A synthesis of behavioural and mainstream economics
2019, Nature Human Behaviour
https://doi.org/10.1038/S41562-019-0617-3Abstract
AI
AI
The synthesis of behavioral economics (BE) and mainstream economics (ME) explores the relationship between how people should act according to traditional economic theories and how they actually behave. Mainstream economics is rooted in the rationality hypothesis, whereas behavioral economics emphasizes systematic deviations from this rationality. The paper argues that these deviations are instrumental in understanding and applying economic principles, suggesting that the insights gained from BE do not contradict ME, but rather enhance its application by revealing the heuristics that guide economic behavior in practice.
FAQs
AI
What explains the distinction between rule-rationality and act-rationality in decision-making?
The paper presents rule-rationality as an adaptive behavior strategy, where individuals adopt heuristics that usually maximize utility based on evolution. In contrast, act-rationality focuses on optimizing utility in each specific decision, often leading to inconsistent outcomes in unusual scenarios.
How does the ultimatum game challenge traditional economic theories of rationality?
The study finds that responders often reject offers perceived as unfair, despite rational incentives to accept any positive amount. This behavior highlights the influence of social norms and emotions, such as pride and self-respect, in decision-making.
What role do heuristics play in everyday decision-making according to the synthesis?
The research indicates that heuristics enable individuals to make quick, effective decisions in common situations, as they are evolutionary adaptations. However, these rules can lead to systematic errors in contrived scenarios, where evolutionary pressures are absent.
When did behavioral economics begin to diverge from mainstream economic theories?
Behavioral economics emerged significantly in the late 20th century, beginning with pivotal contributions from Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970s. These works highlighted deviations from utility maximization and introduced concepts of systemic irrationality.
How does the concept of ecological rationality differ from rule-rationality?
Ecological rationality focuses on adapting behaviors to specific environments, emphasizing optimality based on context. Rule-rationality, however, accounts for both rational and irrational behaviors and specifies that deviations arise in unusual, contrived contexts.
References (44)
- Simon, H.A. Administrative Behavior (Macmillan, 1947).
- Newell, A., Shaw, C. & Simon, H.A. The process of creative thinking. in Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking (eds. Gruber, H. E., Terrell, G., & Wertheimer, M.) 63-119 (Atherton, 1962).
- Hetzel, R. L. Econ. Q. 93, 1-30 (2007).
- Friedman, M. The methodology of positive economics. in Essays in Positive Economics 3-43 (U. Chicago Press, 1953).
- Siegel, S. & Goldstein, D. A. J. Exp. Psychol. 57, 37-42 (1959).
- Guth, W., Schmittberger, R. & Schwarze, B. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 3, 367-388 (1982).
- Hegel, G.W.F. Phänomenologie des Geistes [Phenomenology of the Spirit] (Joseph Anton Gebhardt, 1807).
- Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene (Oxford Univ. Press, 1976).
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. Science 185, 1124-1131 (1974).
- Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. Psychol. Rev. 103(582-591), 592-596 (1996).
- Bentham, J. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (T. Payne, 1789).
- Harsanyi, J. C. Theory Decis. 12, 115-133 (1980).
- Dostoyevsky, F. Prestuplenie i nakazanie [Crime and Punishment]. (The Russian Messenger, 1866).
- Aumann, R. J. Games Econ. Behav. 21, 2-14 (1997).
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. Judgments of and by representativeness. in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (eds. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A.) 84-100 (Cambridge U. Press, 1982).
- Hertwig, R. & Gigerenzer, G. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 12, 275-305 (1999).
- The Real Mother Goose. (Rand McNally, 1916).
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. Psychol. Rev. 90, 293-315 (1983).
- McClure, S. M., Laibson, D. I., Loewenstein, G. & Cohen, J. D. Science 306, 503-507 (2004).
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. J. Bus. 59, S251-S278 (1986).
- Hertwig, R. & Ortmann, A. Ethics Behav. 18, 59-92 (2008).
- Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. & Thaler, R. H. J. Bus. 59, S285-S300 (1986).
- Espin, A. M., Brañas-Garza, P., Herrman, B. & Gamella, J. F. Proc. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 279, 4923-4928 (2012).
- Brañas-Garza, P., Espin, A. M., Exadaktylos, F. & Herrman, B. Sci. Rep. 4, 6025 (2014).
- Aumann, R. J. Survey of repeated games. in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern 11-42 (Wissenschaftsverlag, 1981).
- Aumann, R. J. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 103, 17075-17078 (2006).
- Brañas-Garza, P., Rodriguez-Lara, I. & Sánchez, A. Sci. Rep. 7, 42446 (2017).
- Knafo, A. et al. Genes Brain Behav. 7, 266-275 (2008).
- Mayr, E. The Growth of Biological Thought (Belknap Press, 1982).
- O'Neill, B. Honor, Symbols, and War (Univ. Michigan Press, 1999).
- Stigler, G. S. & Becker, G. S. Am. Econ. Rev. 67, 76-90 (1977).
- Andreoni, J. & Miller, J. Econometrica 70, 737-753 (2002).
- Smith, V. L. Am. Econ. Rev. 93, 465-508 (2003).
- Tirole, J. Am. Econ. Rev. 99, 265-294 (2009).
- Rustagi, D., Engel, S. & Kosfeld, M. Science 330, 961-965 (2010).
- Fehr, E. & Leibbrandt, A. J. Public Econ. 95, 1144-1155 (2011).
- Delton, A. W., Krasnow, M. M., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 108, 13335-13340 (2011).
- Kahneman, D. Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
- Todd, P.M. & Gigerenzer, G. & ABC Research Group. Ecological Rationality (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).
- Fawcett, T. W. et al. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 153-161 (2014).
- Heller, Y. & Winter, E. Int. Econ. Rev. 57, 997-1026 (2016).
- Dye, R. A. Int. Econ. Rev. 26, 233-250 (1985).
- Chittka, L., Gumbert, A. & Kunze, J. Behav. Ecol. 8, 239-249 (1997).
- Gigerenzer, G. Psychol. Rev. 103, 592-596 (1996).