The Origin of Utility

Theoria an International Journal For Theory History and Foundations of Science, 2003

In several recent papers Arthur Robson sketches evolutionary scenarios in order to explain why we humans evolved hard-wired utility functions and the capacity to choose flexibly on the basis of them. These scenarios are scrutinized minutely in the paper. It is pointed out that Robson ignores several relevant insightful ideas and distinctions that have surfaced in other contemporary evolutionary theorizing. A somewhat different picture of human behavior emerges once these ideas and distinctions are taken seriously.

ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 2003

The standard assumptions on utility functions in economic models are questionable in many cases. The present paper studies whether it is possible to endogenize determination of payoff functions and what are the mechanisms of their changing. The main conclusion of this investigation is that "natural" payoff functions concern reproduction of individuals. We confirm this conclusion by the known results on the Replicator Dynamics (RD).Another model shows that altruistic or cooperative behavior among relatives is evolutionary stable if it maximizes the total fitness of the family. Finally, we discusses why the mentioned models do not work for social populations, what mechanisms provide a possibility to influence individual behavior and who or what changes individual utility function.

In this paper I argue that a property realist who seeks to reduce moral normativity to the possession of the property of moral goodness is committed to affirming the self-predicating nature of moral goodness. I use this result to argue that this poses a significant challenge to hedonistic and preferential forms of utilitarianism, as such theories attempt to reduce moral goodness to the properties of maximizing pleasure and maximizing preference fulfillment respectively. And yet neither the property of maximizing pleasure nor the property of maximizing preference fulfillment is necessarily self-predicating. This calls into question the metaphysical propriety of their proposed reductions. Hedonistic1 and preferential2 utilitarian theories of ethics seek to explain moral obligation in terms of the Good, and the Good in terms of the maximization of overall happiness or preferences. This is only to say, it is obligatory to bring about a state of affairs S if and only if the obtaining of S brings it about that there is a greater amount of goodness in the world than there would be if S did not obtain. And the obtaining of S produces such a situation if and only if the obtaining of S causes the greatest amount of 1 1 Examples of modern advocates of hedonistic utilitarianism are legion: Fred Feldman,

Evolutionary Psychology in the Business Sciences, 2011

Economics has always prided itself on having a unifying theoretical framework based on rational choice theory. However, data from controlled experiments, which often provide theory the best chance to work, refute many of the rationality assumptions that economists make. The evidence against rational choice, as traditionally defined, has forced economists to rethink their traditional models. However, despite the investment of

International Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences Studies, 2022

This paper discusses whether or not we as humans are naturally wired to behave in ways that maximize our own utility. Utilitarianism has long been defined by philosophers and classical economists alike, with the utility maximization rule stating that the last dollar spent on each product yields the same amount of extra marginal utility. In this paper, human actors are shown not to maximize their own utility, especially within the rising field of behavioral economics; in turn, the concept of utility maximization is proven to not be an irrefutable law but rather a mere theoretical framework.

Furth Prize Competition, 1989

The ecosystems of we are part of have been produced by evolutionary forces. These forces, which we have termed natural selection and genetic mutation operate on the genotypes of individuals and are expressed in their specie-characteristic phenotype's ability to adapt to environmental circumstances. The primary environmental characteristics are climate, terrain and food resources. The availability of food is a result of geoclimatic conditions and is then further subject to competition, both intra and interspecie. Success is deemed to have occurred if indivduals propagate another generation, and the macroscopic results are growth and decay of relative populations of the various species. Population growth is indicative of greater "fitness" for the environment of members of that species. The operating principles are localized for the individual, ie., local optimization of food acquisition, offspring and conservation of genetic endowment drive the end results subject to macro processes of geological and climatic changes over which the individuals have no control. Now economic systems bear superficial resemblance to biological ecosystems in that there is competition for scarce resources, growth/decay of employment by economic enterprises and growth/decline in per capita wealth of a social system. Thus, it has been suggested that the paradigm of biological evolution can provide insights into the dynamics of economic systems. Classical economists postulated the principle of maximization of individual benefit subject to climatic and natural resource endowments as the driving force of economic activity, a principle comparable to the biological model of natural selection. Taking this a bit further, genetic endowment would be analogous to technological capability as expressed by the cultural endowment of a society. Cultures mutate over time to adapt to new circumstances. Thus economics is the evolutionary equivalent of food acquisition and consumption in the non-human biosphere. Since, for many millenia, until the Neolithic revolution, human efforts were primarily directed at hunting and gathering, primitive economics is just that, the search, location, capture, distribution and consumption of food. The Neolithic revolution allowed the human species to replace the search, location and capture steps with production through the cultivation of selected plants and the domestication of animals for food, labor and materials. Distribution and consumption steps were still necessary. The communication, command and technology infrastucture needed for capturing or producing food is fundamentally the same for primitive and modern societies; they are the foundations for political and economic relationships. Modern societies are characterized by greater complexity, larger populations and larger production/distribution systems, but the issues are the same. The purpose of this paper is to provide a summarized, exact mathematical model for the dynamics of evolutionary economic systems. That model can be applied to the evidence that is plentiful. It represents a digest of work that has been developed over the last twelve years and incorporated into a number of papers presented at various conferences [Karasik, 1983. 1984, 1985, 1986]. We will also show how the social dynamics intertwine with the economic ones and define the processes of cultural growth and decay, once more bringing the human element into center stage. The basic starting point for this model are two fundamental principles. Starting from the out-growth of economics from biology (and thereby physics), we find that certain relationships are invariant. Invariant principles are known as conservation laws. Conservation of energy is the most famous of these laws. This law operates in the biological realm as well in the guise of the

Novartis Foundation Symposia, 2007

In economics, equilibria are often found by equating two versions of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS). For example, my MRS in preferences (the ratio at which I am "just willing" to exchange two goods) should equal the MRS in exchange (the ratio at which I can exchange them in the market). Otherwise, I would have reason to sell one good and buy the other. At equilibrium (as shown in figure ) these two versions of the MRS must be equal. This analysis is also familiar to evolutionary ecologists, as shown in figure . There, the indifference curves are replaced by fitness isograms, which connect points of equal Darwinian fitness. In place of a budget constraint, ecologists study a variety of other constraints. The principle, however, is the same: equilibrium occurs at the point where the two curves have equal slope. These two forms of analysis are connected by something deeper than analogy. They are connected by a third equilibrium principle, which was first described by Hansson and Stuart [12]. These authors define the MRS in fitness as the ratio at which two goods can be exchanged without affecting Darwinian fitness. Thus, the MRS in fitness measures the absolute slope of the dotted lines in figure . The new equilibrium principle asserts that, at evolutionary equilibrium, the MRS in fitness must equal that in preferences. A simple proof of this principle is shown in figure . The new equilibrium principle adds an additional equation to the arsenal of economics. The MRS in preferences must now equal that in fitness as well as those in exchange and production. If the hypothesis of evolutionary equilibrium turns out to be useful, then this should allow a more powerful theory of economics.

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1998

Ecological Economics, 1998

The conventional economic paradigm assumes that tastes and preferences are exogenous to the economic system, and that the economic problem consists of optimally satisfying those preferences. Tastes and preferences usually do not change rapidly and, in the short term, this assumption makes sense. Sustainability is an inherently long-term problem and in the long run it does not make sense to assume tastes and preferences are fixed and given. If preferences are expected to change over time and under the influence of education, advertising, changing cultural assumptions, etc., the old assumption of 'consumer sovereignty' is not adequate. Different criteria of optimality are needed. How preferences change, how they relate to the goal of sustainability, and how they can or should be actively influenced to satisfy the new criteria needs to be determined. Ecological economics has emphasized the three rank ordered goals of ecological sustainability, fair distribution, and allocative efficiency. This paper examines how preferences evolve and change over time and the implications of this for developing policies that meet these three goals in democratic societies.