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Pollution and penalties
Research in Law and Economics
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-5895(02)20023-8
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Abstract
Agency of England and Wales. Drawing on the law and economics literature, there follows an evaluation of the current reliance on the criminal justice system and of the use of the sanction of suspension or revocation of a licence. We then turn to alternative enforcement strategies, in particular the use of administrative penalties. 2. Enforcement Powers and Practice: The Environment Agency in England and Wales (a) General One feature of most modern systems of pollution control is that the regulatory authority has strong powers of enforcement. Whilst the Environment Agency, in many instances, adopts a cooperative approach to enforcement, using persuasion, warnings and other informal, non-statutory measures to ensure compliance, it has recourse to a number of formal mechanisms which vary from function to function. These powers of enforcement fall into two broad categories. The first covers what are termed, administrative enforcement mechanisms; these include the variation, suspension or revocation of a licence, the issuing of enforcement, prohibition or works notices, and, if appropriate, the seeking of an injunction through the courts. 5 The second involves criminal justice proceedings and contains the power to initiate prosecutions and to serve formal cautions 6 and warnings 7 where a criminal offence has been committed. At the heart of the enforcement process lies a number of criminal offences which provide for prosecution through the criminal courts. These offences fall into several different categories two of which are important for our purposes: the general offences which can be committed regardless of whether a licence has been breached or indeed, whether a licence is required; 8 and those specifically based on noncompliance with a condition of a licences or operating without an appropriate
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