Julian Huxley's Transhumanism

DELIBERATIO. STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES, 2021

The acceleration of scientific and technological developments in recent decades has brought both hope and concern for mankind regarding its wellbeing and future existence. In this context, the cultural-philosophical movements of transhumanism, posthumanism and metahumanism have had an important imprint on what currently represents the finding of alternative methods to improve human and non-human living conditions. Thus, the general objective of this paper is to analyze the three aforementioned movements, using Stefan Lorenz Sorgner's book On Transhumanism (2016/2020) as a starting point. In the first part of my study, I will emphasize some of the philosophical theories and approaches that brings transhumanism and posthumanism together in their common path towards the 'posthuman', as well as those that separate them. The second part of the paper seeks to highlight the possibility that metahumanism-and especially what Sorgner calls "weak transhumanism"-is a more appropriate approach when considering the various advanced technologies designed to improve human health and lifespan. This perspective also serves to illustrate that any advanced technologies such as bio-and nano-technology, genetic engineering etc. should first of all preserve negative freedom-in terms of achieving a good life, by adopting a pluralistic, naturalistic, non-dualistic and relational understanding of our worldly existence-merged with dynamic adaptation and critical thinking regarding the challenges revealed by these future technologies.

Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences, 2023

Transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom and Ray Kurzweil argue that radical human enhancements will allow persons alive today to achieve a kind of technological immortality. The transhumanist movement has gained numerous followers who hope to live indefinitely as bio-enhanced 'posthumans' in a state of perpetual bliss. Transhumanism also has its opponents, however. Objections have been raised both to the possibility and to the desirability of the 'posthuman' future that transhumanists envision. This article argues that existing objections to transhumanism are vulnerable to one of two characteristic weaknesses. They depend either on debatable evaluative judgements or on doubtful speculation about the long-term future. Following this, I outline a new objection which, I claim, is not vulnerable to either weakness. According to this new objection, transhumanism presupposes two incompatible views of human nature.

Ethics in Progress, 2015

In his famous paper, Julian Huxley gives the outline of what he believes future humanity could – and should – look like. By pointing out the numerous limitations and feebleness the human nature is – at the time – prone to, and by confronting them with the possibilities humankind has, Huxley expresses the need to research and put into use all possible measures that would enable man achieve utmost perfection.

The appearance of this text indicates a milestone of a bigger project about transhumanism. Since the parent text was expanded beyond my initial planning and i will take some more time to be completed I thought that this part has a rather strong unity and could appear as a a standalone whole. What remains to be depicted is primarily some aspects of technoscience and the realtions with ideology (liberalism). However their impact of the first is small and the second is here wrapped inside the idea of the progress and seems to me its internal details would not affect the basic approach, structure and content of this text.

Scientific and technological advances have questioned predominant doctrines concerning the human condition. Transhumanism and posthumanism are among the most recent and prominent manifestations of this phenomenon. Debates on trans- and posthumanism have not only gained a considerable amount of academic and popular attention recently, but have also created a widespread conceptual confusion. This is no surprise, considering their recent dates of origin, their conceptual similarities, and their engagements with similar questions, topics, and motifs. Furthermore, trans- as well as posthumanism frequently question their relationship to humanism and reconsider what it means to be human. In this regard both movements are streaming beyond humanism. What this means, however, is far from clear and shall be subject of discussion in this volume.

The foundation of predictions in the human area is the past. Transhumanism is not an exception to this rule. But, on the one hand, the past does not provide sufficient arguments for transhumanist proposals (a) and on the other these predictions are dominated by epistemic arrogance (b). a) Transhumanism is dependent on how we define the humane. A continuous redefinition of humanity depending on the place o the order of evolution cancels the specific differences underlying the transhumanist movement, being always situated in the area of "all-humane". Transhumanism is based on a desire of a generation to see themselves in a central point of history, in a revolutionary time. This desire, however, has a historical character acquiring different faces over time (end of history, the new human, super human, the reborn human, end of the world, etc.) without becoming real. The transhumanist Wager proposed by Zoltan Istvan can be considered lost: Istvan's Three Laws of Transhumanism contradict the prevailing attitude of the existence of the society, given that we consider human consciousness as the focus of the humane and the existence of consciousness is dependent on the society. The society is a result of evolution, relying on a certain balance between individual and social interests. The Teleological Egocentric Functionalism is inconsistent with the natural evolution of society. The evolution of technology does not provide a sufficient argument to talk about a possible brain emulation on other media. We can see the orientation of innovations towards the facilitation of human's work, without having evidence of the desire for its replacement. The anticipated technological singularity does not aim at the construction of a consciousness, but at the emergence of a self-generating loop in the producing of information technologies. At issue is the creation of artifacts that correspond only to a certain dimension of the humane, rationality. The hypothesis of building an "artificial man" is not consistent with the interests of humanity. b) Because of epistemic arrogance, transhumanism overestimates what we know and underestimates uncertainty. All models of transhumanists expect an increase in complexity accompanied by an increase in predictability; but the artificial increase of complexity is accompanied by a decrease of predictability. The evolution of humanity is nonlinear. The predictions of the future are based on our technological certainties given that innovations have to face every time the Ontological Uncertainty. The Law of Unintended Consequences is just one example of nonlinearity affecting the transhumanism scenarios.

The Humanist and the transhumanist propose different methods for cultivating human capacities. The transhumanist claims that traditional techniques favoured by the humanist run up against the limits of our biology. She believes that prospective technologies could further the humanist cause by improving our nature. However, the transhumanist faces a difficulty. Her policies could produce posthumans. Evaluating posthuman lives might be impossible for us. But discounting them is not an option because she will share responsibility for their creation. I argue that one way through this impasse is for the transhumanist to produce posthumans or to become posthuman.