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Outline

Nonlinear Pricing with Resale

2008

Abstract

We consider the problem of a monopolist-choosing an optimal nonlinear pricing scheme-facing two consumers who can resell some or all of the goods to each other in a secondary market. We suppose that the valuations of the consumers are drawn independently from a continuous distribution. We …nd conditions for the optimum direct mechanism and show that the monopolist can be better o¤ or worse o¤ as compared to the without resale case, depending on the speci…cs of the cost function of the monopolist and the utility functions of the consumers.

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