Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Outline

Title
Abstract
Introduction
Empirical Findings on Cooperation in R&D
Empirical Findings on the Forms of Cooperation
Conclusion
References
All Topics
Economics
Risk Analysis

Incentives and forms of cooperation in research and development

Profile image of Damiano SilipoDamiano Silipo

2008, Research in Economics

https://doi.org/10.1016/J.RIE.2008.04.003
visibility

…

description

19 pages

link

1 file

Abstract

The paper examines the main factors that affect the incentive to cooperate in R&D, inquiring into the effects of cooperation on incentives to innovate in both a complete and an incomplete contract framework. It considers several forms of cooperative agreements and studies the circumstances that make one type of cooperation, more likely than others, to emerge. Theoretical considerations suggest that two of the main factors are uncertainty and spillovers. Further, the incentive to cooperate may be greater or less among symmetric than among asymmetric firms, depending on the source of the asymmetry. When firms cooperate, in most cases they prefer a research joint venture, but because of transaction costs, moral hazard and adverse selection problems other forms of cooperation in R&D may occur. Uncertainty and spillovers also affect the size and the nature of coalitions, and in some circumstances competing research joint ventures may be formed. Finally, the paper surveys the empirical evidence and discusses its consistency with the theoretical conclusions.

Related papers

Cooperation and competition in an R&D market with spillovers
Damiano Bruno Silipo

Research in Economics, 2005

In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive to cooperate among firms at any or all of the following three stages. Firms can jointly agree on the level of R&D expenditures, they can set up joint research facilities, and/or they can engage in an information sharing agreements, by which they agree to share any findings with the other firm. We compare expenditures on R&D, profit levels, and welfare levels across the different possible cooperative and competitive setups and offer antitrust implications. Our model differs from previous analyses in three important ways. First, most studies consider only research aimed at lowering production costs, and therefore consider only situations where total industry profits fall as spillovers increase. We allow for the industry profits to increase, and define the concepts of offsetting spillovers (falling total profits) and incremental spillovers (when total profits increase as spillovers increase). Second, we consider a wider variety of cooperation possibilities than do most prior studies. Finally, we use far more general functional forms than is usual in the literature.

View PDFchevron_right
Cooperation and competition in an R&D market with spillovers
Damiano Bruno Silipo

Ssrn Electronic Journal, 2003

In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive to cooperate among firms at any or all of the following three stages. Firms can jointly agree on the level of R&D expenditures, they can set up joint research facilities, and/or they can engage in an information sharing agreements, by which they agree to share any findings with the other firm. We compare expenditures on R&D, profit levels, and welfare levels across the different possible cooperative and competitive setups and offer antitrust implications. Our model differs from previous analyses in three important ways. First, most studies consider only research aimed at lowering production costs, and therefore consider only situations where total industry profits fall as spillovers increase. We allow for the industry profits to increase, and define the concepts of offsetting spillovers (falling total profits) and incremental spillovers (when total profits increase as spillovers increase). Second, we consider a wider variety of cooperation possibilities than do most prior studies. Finally, we use far more general functional forms than is usual in the literature.

View PDFchevron_right
The Impact of Market Structure and Learning on the Tradeoff between R&D Competition and Cooperation
David Besanko

The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013

This paper compares R&D competition and cooperation when firms can devote resources to a 'safe' investment or a risky R&D investment. When the discovery of a new product creates positive externalities on non-discovering firms, equilibrium investment flow, ex ante investment, and welfare under R&D competition are less than or equal to what they are under research cooperation. With negative externalities, R&D cooperation results in the same or lower ex ante investment than under R&D competition, and social welfare may also be less. Our results have relevance for empirical studies of the impact of R&D cooperation on R&D outcomes. *We would like to thank the Editor and two anonymous referees for their extensive and valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.

View PDFchevron_right
Cooperation and Competition in a Duopoly R&D Market
Damiano Bruno Silipo

In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive to cooperate among firms at any or all of the following three stages. Firms can jointly agree on the level of R&D expenditures, they can set up joint research facilities, and/or they can engage in an information sharing agreements, by which they agree to share any findings with the other firm. We compare expenditures on R&D, profit levels, and welfare levels across the different possible cooperative and competitive setups and offer antitrust implications. Our model differs from previous analyses in three important ways. First, most studies consider only research aimed at lowering production costs, and therefore consider only situations where total profits fall as spillovers increase. We allow for the possibility of product innovation, and define the concepts of offsetting spillovers (falling total profits) and incremental spillovers (when total profits increase as spillovers increase). Se...

View PDFchevron_right
THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE R&D
Gamal Atallah

Australian Economic Papers, 2004

La littérature sur la R&D préconcurentielle a toujours considéré la coopération et la non-coopération comme des substituts. Dans ce papier, on adopte une approche plus réaliste, où la R&D coopérative et non-coopérative sont effectuées en parallèle. Dans la première étape, les firmes investissent dans les deux types de R&D. Dans la deuxième étape, elles se concurrencent en quantités. Il est démontré que le partage d'information entre les firmes contribue à la R&D non-coopérative, en plus de contribuer à la R&D coopérative. Chaque type de R&D renforce l'autre, impliquant une complémentarité entre les deux. L'investissement en R&D coopérative peut être supérieur ou inférieur à l'investissement en R&D non-coopérative. Dans un duopole de Cournot, la part de la R&D coopérative se situe entre 20% et 80% de la R&D totale, et cette part augmente avec les externalités de recherche et le partage d'information. Il est optimal de subventionner la moitié des coûts de la R&D coopérative, alors que la subvention à la R&D non-coopérative est inchangée par rapport au modèle standard. Les consommateurs préfèrent des niveaux intermédiaires d'externalités de recherche et de partage d'information, alors que les firmes préfèrent des niveaux plus élevés d'externalités, ce qui implique des niveaux très faibles de partage d'information.

View PDFchevron_right
Repeated R&D cooperation with spillovers
Katrien Kesteloot

The literature on the incentives for R&D cooperation typically only deals with the factors affecting cooperative profits. This paper focusses on the incentives to cheat and the stability of such cooperative ventures in a repeated game framework. It is shown that incentives to cheat may result in more or less R&D than in the cooperative agreement and how spillovers and the nature of product market competition affect the stability of cooperation. While cooperative profits are higher with large positive spillovers, such as in fundamental research, our analysis shows that it may be easier to sustain cooperative agreements in areas with lower spillovers, such as applied research, because of the smaller incentives to cheat on an initial agreement.

View PDFchevron_right
Research joint ventures: A cooperative game for competitors
John Aloysius

European Journal of Operational Research, 2002

A ®rm considering a research joint venture with its competitors, balances potential bene®ts of cooperation with con¯icting interests. I model ®rms as players in a game in coalitional form ± the Joint Venture Game, and study asymmetries with respect to ability to fund, market power, and technological capital. In a duopoly between ®rms that are symmetric in all respects, I show that cooperation is always optimal. When ®rms are asymmetric, cooperation may not be optimal for a ®rm with an advantage when the other ®rm can be outright barred from entry into the market. Cooperation may also not be optimal for a ®rm with a disadvantage, when that ®rm can be barred from making a ®nancially viable entry into the market. Finally, in an oligopoly, the necessary conditions for cooperation imply that optimally, all ®rms which cannot be excluded from competing in the product market should cooperate in a single joint venture. Ó (J.A. Aloysius). 0377-2217/02/$ -see front matter Ó 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 3 7 7 -2 2 1 7 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 6 4 -9

View PDFchevron_right
Determining factors in the success of R&D cooperative agreements between firms and research organizations
Luis Angel Guerras-Martin

Research Policy, 2004

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of a series of contextual and organizational factors on the success of 800 cooperative agreements between Spanish firms and research organizations, run between 1995 and 2000. Findings show that the most outstanding factors are, in the case of firms, commitment, previous links, definition of objectives and conflict, whereas for research organizations previous links, communication, commitment, trust and the partners’ reputation are more relevant. These study not only provides a comprehensive theoretical model to analyze the success of these agreements but is useful both for improving management of cooperation and for fostering collaboration both at a national an international level.

View PDFchevron_right
Cooperation in R&D: patenting, licensing and contracting
Sergei Guriev

2012

In this paper we review some of the literature on R&D collective arrangements using game theoretical concepts and considering various settings, involving either complete or incomplete contracts. Patent protection, licensing in various industry contexts as well as the role of various factors such as product differentiation, innovation magnitude and asymmetric information are considered. The relation of innovative activity to the intensity of competition is reconsidered and the benefit of various types of cooperative R&D-agreements in presence of externalities are reviewed. The last two sections are devoted to contracting issues.

View PDFchevron_right
Firms' R&D cooperation strategies: the partner choice
Manuela Gussoni

Discussion Papers, 2010

The aim of the paper is that of providing empirical evidence on the issue of firms' R&D cooperation strategies examining the subject from the point of view of the partner choice. When dealing with the topic of R&D cooperation, the main research interest essentially resides in four broad ...

View PDFchevron_right

References (118)

  1. Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1994. The management of innovation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4), 1185-1209.
  2. Amir, R., Evstigneev, I., Wooders, J., 2003. Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates. Games and Economic Behavior 42, 183-207.
  3. Arrow, K.J., 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for inventions. In: Nelson, R.R. (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Incentive Activity. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  4. Arrow, K.J., 1969. Classificatory notes on the production and transmission of technological knowledge. American Economic Review 59, 29-35.
  5. Banerjee, S., Lin, P., 2001. Vertical research joint ventures. International Journal of Industrial Organisation 19, 285-302.
  6. Baumol, W.J., 2001. When is inter-firm coordination beneficial? The case of innovation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19 (5), 727-737.
  7. Bayona, C., Garcia-Marco, T., Huerta, E., 2001. Firms' motivations for cooperative R&D: An empirical analysis of Spanish firms. Research Policy 30, 1289-1307.
  8. Beath, J., Poyago-Theotoky, J., Ulph, D., 1998. Organization design and information-sharing in a research joint venture with spillovers. Bulletin of Economic Research 50 (1), 47-59.
  9. Beath, J., Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D., 1988. R&D rivalry versus R&D cooperation under uncertainty. Recherches Economique de Louvain 54, 373-384.
  10. Becker, W., Dietz, J., 2004. R&D cooperation and innovation activities of firms-evidence for the German manufacturing industry. Research Policy 33, 209-223.
  11. Belderbos, R., Carree, M., Diedern, B., Lokshin, B., Veugelers, R., 2004. Heterogeneity in R&D cooperation strategies. International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 1237-1263.
  12. Belleflamme, P., 2000. Stable coalition structures with open membership and asymmetric firms. Game and Economic Behavior 30, 1-21.
  13. Berg, S., Duncan, J., Friedman, P., 1982. Joint Venture Strategies and Corporate Innovation. Gunn & Hain, Cambridge, MA.
  14. Bernheim, B.D., Peleg, B., Whinston, M.D., 1987a. Coalition -Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts. Journal of Economic Theory 42, 1-12.
  15. Bernheim, B.D., Peleg, B., Whinston, M.D., 1987b. Coalition -Proof Nash Equilibria I. Applications. Journal of Economic Theory 42.
  16. Bernstein, J., 1988. Cost of production, intra and inter-industry R&D spillovers: Canadian evidence. Canadian Journal of Economics 2, 324-347.
  17. Bernstein, J., Nadiri, M.I., 1988. Interindustry R&D spillovers, rate of return, and production in high technology industries. American Economic Review 78, 429-434.
  18. Bhattacharya, S., Glazer, J., Sappington, D.E.M., 1992. Licensing and sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures. Journal of Economic Theory 56, 43-69.
  19. Bloch, F., 1995. Endogenous structures of associations in oligopolies. Rand Journal of Economics 26, 537-555.
  20. Bloch, F., 1996. Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games and Economic Behavior 14, 90-123.
  21. Branstetter, L., Sakakibara, M., 2002. When do research consortia work well and why? Evidence from Japanese panel data. The American Economic Review 92, 143-159.
  22. Cabral, L.M.B., 2000. R&D cooperation and product market competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization 7, 1033-1048.
  23. Caloghirou, Y., Ioannides, S., Vonortas, N.S., 2003. Research joint ventures. Journal of Economic Surveys 17 (4).
  24. Cassiman, B., Veugelers, R., 2002. R&D cooperation and spillovers: Some empirical evidence from Belgium. American Economic Review 92 (4), 1169-1184.
  25. Chaudhuri, P., 1995. Technological asymmetry and joint product development. International Journal of Industrial Organization 13, 23-39.
  26. Chen, Z., Ross, T.W., 2003. Cooperating upstream while competing downstream: A theory of input joint ventures. International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 381-397.
  27. Choi, J.P., 1992. Cooperative R&D with moral hazard. Economics Letters 39, 485-491.
  28. Choi, J.P., 1993. Cooperative R&D with product market competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization 11, 553-571.
  29. Cohen, W, Levinthal, D., 1989. Innovation and learning: The two faces of R&D. Economic Journal 99, 569-596.
  30. Colombo, M., Garrone, P., 1996. Technological cooperative agreements and firm's R&D intensity. A note on causality relations. Research Policy 25, 923-932.
  31. Combs, K.L., 1992. Cost sharing versus multiple research projects in cooperative R&D. Economics Letters 39, 353-357.
  32. Combs, K.L., 1993. The role of information sharing in cooperative research and development. International Journal of Industrial Organization 11, 535-551.
  33. D'Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., 1988. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers. American Economic Review 78, 1133-1137.
  34. De Bondt, R., 1996. Spillovers and innovative activities. International Journal of Industrial Organization 15, 1-28.
  35. De Bondt, R., Wu, C., 1997. Research joint venture cartels and welfare. In: Poyago-Theotoky, J. (Ed.), Competition, Cooperation, Research and Development. The Economics of Research Joint Ventures. Macmillan, London, pp. 39-56.
  36. De Bondt, R., Henriques, I., 1995. Strategic-investment with asymmetric spillovers. Canadian Journal of Economics 28, 656-674.
  37. De Bondt, R., Veugelers, R., 1991. Strategic investment with spillovers. European Journal of Political Economy 7, 345-366.
  38. De Fraja, G., 1993. Strategic spillovers in patent races. International Journal of Industrial Organisation 11, 139-146.
  39. De Fraja, G., Silipo, D.B., 2002. Product market competition, R&D and welfare. Research in Economics 56, 381-397.
  40. Desai, M.A., Foley, C.F., Hines Jr., J.R., 2004. The costs of shared ownership: Evidence from international joint ventures. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 323-374.
  41. Doz, Y., 1988. Technology partnership between large and small firms: Some critical issues. In: Contractor, F., Lorange, P. (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies in International Business. D.C. Health and Co., Lexington, MA, pp. 317-338.
  42. Eerola, E., Määttänen, N., 2004. Strategic alliances, joint investments, and market structure. International Journal of Industrial Organization 2, 241-252.
  43. Fritsch, M., Lukas, R., 2001. Who cooperates on R&D? Research Policy 30 (2), 297-312.
  44. Gandal, N., Scotchmer, S., 1993. Coordinating research through research joint ventures. Journal of Public Economics 51, 173-193.
  45. Grossman, G.M., Shapiro, C., 1986. Research joint venture: An antitrust analysis. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 315-337.
  46. Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-719.
  47. Hagedoorn, J., Link, A.N., Vonortas, N.S., 2000. Research partnerships. Research Policy 29, 567-586.
  48. Hagedoorn, J., Schakenraad, J., 1994. The effects of strategic technology alliances on company performance. Strategic Management Journal 16, 214-250.
  49. Harrigan, K., 1988. Strategic alliances and partner asymmetries. In: Contractor, F., Lorange, P. (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies in International Business. D.C. Health and Co, Lexington, MA, pp. 205-226.
  50. Hart, O.D., 1995. Firms, contracts and financial structure. Oxford University Press.
  51. Hart, O.D., Moore, J., 1990. Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 98, 1119-1158.
  52. Hernan, R., Martin, P., Siotis, G., 2003. An empirical evaluation of the determinants of research joint venture formation. Journal of Industrial Economics 1, 75-89.
  53. Ishii, A., 2004. Cooperative R&D between vertically related firms with spillovers. International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 1213-1235.
  54. Jacquemin, A., 1988. Cooperative agreements in R&D and European antitrust policy. European Economic Review 32, 551-560.
  55. Jaffe, A., 1986. Technological opportunities and spillovers of R&D: Evidence from firms' patents, profit and market value. American Economic Review 76 (5), 984-1001.
  56. Kamien, I.M., Muller, E., Zang, I., 1992. Research joint ventures and R&D cartels. American Economic Review 82, 1293-1306.
  57. Kamien, M.I., Zang, I., 1993. Competing research joint ventures. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2 (1), 23-40.
  58. Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D., 1998. Endogenous spillovers and the performance of research joint ventures. The Journal of Industrial Economics XLVI, 333-357.
  59. Katz, M.L., 1986. An analysis of cooperative research and development. Rand Journal of Economics 17, 527-543.
  60. Katz, M.L., Ordover, J.A, 1990. R&D cooperation and competition. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 137-191.
  61. Kim, C., Shin, H., 2002. Endogenous formation of coalitions with composite goods. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 1491-1511.
  62. Kleinknecht, A., van Reijnen, J., 1992. Why do firms cooperate in R&D: An empirical study. Research Policy 21, 347-360.
  63. Kogut, B., 1988. A study of the life cycle of joint ventures. In: Contractor, F., Lorange, P. (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies in International Business. Lexington Books, Boston MA, pp. 169-186.
  64. Leahy, D., Neary, J.P., 2005. Symmetric research joint ventures: Cooperative substitutes and complements. International Journal of Industrial Organization 23, 381-397.
  65. Levin, R., Reiss, P., 1988. Cost-reducing and Demand-creating R&D with Spillovers. Rand Journal of Economics 19, 538-556.
  66. Levin, R.C., Klevorick, R.R., Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G., 1987. Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development. Brookings Papers on Economics Activity: Microeconomics 3, 783-820.
  67. Link, A.N., 1990. Strategies for cooperation in R&D. In: Khalil, T., Bayraktar, B. (Eds.), Management of Technology Il. The Key to Global. Competitiveness. Institute of Industrial Engineering, Miami, pp. 335-343.
  68. Link, A.N., Bauer, L.L., 1989. Cooperative Research in U. S. Manufacturing. Lexington Books, Lexington.
  69. López, A., 2008. Determinants of R&D cooperation: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, 113-136.
  70. Marjit, S., 1990. On a non-cooperative theory of technological transfer. Economics Letters 33, 293-298.
  71. Marjit, S., 1991. Incentives for cooperative and non-cooperative R and D in duopoly. Economics Letters 37, 187-191.
  72. Martin, S., 1995. R&D Joint ventures and tacit product market collusion. European Journal of Political Economy 11, 733-741.
  73. Miotti, L., Sachwald, F., 2003. Co-operative R&D: Why and with whom? An integrated framework of analysis. Research Policy 32, 1481-1499.
  74. Miyagiwa, K., Ohno, Y., 2002. Uncertainty, spillovers, and cooperative R&D. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 855-876.
  75. Morasch, K., 2000. Strategic alliances as Stackelberg cartels -concept and equilibrium alliance structure. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 257-282.
  76. Morasch, R., 1995. Moral hazard and optimal contract form for R&D cooperation. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 28, 63-78.
  77. Motta, M., 1992. Cooperative R&D and vertical product differentiation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 10, 643-661.
  78. Nakamura, M., Shaver, J.M., Yeung, B., 1996. An empirical investigation of joint venture dynamics: Evidence from US-Japan joint ventures. International Journal of Industrial Organization 14, 521-541.
  79. Narula, R., 2002. R&D collaboration by SMEs: Some empirical issues and evidence. In: Contractor, F.J., Lorange, P. (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies and Alliances. Pergamon, Amsterdam, pp. 543-566.
  80. Okamuro, H., 2004. The effects of inter-firm cooperation: A comparative analysis of small and large firms using micro data. COE/RES Discussion Paper No. 66. Hitotsubashi University.
  81. Okamuro, H., 2007. Determinants of successful R&D cooperation in Japanese small businesses: The impact of organizational and contractual characteristics. Research Policy 36, 1529-1544.
  82. Ordover, J.A., Willig, R.D., 1985. Antitrust for high-technology industries: Assessing research joint ventures and mergers. The Journal of Law and Economics 28, 311-343.
  83. Pastor, M., Sandonis, P., 2002. Research joint ventures versus cross-licensing agreements: An agency approach. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 215-249.
  84. Perez Castrillo, J.D., Sandonís, J., 1996. Disclosure of know-how in research joint ventures. International Journal of Industrial Organization 15, 51-75.
  85. Petit, M.L., Tolwinski, B., 1999. R&D cooperation or competition? European Economic Review 43, 185-208.
  86. Poyago-Theotoky, J.A., 1995. Equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in a oligopoly with spillovers. The Journal of Industrial Economics 2, 209-226.
  87. Poyago-Theotoky, J.A., 1999. A note on endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly. Review of Industrial Organization 15, 253-262.
  88. Roller, L.M., Tombak, M.M., Siebert, R., 1997. Why firms form research joint ventures: Theory and evidence. CEPR Discussion Paper Series 1654.
  89. Rosegger, G., 1989. Cooperative research in the automobile industry: A multinational perspective. In: Link, A.N., Tassey, G. (Eds.), Cooperative Research and Development: The Industry-University-Government Relationship. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, pp. 167-186.
  90. Rosenkranz, S., 1995. Innovation and cooperation under vertical product differentiation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 13, 1-22.
  91. Rosenkranz, S., Schmitz, P.W., 1999. Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts. Economic letters 63, 181-185.
  92. Rosenkranz, S., Schmitz, P.W., 2003. Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances. Games and Economic Behavior 43, 153-173.
  93. Roy Chowdhury, I., Roy Chowdhury, P., 2001. A theory of joint venture life-cycles. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 319-343.
  94. Salant, S.W., Shaffer, G., 1998. Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures. International Journal of Industrial Organisation 16, 195-208.
  95. Schumpeter, J., 1961. Theory of Economic Development. Oxford University Press, New York, First edition 1911.
  96. Scott, J.T., 1993. Purposive Diversification and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  97. Scott, J.T., 1996. Environmental research joint ventures among manufacturers. Review of Industrial Organization 11, 655-679.
  98. Shapiro, C., Willig, R., 1990. On the antitrust treatment of production joint ventures. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, 113-130.
  99. Siebert, R., 1997. The impact of research joint ventures on firm performance: An empirical assessment. WZB, Working Paper.
  100. Sinha, D., Cusumano, M., 1991. Complementary resources and cooperative research: a model of research joint ventures among competitors. Management Science 37 (9), 1091-1106.
  101. Silipo, D.B., 2005. Cooperation in patent races: Theory and experimental evidence. Journal of Economics 85, 1-38.
  102. Silipo, D.B., Weiss, A., 2005. Cooperation and competition in a duopoly R&D market. Research in Economics 59, 41-57.
  103. Stenbacka, R., Tombak, M.M., 1998. Technology policy and the organization of R&D. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 36, 503-520.
  104. Tao, Z., Wu, C., 1997. On the organization of cooperative research and development: Theory and evidence. International Journal of Industrial Organization 15 (5), 573-598.
  105. Tyler, B.B., Steensma, K.H., 1995. Evaluating technological collaborative opportunities: A cognitive modeling perspective. Strategic Management Journal 16, 43-70.
  106. Veugelers, R., 1993. Global cooperation: A profile of companies in alliances. Research Report D.T.E.W. 9325 (K. U. Leuven, Leuven).
  107. Veugelers, R., 1997. Internal R&D expenditures and external technology sourcing. Research Policy 26 (3), 303-315.
  108. Veugelers, R., 1998. Collaboration in R&D: An assessment of theoretical and empirical findings. De Economist 146, 419-443.
  109. Veugelers, R., de Bond, R., 1992. Cooperative innovative activities. In: Antonelli, C. (Ed.), The Economics of Information Networks. North- Holland, Amsterdam.
  110. Veugelers, R., Kesteloot, K., 1994. On the design of stable joint ventures. European Economic Review 38, 1799-1815.
  111. Veugelers, R., Kesteloot, K., 1997. Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the Matthew effect catalyzing? Journal of Economics 64, 23-51.
  112. Vonortas, N.S., 1994. Inter-firm cooperation with imperfectly appropriable research. International Journal of Industrial Organization 12, 413-435.
  113. Vonortas, N.S., 1997. Research joint ventures in the US. Research Policy 26, 577-595.
  114. Vonortas, N.S., 2000. Multimarket contact and inter-firm cooperation in R&D. Journal of Evolutionary 10 (1-2), 243-271.
  115. Yi, S.S., 1997. Stable coalition structures with externalities. Games and Economic Behavior 20, 201-237.
  116. Yi, S.S., 1999. Entry, licensing and research joint ventures. International Journal of Industrial Organization 1, 1-25.
  117. Yi, S.S., Shin, H., 2000. Endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 229-256.
  118. Zhang, A., Zhang, Y., 2006. Rivalry between strategic alliances. International Journal of Industrial Organization 24, 287-301.

Related papers

A Model of Cooperative R&D Among Competitors
Deepak Sinha

Academy of Management Proceedings, 1990

Existing theoretical models of research joint ventures have influenced anti-trust policy but have several limitations. They suggest firms are more likely to cooperate when the technology is not highly appropriable, as in basic research. They also tend to ignore motivations associated with complementarity of skills and resources among potential participants as well] as firm market share, while suggesting small firms may want to enter into joint ventures to pool resources and that anti-trust policy should permit this type of cooperation. We created an economic model that incorporates multiple factors. This suggests that, in the presence of high complementarity, firms are more likely to cooperate and more likely to succeed when the technology is highly appropriable, as in applied research. Our model also indicates large firms have a greater incentive to cooperate because they probably are better positioned to capture the benefits of a research venture. These findings seem to explain why cooperative research among rival firms in Japan has been applied rather than basic, conducted frequently among large companies, and relatively successful. But firms prefer as small a partner as possible to limit the sharing of research results, creating a tension that should make cooperative efforts among rivals difficult to manage. For this reason, cooperation through neutral organizations, such as universities or non-profit institutions, appears to be a useful alternative for rival firms wishing to pool R&D resources.

View PDFchevron_right
R&D cooperative agreements between firms and research organizations. A comparative analysis of the characteristics and reasons depending on the nature of the partner
Luis Angel Guerras-Martin

International Journal of Technology Management, 2006

This paper is intended to present a descriptive analysis of a representative set of Spanish cooperative agreements in R&D activities between firms and Research Organisations (RO), including universities, public research centres and private Institutes or associations. For this purpose, we have examined 800 collaborations (1995–2000) boosted by the public agency, Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI). Firstly, the main characteristics of the project have been studied such as investment, public subsidies, kind and number of partners and duration. Secondly, the various partners have been inquired about the reasons that have led them to cooperate in R&D. Finally, the results have been analysed from a global point of view and classified according to the nature of the partner with the aim of adopting a comparative perspective of the data. The results show that cooperation between firms and RO still is not the general pattern of behaviour in Spain for technological activities.

View PDFchevron_right
On the Incentives for Cooperative and Non-Cooperative R&D in Duopoly
Tarun Kabiraj

Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2006

This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-a-vis non-cooperative research when there arc two conceivable product innovations. We show that, contrary to the literature. there are situations where non-cooperative R&D generates a larger payoff even when the success probability in R&D is high. We consider dilTercnt forms of cooperation in this context. If research cooperation has access to all these forms, cooperative R&D will dominate at least for high probability of success. We have also studied the effect of patent protection on the choice ofR&D institution. It is shown that patent protection reduces the scope of cooperation in R&D.

View PDFchevron_right
What Drives the Choice of Partners in R&D Cooperation? Heterogeneity across Sectors
Erika Badillo
View PDFchevron_right
R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers
Gamal Atallah

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d&apos;<html_ent glyph="@eacute;" ascii="e"/>conomique, 2005

This paper analyses R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that the change in R&D by a firm following cooperation is proportional to the gap between the spillover rate transmitted by that firm and a critical level of spillovers. In consequence, cooperation increases total R&D investments when the average of firms' spillover rates is sufficiently high. Whereas with symmetric spillovers cooperation is always beneficial to firms, with asymmetric spillovers only a very limited range of spillovers makes cooperation beneficial to both firms. Asymmetries also create a potential conflict between maximizing total welfare and maximizing effective cost reduction. JEL classification: L13, O33

View PDFchevron_right

Related topics

  • Economics
  • Adverse Selection
  • Incomplete Contracts

    • Cited by

    Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information
    Tarun Kabiraj

    Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2014

    View PDFchevron_right
    Forms and Determinants of R&D Collaborations: Evidence Based on French Data
    Pascale Roux

    Industry &amp; Innovation, 2010

    The aim of this paper is to explore the heterogeneity in R&D collaborations and of their determinants and motives. Using a recent French survey on research and innovation relations, we first show the heterogeneity of such relations thanks to a typology of their characteristics: their nature (common research, subcontracting , multi-partnership, management of a common structure), organizational arrangement (contract, specific investments), duration and type of research (market-oriented vs. research-oriented). Five categories of collaborations are obtained from different combinations of these relational characteristics. Using a multinomial logit estimation (and testing for the IIA assumption), we then try to explain how this diversity of partnerships is related to a broad set of explanatory variables (economic rationale for the cooperation, knowledge spillovers, appropriability conditions and partners' individual characteristics). Thanks to this original approach, we have obtained new results on R&D cooperation motives.

    View PDFchevron_right
    580 California St., Suite 400
    San Francisco, CA, 94104
    © 2025 Academia. All rights reserved