South Africa's Nuclear Decisions

History Compass, 2010

In March 1993, South African State President F. W. de Klerk stunned the world with an announcement that the South African Apartheid Government had developed six and a half nuclear bombs during a top-secret 15-year programme. A number of factors led to the decision to develop nuclear weapons; the most important being Pretoria’s fear from the mid-1970s that a communist takeover in Southern Africa was imminent and that they needed a suitable deterrent to ensure the security of South Africa and their own position of power. It was specifically the involvement of Cuba and the Soviet Union in the Angolan Civil War that led Pretoria to a formal decision in 1978 to develop a limited nuclear capability. At the end of the 1980s, however, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the independence of Namibia, and the imminent democratisation of South Africa brought a rapid end to the perceived ideological and security threat to South Africa and indeed made the deterrence factor of the nuclear arsenal obsolete. In August 1989, Pretoria decided to destroy the arsenal, thereby becoming the first country to voluntarily destroy a nuclear arsenal before acceding to the NPT, which happened in July 1991. This article provides a chronological overview of Apartheid South Africa’s development of a nuclear arsenal, within the framework of the Cold War.

South African Historical Journal, 2010

This article, based on multi-archival research in the United States of America and South Africa, analyses the South African apartheid government's development of a nuclear capability within the framework of the Cold War, and the eventual destruction of this capability. Specific emphasis is placed on factors that led to the apartheid government's decision to develop a nuclear capability, including the perceived spread of communist influence in southern Africa, the escalating conflict with communist-backed forces on Namibia's northern frontier, and intensifying military and political strikes by the African National Congress (ANC) in exile. Specific focus is also placed on the existence of a long-standing nuclear relationship between the United States and South Africa, based on a complex relationship between apartheid and anti-communism. The article finally offers a brief analysis of the factors that led to the apartheid government's decision to destroy the nuclear arsenal, and concludes with the notion that while the general perception was that the apartheid government's ‘bomb in the basement’ gave it some degree of leverage in their relations with the outside world and within the geopolitical dynamics of southern Africa, it was perhaps not regarded as the ultimate threat by those aiding the liberation movements in southern Africa.

Politikon, 1978

This article focusses on South Africa's position regarding the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; an issue which was pushed into prominence by the Russian allegation in August 1977 that the Republic was on the verge of testing a nuclear device. The Soviet Union's objective was to embarrass the Western powers during the Lagos Conference on Apartheid, as well as to bring them in disrepute among African countries during the sessions of various United Nations bodies where South Africa's nuclear potential was discussed. Subsequent reaction from especially the United States shows that the Carter Administration will use continued nuclear cooperation with the Republic as a lever to press for political change and to secure South Africa's adherence to the NPT. The Republic has however steadfastly declined to sign the NPT. although it has made clear on several occasions that it will not allow its uranium sales to be used to increase the number of nuclear-weapon states. South Africa's refusal to sign the NPT does not necessarily reflect any desire to acquire nuclear weapons, but rather a fear that the application of "safeguards" might be economically harmful to the Republic's uranium mining industry, while the development of a new enrichment process has finally raised real concerns about possible commercial espionage. It would seem very unlikely that South Africa has in actual fact produced a nuclear device, but it would also seem imperative for the Republic neither to surrender nor to exercise the nuclear option-especially seen in the light of the peculiar politico-economic and military-strategic position it finds itself in in the international arena. South Africa's high-level nuclear technology is seen as a valuable diplomatic and strategic bargaining counter with the super powers, as well as with Black Africa. The Republic is in potential conflict with African states over its racial policies, and should its present superiority in conventional weapons be eroded by UN mandatory arms embargoes, South African strategists may begin to consider a nuclear deterrent not only as feasible, but indeed as absolutely essential. Presently, however, it is difficult to see the military value of nuclear weapons for a state whose main threat takes the form of insurgency promoted from beyond its borders. •This is the text of a talk given to the Transkei Branch of the SAIIA in Umtata on 16 November, 1977, and is based on short comments made at the Institute's monthly meeting on current international developments on

Journal of Cold War Studies, 2019

In 1989 the National Party (NP) government of South Africa willingly destroyed the country's six and a half nuclear devices when it became clear that the party could no longer maintain its "apartheid" segregation policy without dire consequences for the country. Over the years, many questions have been raised about why Pretoria wanted nuclear weapons and how it was able to obtain a nuclear capability in a relatively short period of time. The unavailability of archival material (the apartheid government allegedly destroyed device blueprints and related documents), complicates efforts to obtain the full picture. However, the ongoing declassification of archival material has allowed new insights into South Africa's nuclear weapons history. This article, based on research in South African and U.S. archives, tells a small piece of the story of "Apartheid's Bomb" and how it fit into the larger framework of southern Africa, which became a Cold War battlefield in the mid-1970s. In discussing this issue, the article focuses specifically on U.S.-South African relations. The year 1974 was a watershed in apartheid South Africa's quest to obtain a nuclear device. After the leftwing military coup in Portugal that year, South African leaders anticipated the removal of the colonial governments in Angola and Mozambique and a surge of Communist influence in southern Africa. 1 Cuban forces soon arrived in Angola, assisted by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). This led the anti-Communist apartheid government in Pretoria to believe that a Soviet-orchestrated assault 1.

International History Review, 2018

The 1970s is often argued to be the era marking the beginning of the overall transformation of the international system and the nuclear order, following the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) entering into force in 1970. South Africa challenged this nuclear order from the outset. In addition to regarding the NPT as inherently discriminatory and hypocritical in allowing a difference between nuclear weapon 'haves' and 'have-nots', the South African apartheid regime felt threatened by Soviet expansionism into Southern Africa. Facing international condemnation and isolation due to its repressive domestic politics of racial segregation, and gripped in a war against Soviet-and Cuban-backed forces in Angola, the apartheid regime was quick to move from a decision to build one peaceful nuclear explosive device in 1974, to a formal decision in 1978 to design and develop a secret strategic nuclear deterrent. Using knowledge and skills acquired during a period of techno-nationalism and Western collaboration during the 1960s, South Africa was able to cross this threshold in a relatively short space of time, thereby signaling a clear departure from the nuclear non-proliferation regime that the five nuclear powers of the NPT were trying to establish.