Attributive Quantity Words as Nonrestrictive Modifiers

Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 1999

1999

The present paper is about the conversational implicatures (hereafter referred to simply as ‘implicatures’) that result from the two maxims of quantity identified by Grice 1975 and subsequently discussed by (amongst others) Atlas and Levinson 1981, Horn 1984, and Levinson 1995. The question I seek to resolve is whether Q[uantity] implicatures should be entered in the lexicon or whether they constitute encyclopedic information. Allan 1995, fc argues for a division of labour between the lexicon and the encyclopedia. The lexicon contains formal, morphosyntactic, and semantic specifications of listemes and the encyclopedia contains other kinds of information about listemes, e.g. their etymology, and information about their denotata.

Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes, 2005

In some languages, measure phrases can appear with non-compared adjectives : 5 feet tall. I address three questions about this construction : (a) Is the measure phrase an argument of the adjective or an adjunct ? (b) What are we to make of the markedness of this construction *142lbs heavy ? (c) Why is it that the markedness disappears once the adjective is put in the comparative (2 inches taller alongside 2lbs heavier)? I claim that because degree arguments are 'functional', the measure phrase has to be an adjunct and not a syntactic argument of the adjective. Like event modifiers in extended NPs and in VPs, the measure phrase predicates of a degree argument of the adjective. But given the kind of meaning a measure phrase must have to do its job in comparatives and elsewhere, it is not of the right type to directly predicate of a degree argument. I propose a lexically governed type-shift which applies to some adjectives allowing them to combine with a measure phrase.

arXiv (Cornell University), 1995

The relationship between Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG) functional structures (fstructures) for sentences and their semantic interpretations can be expressed directly in a fragment of linear logic in a way that correctly explains the constrained interactions between quantifier scope ambiguity, bound anaphora and intensionality. The use of a deductive framework to account for the compositional properties of quantifying expressions in natural language obviates the need for additional mechanisms, such as Cooper storage, to represent the different scopes that a quantifier might take. Instead, the semantic contribution of a quantifier is recorded as a logical formula whose use in a proof will establish the scope of the quantifier. Different proofs will in general lead to different scopes. In each complete proof, the properties of linear logic will ensure that each quantifier is properly scoped. The interactions between quantified NPs and intensional verbs such as 'seek' are also accounted for in this deductive setting. A single specification in linear logic of the argument requirements of intensional verbs is sufficient to derive the correct reading predictions for intensional-verb clauses both with nonquantified and with quantified direct objects. In particular, both de dicto and de re readings are derived for quantified objects. The effects of type-raising or quantifying-in rules in other frameworks here just follow as linear-logic theorems. While our approach resembles current categorial approaches in important ways Moortgat, 1992a;, it differs from them in allowing the greater type flexibility of categorial semantics while maintaining a precise connection to syntax. As a result, we are able to provide derivations for certain readings of sentences with intensional verbs and complex direct objects that are not derivable in current purely categorial accounts of the syntax-semantics interface.

Formal semantic analyses often take words to be minimal building blocks for the purposes of compositionality. But various recent theories of morphology and syntax have converged on the view that there is no demarcation line corresponding to the word level. The same conclusion has emerged from the compositional semantics of superlatives. In the spirit of extending compositionality below the word level, this paper explores how a small set of particles (Japanese ka and mo, Chinese dou, and Hungarian vala/vagy, mind, and is) form quantifier words and serve as connectives, additive and scalar particles, question markers, and existential verbs. Our main question is whether the meanings of these particles across the varied environments are highly regular, or they are lexicalized with a variety of different meanings that bear a family resemblance. This paper does not reach definitive conclusions, but it raises analytical possibilities using Boolean semantics and Inquisitive Semantics (the semantics of alternatives). It also draws attention to systematic similarities and some differences between the multiple uses of mo and dou that have not been studied in the literature, and reviews accounts in terms of maximality and additivity.

Noûs, 1972

One of the goals of a certain brand of philosopher has been to give an account of language and linguistic phenomena by means of showing how sentences are to be translated into a "logically perspicuous notation" (or an "ideal language" -to use pass~ terminology). The usual reason given by such philosophers for this activity is that such a notational system will somehow illustrate the "logical form" of these sentences. There are many candidates for this notational system: (almost)ordinary first-order predicate logic (see Quine [1960]), higher-order predicate logic (see Parsons 1970]), intensional logic (see Montague [1969Montague [ , 1970aMontague [ , 1970bMontague [ , 1971), and transformational grammar (see Harrnan ), to mention some of the more popular ones. I donor propose to discuss the general question of the correctness of this approach to the philosophy of language, nor do 1 wish to adjudicate among the notational systems mentioned here. Rather, I want to focus on one problem which must be faced by all such systems -a problem that must be discussed before one decides upon a notational system and tries to demontrate that it in fact can account for all linguistic phenomena. The general problem is to determine what we shall allow as linguistic data; in this paper I shall restrict my attention to this general problem as it appears when we try to account for certain words with non-singular reference, in particular, the words that are classified by the count/ mass and sortal/non-sortal distinctions.

Acta Linguistica Academica 69(1), 2022

In this paper, I investigate the distribution and semantic behavior of various proportional quantifiers (PQs) in Polish. Based on novel evidence including corpus data, I conclude that Polish PQs do not constitute a uniform category, but rather can be divided into four distinct classes based on the following properties: i) (in)compatibility with numerals and measure words, ii) (in)compatibility with approximative modifiers, iii) (in)compatibility with cumulative predicates and iv) (non)occurrence of spatial integrity effects. I propose that such a typology results from an interplay between more primitive semantic notions. In particular, the data call for combining degree semantics with a mereotopological approach to the meaning of PQs.

Language, 2006

Reviewed by ELIZABETH COWPER, University of Toronto Denis Bouchard has, for the past twenty years, been someone we can count on to demand that linguistic theory live up to the standards it sets for itself. In particular, he is most eloquent and convincing when he points out the frequent lack of independent motivation for theoretical constructs such as empty categories (Bouchard 1984), theta-roles (Bouchard 1995), and now in his latest offering, uninterpretable features, meta-features, phonologically null functional heads, and syntactic movement. Adjectives, number and interfaces: Why languages vary is a major work with two main stated goals. The first is descriptive: to provide a comprehensive account of adjectival modification in French, and to show the consequences it has for crosslinguistic variation in adjectival modification. The second is theoretical: to explain why languages vary. There is a third goal, not stated at the outset, which B achieves with at least as much success as the other two: to explore what a properly minimalist theory of language must look like, taking seriously Noam Chomsky's idea that legibility at the interfaces is the only condition required, beyond virtual conceptual necessity. The book includes eight chapters, plus an appendix. Chs. 2 and 3 present B's account of adjectival modification in French, along with a fairly extensive comparison of French with English. He briefly discusses where Celtic languages, Walloon, and Romanian fit into the picture he develops. Chs. 4 and 5 explore some specific consequences of his proposals for the syntax and semantics of nominal phrases, primarily in French, but with considerable discussion of English as well. Chs. 1, 6, 7, and 8 constitute essentially a theoretical manifesto and could almost have been published as a separate book. In fact, such a separation might have made the material more accessible and interesting to a larger audience. The book is 458 pages long, and at times is extremely heavy going. It suffers from what appears to have been a complete lack of editorial attention, both as to the organization of information and as to infelicities of style, bad glossing of data, lexical malapropisms, spelling mistakes, typographical errors, and mislabeling of chapters. Frequently, the infelicities of style impede comprehension; a reader who knows French will at times find this knowledge useful in deciphering the text. Despite these problems, however, the material in the book is well worth the effort of reading it. I first discuss the theoretical proposals, and then turn to the discussion of adjectival modification and the structure of nominal phrases. I recommend that readers begin with Chs. 6-8, then go back to Chs. 1-5. Ch. 6 includes an excellent discussion of theoretical simplicity and parsimony. B distinguishes three sorts of simplicity: formal simplicity, functional simplicity, and what he calls general simplicity. Formal simplicity is achieved by reducing the number of tools available to the theory, so as to eliminate redundancy from linguistic descriptions. Pursuing formal simplicity can frequently uncover broader generalizations and can also result in a cleaner account of the data, but, says B, it does not necessarily reduce the expressive power of the theory. 'Eliminating redundancy is secondary in the sense that it does not really constrain rule formulation: it just removes one formulation which is equal in power with another that is maintained. Therefore, there is no reduction in the power of the theory, in what could be formulated in the theory, because the formulation that is maintained can express what was expressed by the formulation that has been removed' (327-28). He takes the elimination of D-structure as an example of formal simplification. Since all information encoded in D-structure can be recovered from other levels of representation, the elimination of D-structure has no effect on the expressive power of the theory. However, elimination of redundant components can sometimes lead to a more explanatory account. The elimination of phrase structure rules in favor of X-bar theory and lexical projection

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