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Implications for Climate Change Communication
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Climate Change in the American Mind: Data, Tools, and Trends

Profile image of Connie Roser-RenoufConnie Roser-Renouf

Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development

https://doi.org/10.1080/00139157.2019.1589300
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The article discusses the public perception of climate change in the United States, emphasizing that while many Americans recognize its occurrence, belief in human causation is limited, often shaped by political affiliation and misperceptions about societal support for climate action. It highlights the findings from the Climate Change in the American Mind research project over the past decade and suggests that effective communication strategies must consider diverse public views to enhance engagement and address the complex social and political challenges presented by climate change.

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Climate Change in the American Mind: October 2014
Center for Climate Change Communication, Connie Roser-Renouf

Today, two thirds of Americans think global warming is happening (66%, up 3 percentage points since November, 2013), whereas only about one in six think it is not happening (16%, down 7 points). • The public’s understanding of what is causing global warming, however, is largely at odds with climate science. Currently, only half of Americans (50%) think that global warming, if it is happening, is mostly caused by human activities. By contrast, several recent studies have found that almost all climate scientists active in the field (e.g., 97%, according to Cook et al., 2013) have concluded that humancaused global warming is happening. • Just over half of Americans (55%) say they are at least “somewhat worried” about global warming, but only 11% say they are “very worried” about it. Even as the impacts of global warming have increased over time, public worry has remained relatively steady, changing little over the past four years. • According to the 2014 U.S. National Climate Assessment and other sources, the impacts of global warming are starting to be felt in the United States. Yet only one in three Americans (33%) thinks people in the U.S. are being harmed “right now” by global warming, a number that has remained steady for the past several years. • Americans are also less likely to believe global warming will cause a “great deal” or “moderate amount” of harm to them personally (36%) than to their family (42%), people in their community (43%), people in the U.S. (53%), people in other industrialized countries (53%), people in developing countries (55%), plant or animal species (64%), or future generations of people (64%). • Americans think both the private and public sectors should be doing more to address global warming. Majorities say corporations and industry (67%) and citizens themselves (63%) should be doing “much more” or “more” to address it. Half or more also believe federal, state, and local governments should be doing more: o The U.S. Congress (57%) o My member of Congress (54%) o My local government officials (53%) o My governor (53%) o President Obama (51%) Climate Change in the American Mind: October 2014 5 • Americans support a broad range of policies that would help reduce or respond to global warming. For example, solid majorities “strongly” or “somewhat” support the following: o Increased funding for improvements to local roads, bridges, and buildings to make them more resistant to extreme weather (83%) o Funding more research into renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power (77%) o Providing tax rebates to people who purchase energy-efficient vehicles or solar panels (77%) o Regulating carbon dioxide as a pollutant (75%) o Setting strict carbon dioxide emission limits on existing coal-fired power plants to reduce global warming and improve public health, where (a) power plants would have to reduce their emissions and/or invest in renewable energy and energy efficiency and (b) the cost of electricity to consumers and companies would likely increase (67%) o Requiring electric utilities to produce at least 20% of their electricity from wind, solar, or other renewable energy sources, even if it costs the average household an extra $100 a year (62%) • About one in five Americans (22%) say they are currently part of – or would “definitely” or “probably” be willing to join – a campaign to convince elected officials to take action to reduce global warming.

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climate change in the american mind
Center for Climate Change Communication
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Climate Change in the American Mind: October 2015
Connie Roser-Renouf, Center for Climate Change Communication

Key Findings • Two in three (67%) Americans think global warming is happening. By contrast, only about one in six Americans (16%) thinks global warming is not happening. • About half of Americans (53%) think that global warming, if it is happening, is mostly human caused. One in three (33%) say they believe it is due mostly to natural changes in the environment. • Only about one in ten Americans understands that nearly all climate scientists (over 90%) are convinced that human-caused global warming is happening. • Over half of Americans (57%) say they are at least “somewhat worried” about global warming, but only 16% say they are “very worried.” Worry about global warming has increased 5 points since spring 2015, an increase that is driven mostly by people who now say they are “very worried” (+5 points since the spring). • Only about one in three Americans (34%) thinks people in the U.S. are being harmed “right now” by global warming. • Since spring 2015, however, the number of Americans who think climate change will cause harm has increased substantially. More think global warming will harm them personally (42%, +6 percentage points since spring 2015), people in the U.S. (56%, +7 points), people in developing countries (61%, +9 points), and future generations (70%, +7 points). • Majorities of Americans say global warming is a major environmental (69%), scientific (62%), or agricultural issue (56%). About half consider it a major health (49%) or economic issue (47%). Fewer consider it to be a major moral (24%), poverty (17%), social justice (17%), national security (14%), spiritual (8%), or religious issue (7%). • Few Americans (4%) say they have changed their opinion about global warming in the past year, while most—85 percent—say they have not. • The number of Americans who say they discuss global warming with family and friends at least occasionally increased by 9 percentage points over the past six months, from 26% in spring 2015 to 35% in fall. • About four in ten Americans (42%, -7 percentage points since fall 2012) think “humans could reduce global warming, but it’s unclear at this point whether we will do what is necessary.” This decline signals a growing pessimism that people will successfully address climate change. For example, whereas only 4% say humans can and will successfully reduce global warming, about one in four (26%) says we won’t because people are unwilling to change their behavior, and about one in five (18%, +6 points since spring 2015) says humans can’t reduce global warming even if it is happening. Climate Change in the American Mind: October 2015 4 • At least two in three Americans say corporations and industry (72%), citizens themselves (67%), and the United States (64%) should be doing “much more” or “more” to address global warming. Moreover, many also think the U.S. Congress (59%) and/or President Obama (49%) should be doing more. • In a separate study1 conducted concurrently with the survey detailed in this report, we found that many Americans’ views of global warming, especially Catholic Americans, have recently been influenced by Pope Francis’s teachings about global warming. In this survey we found many of the same results. We call this “The Francis Effect.” • For example, Catholics were especially likely to say: “I trust Pope Francis as an information source on global warming” (77% of Catholics versus 56% of non-Catholics); “The Pope’s position on global warming had an influence on my own views about global warming” (20% versus 5%, respectively); and “The Pope’s position on global warming has made me more concerned about global warming” (19% versus 5%).

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climate change in the american mind Americans' Global Warming Beliefs and Attitudes in November 2013
Center for Climate Change Communication
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