Computational aspects of consciousness

Two of the most important concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind are computation and consciousness. This paper explores whether there is a 'strong' relationship between these concepts in the following sense: is a computational theory of consciousness possible? That is, is the right kind of computation sufficient for the instantiation of consciousness? In this paper, I argue that the abstract nature of computational processes precludes computations from instantiating the concrete properties constitutive of consciousness. If this is correct, then not only is there no viable computational theory of consciousness, the Human Mental State Multiple Realizability in Silicon Thesis is almost certainly false.

Human and Machine Consciousness, 2018

I have really appreciated the help of Anil Seth, who supported my application for a Turing Fellowship and was very welcoming during my time at the University of Sussex. I am also grateful to the Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science and the Department of Informatics at the University of Sussex for giving me a place to work. I greatly enjoyed conversations about consciousness with my colleagues at Sussex. I would also like to thank Owen Holland, whose CRONOS project started my work on human and machine consciousness, and the reviewers of this book, who had many helpful suggestions. I owe a warm debt of gratitude to my parents, Alejandro and Penny Gamez, who have always given me a great deal of support and encouragement. Contents List of Illustrations 1 List of Illustrations All images are © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0. 2.1. Visual representation of a bubble of perception. 2.2. The presence of an invisible god explains regularities in the visible world. 2.3. Colour illusion. 17 2.4. Primary and secondary qualities. 2.5. The relationship between a bubble of experience and a brain. 21 2.6. Interpretation of physical objects as black boxes. 2.7. The relationship between a bubble of experience and an invisible physical brain. 2.8. The emergence of the concept of consciousness. 3.1. The use of imagination to solve a scientific problem. 3.2. Imagination cannot be used to understand the relationship between consciousness and the invisible physical world. 3.3. Learnt association between consciously experienced brain activity and the sensation of an ice cube. 4.1. Problem of colour inversion. 51 4.2. Some of the definitions and assumptions that are required for scientific experiments on consciousness. 4.3. The relationship between macro-and micro-scale e-causal events. 4.4. Assumptions about the relationship between CC sets, consciousness and first-person reports. 5.1. The measurement of an elephant's height in a scientist's bubble of experience. 5.2. Theory of consciousness (c-theory). 2 Human and Machine Consciousness 7.1. Information c-theory. 97 8.1. Soap bubble computer. 9.1. Testing a c-theory's prediction about a conscious state. 9.2. Testing a c-theory's prediction about a physical state. 9.3. Deduction of the conscious state of a bat. 10.1. Modifications of a bubble of experience. 10.2. A reliable c-theory is used to realize a desired state of consciousness. 11.1. A reliable c-theory is used to build a MC4 machine. 11.2. A reliable c-theory is used to deduce the consciousness of an artificial system.

Progress in Brain Research, 2007

NeuroQuantology, 2013

In the last 400 years physics has achieved great success, in theory and experimentation, determining the structure of matter and energy. The next great step in the evolution of science will be exploring the role of mind and consciousness in the universe, employing mathematics and fundamental theoretical constructs to yield specific predictions. Based on recent findings in biological autonomy, we propose to approach consciousness from the key aspect of decision-making. This approach allows us to develop a quantitative theory of consciousness as manifested in information processing. Since decision-making occurs at a certain level of organization, natural relations are obtained between consciousness at one level of organization and unconsciousness at another. By following this chain of argument, we also consider the possibility that levels of consciousness and unconsciousness form a self-closing hierarchy. This line of reasoning has led us to theoretically formulate the possible relationships between mind, cellular activity (both neuronal and non-neuronal), and the universe, working with the categories of consciousness, self-consciousness, and unconsciousness. What we propose in the present paper is a natural and straightforward extension of information theory to quantitative measures of consciousness at different levels and scales. A framework that integrates data from multiple disciplines can help us develop a broader theory of consciousness than what is possible from any single field alone. We present quantitative estimations for the rates of information processing at the global and cellular levels of the human organism and suggest values at the level of the universe. Our picture yields a new, quantitative picture of the mental capabilities of Homo sapiens and a reformulation of our place in the universe.

The dual-aspect-dual-mode framework of consciousness, based on neuroscience, consists of four components: (1) dual-aspect primal entities; (2) neural-Darwinism: co-evolution and co-development of subjective experiences (SEs) and associated neural-nets from the mental aspect (that carries the SEs/proto-experiences (PEs) in superposed and unexpressed form) and the material aspect (mass, charge, spin and spacetime) of fundamental entities (elementary particles), respectively and cotuning via sensorimotor interaction; (3) matching and selection processes: interaction of two modes, namely, (a) the non-tilde mode that is the material and mental aspect of cognition (memory and attention) related feedback signals in a neural-network, which is the cognitive nearest past approaching towards present; and (b) the tilde mode that is the material and mental aspect of the feed forward signals due to external environmental input and internal endogenous input, which is the nearest future approaching towards present and is a entropy-reversed representation of non-tilde mode; and (4) the necessary ingredients of SEs (such as wakefulness, attention, re-entry, working memory, stimulus at or above threshold level, and neural-net PEs). This framework leads to structural and functional coherence between the mind and the brain, bridges the explanatory gap (the gap between SEs and their neural-correlates), and leads to our mundane subjective experiences. This dual-aspect-dual-mode

A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious will do so for some—perhaps most—of its subsystems, as well as for irrelevantly extended systems (e.g., the original system augmented with physical appendages that contribute nothing to the properties supposedly supporting consciousness), and for aggregates of individually conscious systems (e.g., groups of people). This problem suggests that the properties that are being measured are epiphenomenal to consciousness, or else it implies a bizarre proliferation of minds. We propose that a solution to the boundary problem can be found by identifying properties that are intrinsic or systemic: properties that clearly differentiate between systems whose existence is a matter of fact, as opposed to those whose existence is a matter of interpretation (in the eye of the beholder). We argue that if a putative MoC can be shown to be systemic, this ipso facto resolves any associated boundary issues. As test cases, we analyze two recent theories of consciousness in light of our definitions: the Integrated Information Theory and the Geometric Theory of consciousness.

A solution to the " hard problem " requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub-agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub-agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal and serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least informally bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter.

1997

Joseph E. Bogen Department of Neurological Surgery, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90033-4620. ... Abstract: Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a “zombie,” computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?

Biomedcal Journal of Scientific & Technical Research, 2024

In this paper it is shown that the Informational System of Human and Living Structure is able to explain the structuration and behavior of human and subhuman organisms, including the basic component of human, animals and plants, which is the eukaryotic cell. For this, it is shown that the living organisms are connected to two main sources of information, represented by the internal/implicit genetic source, defined as iS, and explicit/external sources defined as eS, which include also the sources detecting the status of the body. The connection to matter (foods, water, air) sources, defined as mS, allows to provide energy and the necessary substitutional/added micro-elements for body running processes. Information in living organisms is defined as matter-related information (mrI), involved in structuration/destructuration, configuration/ reconfiguration processes, which absorb/release information during the application of the physics, chemical, biologic and mathematical laws on the micro/macro-structural components of the body, working as/like informational operators or informational devices. The connection to iS explains the body structure, the building of informational circuitry, sensors and the other informational tools. The connection to eS allows the optimal adaptation to the external cues, by means of info-transduction transmission/operability by micro/ macro info-devices of the body, and decisional processes toward TARGET/TERMINAL steps. Consciousness at human is a result of such informational processes, operated by MIND-an informational device working basically with DECISION and MEMORY components in two operational steps. This Informational Model of Human and Living Structures (IMHLS) is demonstrated thus to be a reliable, new and revolutionary way to explain the functioning of living organisms and consciousness, demonstrating also the priority of the Romanian contribution in this front-line investigation field.

Consciousness has been the bone of contention for philosophers throughout centuries. Indian philosophy largely adopted lived experience as the starting point for its explorations of consciousness. For this reason, from the very beginning, experience was an integral way of grasping consciousness, whose validity as a tool was considered self-evident. Thus, in Indian philosophy, the question was not to move from the brain to mind but to understand experience of an individual and how such an experience is determined through mental structures (and secondarily, the preoccupation with the brain and its relation to the mind). In contrast, cognitive science (the study of mind and cognition through 1 interdisciplinary methods, with emphasis on computational methods) found its debates soaked in discussion which primarily involved the brain and mind. Experience was not considered a primary source of information and its validity had to be established to consider it a source of information of mind. With the rise of physicalism and realization that mental states are correlative to brain states, the body was virtually neglected from involvement in understanding the mind and the attempts to reduce mind to the brain were rampant. The inability to explain subjective experience of an individual through neuroscientific findings alone has urged philosophers to explore other ways of understanding the ontology of mind. Over the last few years, embodied cognition and enactive approach have brought back the body as a central participant in this debate, providing fertile grounds to explain the relation of brain, body and mind. This paper proposes that we understand the brain as a complex system from which the mind emerges. This emergence is marked by the development of novel property of self-consciousness in human beings. The mind is a process which is embedded throughout the body and thus, the body acts as an actualizing medium for the individual. Thus, the brain is a necessary condition for the mind to be while the mind is embedded throughout the body. The brain and mind are in reciprocal causal relationship with one another, as is the body and environment with one another. In this paper, embodied cognition is understood through principles of Merleau Ponty's idea of embodiment, than through Andy Clark and Francis Varela's alone.