Generalization of Learning in Games of Strategic Interaction

2007

We consider a multi&game interactive learning environment and ask ourselves whether long run behaviors in one game are affected by behaviors in the other, ie whether there are learning spillovers. Our main finding is that learning spillovers arise whenever the feedback ...

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011

We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment in which subjects sometimes only have access to the aggregate distribution of play of the opponents over the various games and sometimes are told the joint distribution of actions and games in a more or less accessible way. Our main findings are: 1) In the presence of feedback spillover, long run behaviors stabilize to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005). 2) Faced with the same objective feedback, the long run behaviors are sometimes better described by Nash equilibrium and sometimes they are better described by the analogybased expectation equilibrium depending on the accessibility of the feedback.

2004

We call into question game theory, as a account of how people play two player zero-sum games. Evidence from a modified version of the game Paper, Rock, Scissors suggests that people do not play randomly, and not according to certain play probabilities. We investigated the relationship between game theory predictions and a cognitive model of game playing based on the detection of sequential dependencies.

2010

This article experimentally explores the way in which human agents learn how to process and manage new information. In an abstract setting, players should perform an everyday task: selecting information, making generalizations, distinguishing contexts. The tendency to generalize is common to all participants, but in a different way. Best players have a stringer tendency to generalise rules. A high score is, in fact, associated with low entropy for mistakes, that is with a tendency to repeat the same mistakes over and over.

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999

This paper presents experimental results from an analysis of two similar games, the repeated ultimatum game and the repeated best shot game. The experiment examines whether the amount and content of information given to players a ects the evolution of play in the two games. In one experimental treatment, subjects in both games observe not only their own actions and payo s, but also those of one randomly chosen pair of players in the just completed round of play. In the other treatment, subjects in both games observe only their own actions and payo s. We present evidence suggesting that observation of other players' actions and payo s may a ect the evolution of play relative to the case of no observation.

Economics Letters, 2014

We conduct a laboratory experiment and provide evidence of learning spillovers within and across equivalence classes of "structurally similar" games. These spillovers are inconsistent with existing theories of learning in games.

Journal of Expertise, 2019

This study investigated the development of player skill and cognitive understanding of a game over repeated plays to (a) bridge separate research traditions on skill acquisition and games learning and (b) provide deeper insight into the process of developing mental models of games. 325 participants responded to an online questionnaire with questions concerning their experience with the game, Hive, as well as both open-and closed-ended items designed to compare their understanding of the game to an expert's understanding. Open-ended items were content analyzed and modeled as a latent variable. As predicted, both player skill and mental model matching were positively associated with number of plays. Additionally, while player skill had a curvilinear relationship with number of plays that indicated diminishing returns on additional plays, that between cognitive understanding and plays appeared to be linear. The implications of these findings for the cognitive underpinnings of player skill-and for mental model matching theory in particular-are discussed. Supplemental online material is provided here: https://osf.io/3yeg2/

Reinforcement learning involves a tight coupling of reward-associated behavior and a type of learning that is very different from that promoted by education. However, the emerging understanding of its underlying processes may help derive principles for effective learning games that have, until now, been elusive. This article first reviews findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology to provide insight into the motivating role of uncertain reward in games, including educational games. Then, a short experiment is reported to illustrate the potential of reward-based neurocomputational models of behavior in the understanding and development of effective learning games. In this study, a reward-based model of behavior is shown to predict recall of newly learned information during a simple learning game.

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2013

Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of lear ning between games of strategic interaction A bstract We studied transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. We found that the interpersonal relation between two players during and across two games influence development of reciprocal trust and transfer of learning from one game to another. We show that two types of similarities between the games affect transfer: (1) deep similarities facilitate transfer of an optimal solution across games; (2) surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer depending on whether they lead players toward an optimal or sub-optimal solution in the target game. Learning an optimal solution in a context of interdependence between players is associated with development of reciprocal trust, which in turn mediates transfer of learning across games. The results can be used to inform the design of training exercises to develop strategic interaction skills.

Games and Economic Behavior, 2001