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Philosophy

Mind, Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds

Profile image of Gabriel VacariuGabriel Vacariu

2005, Synthese

https://doi.org/10.1007/S11229-005-8366-4
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34 pages

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Abstract

The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind-body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes' dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation). On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different worlds.

FAQs

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AI

What novel insight does the paper reveal about the mind-body problem?add

The paper demonstrates that the mind-body problem is a pseudo-problem rooted in the unicorn-world concept, which limits philosophical inquiry and understanding.

How do observational conditions affect our understanding of mental states?add

The study suggests that shifting observational conditions allows one to access epistemologically different worlds (EDWs), influencing the interpretation of mental states.

What distinguishes the various approaches to the mind-body problem?add

Key approaches like identity theory and non-reductive physicalism differ in their perspectives on whether mental states can be reduced to physical states.

How does the principle of conceptual containment apply to cognitive science?add

The principle indicates that judgments about phenomena must account for observational conditions, differentiating mental states from neural patterns in cognitive neuroscience.

When did philosophers generally begin rejecting the dualist approach to the mind-body problem?add

In recent decades, nearly all philosophers have moved away from dualism, embracing views like non-reductive physicalism and functionalism to explain mental phenomena.

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