The logical problem of the incarnation: a new solution

Agatheos: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

This article focuses on providing a new a priori argument for the veracity of the doctrine of the Incarnation. This new argument, called the Subjectivity Argument, will be formulated in light of the concept of "omnisubjectivity," as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, and an "emotion," as conceptualised by the "somatic feeling theory," posited by Jesse Prinz. Doing this will provide a specific argument that provides strong grounds for affirming the necessity of the Incarnation, without, however, being subject to the primary objections that can be raised against other a priori arguments for the Incarnation in the contemporary literature.

Philosophy and Theology 22, 1-2, 2011

In this paper, we examine Abelard’s model of the incarnation and place it within the wider context of his views in metaphysics and logic. In particular, we consider whether Abelard has the resources to solve the major difficulties faced by the so-called “compositional models” of the incarnation, such as his own. These difficulties include: the requirement to account for Christ’s unity as a single person, despite being composed of two concrete particulars; the requirement to allow that Christ is identical with the pre-existent Son, despite the fact that the pre-existent Son is a (proper) part of the incarnate Christ; and finally the requirement to avoid Nestorianism, i.e., the position that Christ’s proper parts are persons in their own right. We argue that Abelard does have adequate solutions to these problems. In particular, we show that his theories of relations and predication can be put to use in defence of a compositional account of the incarnation.

JETS 68.1, 2025

Traditional accounts of the incarnation, accounts which maintain the true divinity and true humanity of Christ, have faced numerous criticisms across the history of the church, criticisms that have never entirely been resolved. What if the problem is not the claim of dual "natures" but rather the philosophical paradigm within which "nature" has been interpreted? In this article, it is argued that significant issues caused by the traditional dual-nature paradigm can be resolved through a conceptualist account of "nature." It is proposed that two things are said to share a nature, to be ontologically identical (the same sort of thing), when they share enough similarity that members of a sociolinguistic community will recognize them as the same sort of thing, that is, when the same mental act (signified by a universal term) will supposit for them both. After introducing the classic paradigm and the problems associated with it, conceptualism is proposed as a plausible solution to the problems of natural and personal identity and, as a result, a strong framework within which to tackle the classic problems associated with the incarnation. At the very least, the plausibility of conceptualism as an answer to pressing issues in the doctrine of the incarnation suggests that the problems are found not in the God-man claim but in a particular construal of the meaning of that claim.

This is now published in JETS 68.1 Traditional accounts of the incarnation, which maintain the true divinity and true humanity of Christ, have faced numerous criticisms across the history of the church, criticisms that have never entirely been resolved. What if the problem is not the claim of dual "natures" but rather the philosophical paradigm within which "nature" has been interpreted? In this paper, it is argued that significant issues caused by the traditional dual-nature paradigm can be resolved through a conceptualist account of "nature," that is, ontological identity or similitude with like things. After introducing the classic paradigm and the problems associated with it, conceptualism is proposed as an adequate solution to the problems of natural and personal continuity and, as a result, a strong framework within which to tackle the classic problems associated with the incarnation. Keywords: ontology, Hellenistic philosophy, conceptualism, essentialism, incarnation, Christology.

Philosophy and Theology, Vol 20, 2009

What metaphysics can plausibly back up the claim that God became incarnate? In this essay we investigate the main kinds of models of incarnation that have been historically proposed. We highlight the philosophical assumptions in each model, and on this basis offer novel ways of grouping them as metaphysical rather than doctrinal positions. We examine strengths and weakness of the models, and argue that the so called ‘composition models’ offer the most promising way forward to account for the pivotal Christian belief that, in Christ, true divinity and true humanity meet in a genuine union.

Religious Studies, 2010

In this paper we investigate composition models of incarnation, according to which Christ is a compound of qualitatively and numerically different constituents. We focus on three-part models, according to which Christ is composed of a divine mind, a human mind, and a human body. We consider four possible relational structures that the three components could form. We argue that a ‘hierarchy of natures’ model, in which the human mind and body are united to each other in the normal way, and in which they are jointly related to the divine mind by the relation of co-action, is the most metaphysically plausible model. Finally, we consider the problem of how Christ can be a single person even when his components may be considered persons. We argue that an Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which identity is a matter of function, offers a plausible solution: Christ’s components may acquire a radically new identity through being parts of the whole, which enables them to be reidentified as parts, not persons.

2024

This is now published in JETS 68.1 Traditional accounts of the incarnation, accounts which maintain true divine nature and true human nature of Christ, have faced numerous criticisms across the history of the church, criticisms that have never entirely been resolved. What if the problem is not the claim of dual "natures" but rather the philosophical paradigm within which "nature" has been interpreted? In this paper, it is argued that significant issues caused by the traditional dual-nature paradigm can be resolved through a conceptualist account of "nature," that is, ontological identity or similitude with like things. After introducing the classic paradigm and the problems associated with it, conceptualism is proposed as a plausible solution to the problems of natural and personal identity and, as a result, a strong framework within which to tackle the classic problems associated with the incarnation. At the very least, the plausibility of conceptualism as an answer to pressing issues in the doctrine of the Incarnation suggests that the problems are found not in the God-man claim but in a particular construal of the meaning of that claim.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2013

In this paper, I identify a problem, which the project that I will refer to as the ‘Being and Time Project’ (or ‘BTP’ for short) aimed to solve; this is the project within which Heidegger reinterpreted his early thought—and which he unsuccessfully attempted to bring to fruition—in, roughly speaking, the years 1925-28. The problem in question presents several faces: viewed from one angle, it concerns the unity of the concept of “Being in general,” from another, the integrity of the notion of “Dasein,” and from another, the possibility of the perspective from which the philosopher does her work. The solution that the BTP would have offered turns on the claim that time is “the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” (SZ 1), and what I want to focus upon in particular is why making a claim of this form was a metaphilosophically pressing matter. It is widely believed that the BTP does not work, a view seemingly confirmed by Heidegger’s own failure to complete it; one also encounters the view that the project represented a further, perhaps over-ambitious step that also lacks deep motivation: so Inwood, for example, argues that “[i]t is … not obvious that we need to elucidate Being in general to understand the differences between various modes of Being, between rocks, tools, Dasein, time and world.” While that might be true, my concern will be to make vivid why Heidegger felt he had to elucidate that concept and undertake the associated—and doomed—BTP. In presenting this case, I will juxtapose the issues Heidegger’s work raises with issues raised by Kris McDaniel’s and Jason Turner’s recent attempts to revive what they call “ontological pluralism” (OP), a doctrine of which they see Heidegger as an advocate. Others whom they would recruit to their cause include Aristotle and Russell and both will figure in the following discussion. Section 1 begins with Heidegger’s proposal that many philosophical problems are really pseudo-problems which we encounter solely because of our “ontological indifference,” our failure to recognize the distinct kinds of Being that the entities on which we reflect instantiate. But this same diversity raises questions about the possibility of assertions of the level of generality that we might take to be characteristic of philosophical assertions, a worry which section 2 introduces through a comparison with problems that Russell encounters. It was in the work of Aristotle, however, that Heidegger saw analogous worries arise and section 3 identifies two lines of argument which cast doubt on the possibility of a “science of being qua being.” They do so by casting doubt on the idea that Being might be a genus that subsumes species or kinds of Being. Section 4 explains how the second of these lines of thought finds an echo in a worry about the very possibility of a philosophical perspective: a certain “ontological indifference” seems necessary if ontological claims, such as those that distinguish between kinds of Being as kinds of Being, are to be possible. Section 5 further deepens our concerns, by arguing that the worries identified in sections 3-4 also raise doubts about our grasp on the very notion of “Dasein.” Section 6 turns to how the BTP might be seen as responding to the challenges that sections 2-5 reveal. Heidegger claims that “[w]ithin the horizon of time the projection of a meaning of Being in general can be accomplished” (SZ 235) and I offer an outline sketch of the project for which this claim was the centre-piece, highlighting in particular its metaphilosophical significance: time “enabl[es] … the thematic interpretation of Being and of its articulation and manifold ways,” and “thus make[] ontology possible” (BPP 228). But the BTP ultimately unravels and section 7 suggests that the first Aristotelian line of thought that section 3 presents may help us understand why. The final section considers another way in which one might imagine responding to the issues we consider here, a way that McDaniel and Turner’s presentation of OP suggests; however, I argue that this response fails to meet the challenge of section 3’s second Aristotelian line of thought.

Religions, 2022

This article aims to introduce a new solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity. This solution is provided by utilising a number of theses within the field of contemporary metaphysics in order to establish a conceptual basis for a novel account and model of the doctrine of the Trinity termed Monarchical Aspectivalism, which will provide the means for proposing an alternative reading of the Athanasian Creed that is free from any consistency problems.

Verbum Vitae, 2021

The paper presents the latest achievements of analytic philosophers of religion in Christology. My goal is to defend the literal/metaphysical reading of the Chalcedonian dogma of the hypostatic union. Some of the contemporary Christian thinkers claim that the doctrine of Jesus Christ as both perfectly divine and perfectly human is self-contradictory (I present this point of view on the example of John Hick) and, therefore, it should be understood metaphorically. In order to defend the consistency of the conciliar theology, I refer to the work of, among others, Eleonore Stump, William Hasker, Peter Geach and Kevin Sharpe. As a result, I conclude that recent findings in analytic metaphysics provide an ontological scaffolding that explains away the objection of the incompatibility of the doctrine of the hypostatic union. In order to confirm this conclusion such metaphysical topics as properties attribution (what it means for an object to have a property), relation of identity (what it means for an object x to be identical with object y), and essentialism and kind membership (what it means for an object to belong necessarily to a kind) are scrutinized in detail.