What is Realistic about Putnam's Internal Realism?

2016

In this paper I want to adjudicate the dispute between those philosophers who do and those who do not think that the philosophy of language can illuminate metaphysical questions. To this end, I take the debate between Devitt and Putnam as a case study and diagnose what I take to be illuminating about their disagreement over metaphysical realism. I argue that both Putnam and Devitt are incorrect in their assessment of the significance of the model theoretic argument for realism. That, whilst Devitt is entitled to claim that truth does not have anything to do with realism, Putnam’s challenge can still gain traction and seriously call into question our ability to engage in realist metaphysics. I argue that even if a completely semantically neutral conception of realism can be successfully articulated, doing so has the potential to bankrupt the methodology of metaphysical realism. Having taken this debate as a case study, I then offer some brief remarks on how to understand the philosop...

Putnam's internal realism attempts to overcome both radical subjectivism and metaphysical realism. While he agrees with subjectivists that we understand the world through conceptual schemes, Putnam rejects their 'anything goes' relativist conclusions, arguing that states and properties of the external world co-determine our understanding of the world, and that some theories are more rational to accept than others. Theories, in other words, while they can't be expected to correspond 'absolutely' to the external world, can nevertheless be objective-for-us. When theorising about rationality, however, Putnam runs into problems, claiming that the criteria of rational acceptability, determining the choice of conceptual schemes, are a set of historically evolving cultural norms. This causes a slide into subjectivism and relativism. In this paper, I argue that the main tenet of internal realism -the possibility of an objectivity-for-us -can be maintained. Taking a naturalistic approach, I defend the view that both the conceptual tools and the epistemic values making up our conceptual schemes are ultimately grounded in our genetically determined cognitive apparatus. The conceptual schemes mediating our understanding of the world, therefore, are not merely contingent cultural products but, to an important extent, necessary biological products. In this regard, although Putnam explicitly rejects any attempts to naturalise reason, I argue that it is precisely such a naturalistic approach that provides his internal realism with the necessary backing.

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1988

Erkenntnis, 1991

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 1999

Two of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism are examined in detail. One of them is developed as an extension of a model-theoretic argument against mathematical realism based on considerations concerning the so-called Skolem-Paradox in set theory. This argument against mathematical realism is also treated explicitly. The article concentrates on the fine structure of the arguments because most commentators have concentrated on the major premisses of Putnam's argument and especially on his treatment of metaphysical realism. It is shown that the validity of Putnam's arguments is doubtful and that realists are by no means forced to accept the theses Putnam ascribes to them. It is concluded that Putnam fails to give convincing arguments for rejecting mathematical or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, Putnam's internal realism is discussed critically.

Philosophical Quarterly, 2008

Over the last 20 years or so, Hilary Putnam has developed a series of arguments which use basic theorems of model theory to undermine semantic realism. Here, I discuss two generalizations of these arguments. The first employs some new forms of model theory to generate substantially stronger conclusions than Putnam's original arguments generated. The second illustrates a method for replacing the model theory in Putnam's arguments with results from other branches of science-in particular, with results from astronomy. Now, I should say at the outset that neither of these new arguments is supposed to be persuasive: each of them fails, and fails rather badly, when regarded as a serious objection to realism. Nevertheless, the arguments serve three purposes. First, the parallels between my new arguments and Putnam's original arguments help to highlight what's really going on in the latter, and the obvious flaws in my arguments help to isolate the corresponding flaws in Putnam's arguments. Second, these new arguments expose the inadequacy of several recent defenses of Putnam. (Very roughly, I argue that if these defenses saved Putnam's arguments, then they would save my arguments as well. But, my arguments are unsalvageable. So, the defenses don't save Putnam.) Finally, the arguments present a new challenge to Putnam and his defenders: to provide a formulation of the model-theoretic argument which makes that argument seem compelling without doing the same for mine.

I provide in this paper an examination of the influence of Immanuel Kant on the internal realist Hilary Putnam. I begin by discussing Putnam’s transition from external, or metaphysical, realism to internal realism, and argue in favor of the view that Kant is best understood as an internal realist. Where Putnam is concerned, I am interested here only in his versions of external and internal realism and not with his more recent views. Having laid out a case for internal realism, I go on to discuss and defend Putnam’s interpretation of Kant’s views on the nature of truth, arguing that although Kant accepts correspondence as a nominal definition of truth, he should not be understood as endorsing the metaphysical realist conception of truth. I conclude by arguing against those, including Ian Hacking and Allen Wood, who believe that the internal realist Putnam misinterpreted Kant on the nature of truth. This criticism rests on a misunderstanding of what Kant must have meant by ‘correspond...

Southwestern Philosophical Review Vol 3, 19-27, 1986

Putnam's writings on realism have stirred up a rash of responses which raise questions both about Putnam's argument against metaphysical realism, and about internal realism, his positive view. A number of papers question Putnam's "brain in a vat" argument by trying to show that Putnam equivocates. Others argue that Putnam relies to heavily on formal methods, or on an overly restricted formalism. Internal realism has been accused of being incapable of giving a complete account of truth, and of being at least as problematic as metaphysical realism. I will argue that all of these responses fail to come to terms with Putnam's position through a common failing. I believe that isolating this failing will help to focus the debate.

Philosophica, 2002

From early on, Hilary Putnam's efforts reflected a deeply foundational result, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, that formalized the central intuition that governed much of his thinking. This metamathematical result supports the indeterminacy of the reference relation between theories and their models. 1 As this intuition, captured in many ways, was used to support his many and varied philosophical interests, his concern with formal languages and formal models of, particularly, scientific theories and explanations decreased. 2 In place of metamathematics, Putnam offered various informal and quasi-formal arguments and constructions showing the limits of logical models as a challenge to, among other things, metaphysical realIsm. This yielded his notion of internal realism. 3