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Outline

Principle and Prudence: Rousseau on Private Property and Inequality

2014, Polity

https://doi.org/10.1057/POL.2014.13

Abstract

This article analyzes Rousseau's political theory of private property, fills a lacuna in the literature, and develops a novel interpretation of Rousseau's apparently contradictory remarks. Although Rousseau was critical of private property, he did not advocate a clear and easy solution to the problems he discerned. Instead, he put forth a highly differentiated perspective that was principled and pragmatic. He rooted the legitimacy of private ownership in an ideal theory of republican property rights, which refers primarily to the normative principle of reciprocity. In his opinion, a balance of private property rights is indispensable to a well-ordered society and a just republic not only because it binds the state, society, and citizen together, and not only because it secures the independence of individual citizens from each other, but also because it enhances political legitimacy and reciprocity. On these principled grounds, Rousseau's theory rules out "collectivist" solutions as much as vast differences in wealth and "absolutist" theories of more or less unlimited private property rights. Instead, his theory builds on the republican idea of private property as a public political institution. Within this ideal framework, Rousseau allows for certain non-ideal deviations in particular circumstances on prudential grounds.

References (7)

  1. Rousseau, "Social Contract," 448.
  2. This distinction is not accounted for in McCormick's otherwise excellent analysis of Rousseau's interpretation of the Roman assemblies. See John McCormick, "Rousseau's Rome and the Repudiation of Populist Republicanism," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 10 (2007): 3-27.
  3. Rousseau, "Social Contract," 445. 97. Ibid., 446. 98. Ibid., 447.
  4. In Poland, the institution was serfdom; in Corsica it was property and the exchange economy. This is entirely consistent with Rousseau's thought on other subjects, such as censorship, where we observe the distinction between criticisms on the one hand, and arguments directly inciting to action on the other. See Kelly, "Rousseau and the Case for (and against) Censorship," 1245. Rousseau railed against the corrupting effects of art, science, and education, yet did not mean that education, science, arts, and letters should therefore be eliminated.
  5. Rousseau, "Social Contract," 392, 403, 419; Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," 573-75. On Rousseau's rejection of the "best regime" approach, and for an intriguing discussion of this topic in both Rousseau and Montesquieu, see David Williams, "Political Ontology and Institutional Design in Montesquieu and Rousseau," American Journal of Political Science, 54 (2010): 525-42.
  6. Rousseau, "Social Contract," 403; Williams, "Political Ontology," 531-32.
  7. Rousseau, "Social Contract," 392, 403, 419. On Rousseau's prudence, see Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity, Ch. 4, and Roger Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), Ch. 8. In this, as in other aspects, "Rousseau was not wholly in the Enlightenment, but he was of it," as Peter Gay aptly portrayed Rousseau's ambivalent relationship to the Enlightenment in Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York: Norton, 1977), 529. See also Graeme Garrard, Rousseau's Counter-Enlightenment (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 3.