Introduction: The Nature of the Problem

Revista Científica General José María Córdova, 2025

The assertion that current and future available technologies are changing and will likely continue to change, as well as the nature of the operating environment, is undeniable. The more challenging task, however, is to identify the technologies that, if available to one side of a conflict, will provide a decisive advantage over a technologically weaker adversary, particularly the extent to which these technologies will affect the inherently conservative nature of land operations. Emerging technologies in current conflicts already indicate trends and predict the possible shape of the future "algorithmized" battlefield. This paper explores perspectives on the possible shape of the future battlefield over a two-decade horizon and articulates the challenges of employing a land component on a technology-saturated battlefield in a high-intensity conflict.

Annals: Series on Military Sciences, 2020

In its multi-millennial evolution, humanity has been strongly marked by smaller or larger conflicts that have decisively placed their imprint on technological progress and on the application of military power implicitly. The extremely rapid succession of the scientific discoveries of the last period has led to the emergence of new materials and technologies that have profoundly changed society and, as a consequence, the manifestation of the military phenomenon. The process continues with great dynamism, generating particularly complex situations regarding the implications that these technologies have on designing and achieving military capabilities and in their application in future conflicts.

Amsterdam Law Forum

Throughout history, new military technologies have had profound ramifications: The rise of gunpowder and cannon created economies of scale that encouraged the emergence of nation-states, and Prussia used railroads to surprise the Austrians at Ko ¬niggra ¬tz, beginning the end of the Austrian Empire. Today, emerging military technologiesÑincluding unmanned aerial vehicles, directed-energy weapons, lethal autonomous robots, and cyber weaponsÑraise the prospect of upheavals in military practice so fundamental that they challenge assumptions underlying long-established international laws of war, particularly those relating to the primacy of the state and the geographic bounds of warfare. But the laws of war have been developed over a long period, with commentary and input from many cultures. What would seem appropriate in this age of extraordinary technological change, the author concludes, is a reconsideration of the laws of war in a deliberate and focused international dialogue that includes a range of cultural and institutional perspectives.

Die Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2023

Notwithstanding certain immutable features of war, some of its concrete techniques do change, notably following new technological developments. Advanced electronic weapon systems, including armed drones, are a case in point. We shall examine how countries handle the opportunities and challenges involved by means of a comparative analysis of Israel and Germany

Synergy, 2017

As we move into the 21st Century, it is now more than evident that our traditional understandings of war are being increasingly challenged by our recent experiences of it. Among other things, this could be attributed to the rise and ubiquitous spread of advanced technologies - particularly those pertaining to Information, Communication, and bioinformatics – which have impacted (and continue to impact in numerous direct and subtle ways) how we think about, prepare for, and wage war. Thus, it remains a critical strategic imperative to address the question regarding not only the intimate relationship between war and technology, but also to assess the “nature” of the impact that they have on each other.

Wars have been a part of the humanity since the pre-historic ages, and are expected to remain to be an important component of future human societies. Since the beginning of the history wars have evolved in parallel to the changes in societies. The changing circumstances unavoidably affect the characteristics of warfare for instance its motivations, shape, and size. Armies have adapted themselves to these changing characteristics of warfare through Revolution in Military Affairs (RMAs) by introducing new military concepts and technologies. The key question is to what extent military technologies and military concepts drive the RMAs as a response to changing conditions. To answer this question, first the RMA literature is reviewed with a broader historical perspective to understand the extent which military concepts and technologies affected the RMAs. Then, a time-based technological trend analysis is conducted through the analysis of military patents to understand the impact of technological developments on military concepts. Following the historical analyses, two scenarios are developed for the future of military Research and Development (R&D) based on 'concept-driven' and 'technology-driven' factors. The article is concluded with a discussion on the implications of the future scenarios for military R&D, and likely RMAs through the changes of concepts and technologies, and possible consequences such as transformations in organisational structures of armies, new skill and capacity requirements, military education systems, and decisionmaking processes.

The Army's vision of a future multi-domain battlefield makes many assumptions about the cognitive demands and capabilities of current and future soldiers. These assumptions, among others, include that soldiers of the current millennial generation are inherently more tech-savvy than their predecessors because of extensive, lifelong exposure to technological devices such as personal computers, virtual gaming, and cell phones. Thus, they should be able to better leverage new technologies to increase their performance in executing military missions. There is also an assumption that sequentially adding technologies into military skills training only after soldiers are trained in fundamentals will be adequate. Our research suggests otherwise. The purpose of this study was to test a set of hypotheses and assumptions that younger cadets and soldiers possess a higher aptitude and familiarity with digital technologies that could be used to increase combat performance. Our research was conducted over the summer of 2017; it entailed a randomized control trial of West Point cadets participating in urban-raid lane training utilizing new technologies such as virtual reality (VR) goggles. The results of our research showed a sample of millennial soldiers with limited experience and proficiency in military tasks were too cognitively overloaded to accept new and unfamiliar technologies while under the stress of military requirements—despite the clear advantage these technologies held for completing their mission. Our results provide preliminary evidence that cadets generally default to analog technologies—namely, a notepad, pen, or paper—under duress or in the heat of battle, even one simulated. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that the need to train and develop spatial-projection skills are even more important than implementing new technology earlier in the training cycle.

International Security, 2022

Conventional wisdom suggests that innovation consistently improves military power. Militaries that oppose it invite defeat, but those that innovate secure victory. Innovation is considered a sign of organizational health because the ever-changing character of war constantly threatens to render existing capabilities obsolete. Conversely, misfortune comes to those who allow the march of historical change to overtake them. The notion that innovation and better military performance go hand in hand is thus intuitive. It is also wrong. In popular imagination, for example, the German blitzkrieg was a revolutionary innovation in World War II that restored the possibility of decisive victory, which had eluded European armies since the Franco-Prussian War. What is less known is that the British also innovated in armored warfare yet performed poorly on the battleªeld. While the German Army mechanized its combined-arms tactics developed at the end of World War I, the British deployed armored brigades comprised almost entirely of tanks and expected them to ªght with virtually no help from supporting arms. What is puzzling about this example is not the presence or absence of innovation-both armies innovated new forms of armored warfare-but instead why some innovations enhance combat effectiveness while other innovations do not. The idea that innovation is a gamble is not novel, but too often analysts focus on only beneªcial changes. They overlook harmful innovation in military organizations, implying that the gamble is always worth making. This article seeks to restore the atmosphere of risk inherent to innovation and explain why its perils deserve as much attention as its promises. To do so, I de