We report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from zero to one in the case of dichotomous variables. *** - sig at 1% level, ** sig. at 5% level.
and the interaction term fall marginally but remain significant (10% level).
and the interaction term fall marginally but remain significant (10% level).
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) are robust and have been adjusted to account for clustering within sessions. We report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from zero to one in the case of dichotomous variables. *** - sig at 1% level. Table 7: Probit analysis of bribe acceptance
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) are robust and have been adjusted to account for clustering within sessions. We report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from zero to one in the case of dichotomous variables. *** - sig at 1% level. Table 7: Probit analysis of bribe acceptance
Source: Questions on perceptions of corruption in different spheres of life are drawn from Transparency International’s Corruption Barometer. Questions on indirect experiences of corruption in the public job market and in the police follow a format originally developed by Vicente (2005). Questions about willingness to justify bribery and questions about fairness are drawn the World Value Survey. Table Al: Survey questions on corruption
Source: Questions on perceptions of corruption in different spheres of life are drawn from Transparency International’s Corruption Barometer. Questions on indirect experiences of corruption in the public job market and in the police follow a format originally developed by Vicente (2005). Questions about willingness to justify bribery and questions about fairness are drawn the World Value Survey. Table Al: Survey questions on corruption
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