Game-theoretical Approaches to Cyber-crime Monitoring

2020

1,2Sreenidhi Institute of Science and Technology, Hyderabad, Telangana-501301. --------------------------------------------------------------------***--------------------------------------------------------------------ABSTRACT: Cyber security is among the most incredible and rapidly creating issues and has been the point of convergence of present day affiliations. Cyber security chance organization is the path toward regulating or lessening conceivably risky and questionable events that bunch as threats to cyber security. It incorporates seeing what could turn out gravely on the web and choosing ways to deal with maintain a strategic distance from or limit their occasions or effects. One of the observable computerized security chance organization techniques is the Game Theoretic Approach (GTA), which bases on the use of advantages, inward controls, information sharing, specific improvements, direct or various leveled scale ups and digital assurance for advanced peril the board. It d...

2016

Cyber Security is a complex concept that depends on the domain knowledge and requires cognitive abilities to determine possible threats from large amount of network data. Strengthening the security and resilience of cyberspace has become an important homeland security mission. Game theory is famous theory for detecting the threats as well as preventing the threats. In analysis various attack strategies can be considered such as inflation, deflation and Oscillation. Game theory provides the basic training and awareness of key algorithmic principles and lessons learned. In Game theory, the defense strategies are outlier detection and Adaptive Threshold selection. Using game theory the user can easily detect the intruders and provide the solution for the problems in step by step manner, which is easy and understandable language.

2016

The Internet is an integral way of conducting daily business from government agencies to entertainers. Protection from attack, damage, or unauthorized access is necessary with the increase of mobile users, digital applications and data networks. A cyber security problem can be viewed as a conflict-resolution scenario that typically consists of a security system and at least two decision makers (e.g. attacker and defender) each with competing objectives. For instance, on one hand, the defender may be interested in ensuring that the system performs at or above a certain acceptable level. The attacker’s objective, on the other hand, may be to disrupt the system and degrade it. Game theory is a wellestablished tool that can be used to analyze such problems. In this work, we present a brief survey of how game theory can be used to find appropriate strategies for both the hacker (attacker) and the administrator (defender). We model the interactions between them as a stochastic game. Vario...

2007

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A Game Theoretical Approach to Communication Security by Assane Gueye

2007 10th International Conference on Information Fusion, 2007

Game theory is not a new concept in cyber defense. Current game theoretic approaches [1-3] for cyber network intrusion detection and decision support are based on static matrix games and simple extensive games, which are usually solved by game trees. However, these matrix game models lack the sophistication to study multiplayers with relatively large actions spaces, and large planning horizons. Some partial results of our dynamic Markov game approach have been published in .

42nd IEEE International Conference on Decision and Control (IEEE Cat. No.03CH37475), 2000

We investigate the basic trade-offs, analysis and decision processes involved in information security and intrusion detection, as well as possible application of game theoretic concepts to develop a formal decision and control framework. A generic model of a distributed intrusion detection system (IDS) with a network of sensors is considered, and two schemes based on game theoretic techniques are proposed. The security warning system is simple and easy-to-implement, and it gives system administrators an intuitive overview of the security situation in the network. The security attack game, on the other hand, models and analyzes attacker and IDS behavior within a two-person, nonzero-sum, noncooperative game with dynamic information. Nash equilibrium solutions in closed form are obtained for specific subgames, and two illustrative examples are provided.

International Journal of Communications, Network and System Sciences, 2017

To protect the systems exposed to the Internet against attacks, a security system with the capability to engage with the attacker is needed. There have been attempts to model the engagement/interactions between users, both benign and malicious, and network administrators as games. Building on such works, we present a game model which is generic enough to capture various modes of such interactions. The model facilitates stochastic games with imperfect information. The information is imperfect due to erroneous sensors leading to incorrect perception of the current state by the players. To model this error in perception distributed over other multiple states, we use Euclidean distances between the outputs of the sensors. We build a 5-state game to represent the interaction of the administrator with the user. The states correspond to 1) the user being out of the system in the Internet, and after logging in to the system; 2) having low privileges; 3) having high privileges; 4) when he successfully attacks and 5) gets trapped in a honeypot by the administrator. Each state has its own action set. We present the game with a distinct perceived action set corresponding to each distinct information set of these states. The model facilitates stochastic games with imperfect information. The imperfect information is due to erroneous sensors leading to incorrect perception of the current state by the players. To model this error in perception distributed over the states, we use Euclidean distances between outputs of the sensors. A numerical simulation of an example game is presented to show the evaluation of rewards to the players and the preferred strategies. We also present the conditions for formulating the strategies when dealing with more than one attacker and making collaborations.

Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, 2015

There have been attempts to model the interaction between users, both malicious and benign, and network administrators as games. Building on such works, we here present a game model which is generic enough to capture various modes of such interactions. The model facilitates stochastic games with imperfect information. The imperfect information is due to erroneous sensors leading to incorrect perception of the current state by the players. To model this error in perception distributed over other multiple states, we use Euclidean distances between inputs from the sensors.

Journal of Computer Engineering & Information Technology, 2013

Existing computer security techniques lack the quantitative decision framework required to defend against highly organized attacks. Game theory provides a set of quantitative and analytical tools for describing and analyzing interactive decision situations in computer security. Recently, game-theoretic approaches such as stochastic security games have been used to study security problems as an optimization game comprising multiple players notably the attackers and the defenders (system administrators). Stochastic security games are a probabilistic approach appropriate for studying particularly complex networks where attacks often go from a state and proceeds to another according to a probability distribution. A stochastic game-model that views the interaction between malicious users and network administrators as a two-player zerosum game was developed. A binary coding scheme was employed for identifying game states and game transition diagrams were generated to describe possible movements of players. A stochastic algorithm was developed to solve the game and compute the optimal strategies for the players. A simulation of the algorithm was carried out the output analyzed to show the techniques that network administrators can employ to predict adversary's actions, determine vulnerable network assets and suggest optimal defense strategies for the defender.