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Title
Abstract
FAQs
Introduction
Material Constitution
Conclusions
Conclusioni
References
All Topics
Psychology
Personality Psychology

Ontology and the Self: Ancient and Contemporary Perspectives.

Profile image of Massimo MarraffaMassimo Marraffa

2018, Discipline filosofiche

https://doi.org/10.1400/257708
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267 pages

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Abstract

Ontology and the Self: Ancient and Contemporary Perspectives This article focuses on ancient and contemporary accounts of selfhood and on their ontological background. Among ancient theories, the main focus are Plato's and Plotinus' accounts of soul and selfhood. Their ontological framework now appears outdated but, somewhat paradoxically, it also explains why Plato's and Plotinus' analyses are closer to a naturalised metaphysics of the self than those of the Cartesian tradition. Accordingly, human beings are not simple subjects essentially characterised by consciousness; consciousness and mental life are not co-extensive; our selfhood entails a striving towards the unity of various layers. These insights come up again in recent debates, but they are now reshaped within a framework in which philosophy of mind and behavioural sciences are combined in an effort to develop a notion of the self which (like that of Plato) is realist, yet (unlike what happens in Plato) does not entail any metaphysically grounded dualism.

FAQs

sparkles

AI

How does Platonic ontology inform contemporary understandings of the self?add

The research indicates that Platonic conceptions propose a multi-layered selfhood, integrating different aspects, as seen in Part II of the study.

What are key differences between Aristotle's and Neo-Aristotelian Mereology?add

The study clarifies that Aristotle's hylomorphism distinguishes between formal and material aspects more fundamentally than NAM's interpretation allows.

What significance does Aristotle’s notion of final cause hold in contemporary biology?add

Aristotle's teleological explanations align with recent emergentist models by asserting intrinsic purposes in biological functions according to contemporary functional realism.

How do ancient and modern perspectives on the self converge or diverge?add

The findings show both Plato's and Plotinus' frameworks highlight a dynamic selfhood, contrasting starkly with Cartesian views centered on self-consciousness.

What role does the identity-theory play in Aristotle's metaphysics?add

The findings illustrate Aristotle's emphasis on unity through function, suggesting a deeper relationship between identity and essence than mereology might capture.

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  229. infatti si dicono, in altrettanti modi significano l'essere. Poiché quindi, tra le categorie, alcune significano l'essenza (τί ἐστι), altre la qualità (ποιόν), altre la quantità (ποσόν), altre la relazione (πρός τι,), altre l'agire o il patire (ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν), altre il dove (πού) e altre il quando (ποτέ), l'essere ha lo stesso significato per ciascuna di esse. Infatti, non vi è differenza tra 'l'uomo è stante bene' e 'l'uomo sta bene'". 11 Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς […] σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων. 12 Su ciò vedi Barnes 1995, pp. 72-77. 13 Vedi supra, nota 7, p. 162.
  230. Alex., in metaph. 376, 7-9: "Tra gli esistenti, infatti, soltanto la sostanza è separabile, cioè esistente per se" (μόνον γὰρ τῶν ὄντων χωριστὸν καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὂν ἡ οὐσία). Anche qui in- terpreto ὄν esistenzialmente, e prendo καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὂν come esplicativo di χωριστόν, il cui senso sarebbe quindi "esistente di per sé, in modo indipendente". 43 Vedi ad esempio K. Fine 1995; Thanko, Lowe 2015; Schaffer 2009, per fare solo degli esempi. 44 Vedi supra, p. 168 e nota 31.
  231. Alex., in metaph., 242, 10-12: ὂν γὰρ λέγεται κυρίως μὲν ἡ οὐσία, λέγεται δέ γε ὄντα καὶ τὰ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συμβεβηκότα, ἅ ἐστι τὰ ἐννέα γένη.
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  440. ma proprio in quanto aspetto privilegiato dell'essere dell'ente, innanzitutto nella comprensione greca dello stesso. Heidegger a questo punto del corso afferma di essersi reso conto, dalle domande dell'uditorio, che il chiarimen- to dei primi tre aspetti necessita della spiegazione del quarto. Questa moti- vazione, per quanto legata qui a un'apparente circostanza accidentale, vale in realtà già per lo stesso Heidegger come il procedimento più sensato, dac- ché interrogare l'essere dell'ente lasciando da parte il suo aspetto di esser vero come privilegiato non rischia solo di generare l'incomprensione, ma anche di presentare un fraintendimento della stessa articolatezza iniziale dell'essere, la cui comprensione è sì molteplice ma sempre nel riferimento a quell'uno che è il suo carattere autentico, privilegiato e, si vedrà, predominante. Proprio da questa molteplicità della comprensione dell'essere, che già si è riscontrata nella parola fondamentale οὐσία quale ricchezza e varietà dei significati, prende le mosse il confronto di Heidegger con questo quarto a- spetto dell'essere e con Aristotele, che in più luoghi della Metafisica -Γ, Δ e Z -afferma: τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, l'ente è detto in molteplici modi. "L'ente è detto in quanto ente in molteplici modi. Brevemente e in maniera più chiara: noi comprendiamo l'essere in un modo molteplice. Aristotele conosce quattro modi in cui nominiamo l'ente in quanto tale, quattro modi i quali senz'altro non coincidono con la quadruplice articolatezza che ab- biamo presentato -il che adesso è irrilevante" (Heidegger 1982, p. 77; trad. it. p. 173). Così la prima risposta da parte di Aristotele alla domanda guida della filosofia "τί τὸ ὄν", ossia al fondo la questione sull'ὂν ᾗ ὄν, si risolve in una constatazione della molteplicità della comprensione dell'essere dell'ente. Questa molteplicità è però racchiusa in quattro aspetti principali, i quali per Heidegger non coincidono con quelli presentati prima -affermazione che sarebbe ancora da valutare, ma tale che comunque viene da lui stesso rite- nuta irrilevante ai fini dell'interrogazione sull'esser vero. I quattro aspetti dell'essere esposti da Aristotele sono i seguenti, così elencati dallo stesso Heidegger: 1) τὸ ὂν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν (τῆς κατηγορίας) -ὄν καϑ᾽αὑτό, l'ente nella misura in cui viene inteso così come si mostra nelle categorie. […].
  441. 2) τὸ ὂν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, l'ente per quanto concerne il suo esser in questo momento così o così, quell'essere che in questo momento o in un altro si è presenta- to nell'ente -per esempio esser rosso, esser bianco -, ma che l'ente non ha bisogno d'essere necessariamente.
  442. τὸ ὂν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν, l'ente per quanto concerne il suo esser pos- sibile ed esser effettivo.
  443. τὸ ὂν ὡς ἀληϑές καὶ ψεῦδος, l'ente per quanto concerne l'esser vero e l'esser falso (Heidegger 1982, pp. 77-78; trad. it. pp. 173-175). mariamente e per tutto il resto" (Heidegger 1982, p. 103; trad. it. p. 225). Il che significa: perché l'ente sia ente, e lo sia in quanto tale, dev'essere innan- zitutto presente l'essere, vale a dire la presenza, che è quindi la verità origi- naria da cui derivano gli altri modi d'essere e d'esser vero dell'ente. L'esser vero del semplice non riguarda infatti quel che si può affermare, καταφάναι, o pensare, διανοεῖν, dello stesso, come per il giudizio sulle cose che appunto compone e divide. Il dire, φάναι, riguardante il semplice è per Aristotele, in Θ 10, piuttosto un ϑιγεῖν, 7 "un mero toccare, ossia un semplice afferrare, non più una concezione, una considerazione del semplice in quanto qual- cos'altro, non un con-cepire ma semplicemente càpere, afferrare [kein Be- greifen, sondern einfach Greifen]" (Heidegger 1982, p. 105; trad. it. p. 229). Non dunque il pensare logico, διανοεῖν, ma il puro apprendere, νοεῖν, co- glie il semplice. 8 Non vi è qui un'elaborazione, una concezione, una messa in relazione, perché non c'è propriamente per Heidegger l'in quanto che permette di determinare l'ente in quanto qualcosa. Il semplice è sempre af- ferrato in quanto tale, per la sua assoluta presenza e verità, o non afferrato affatto, in accordo con l'ἀγνοεῖν aristotelico nel senso di pura cecità nei con- fronti del suo mostrarsi, ossia della svelatezza in quanto svelatezza. "Questa svelatezza non è nient'altro che la presenza pura del semplice in se stesso, il presente assoluto [die schlechthinnige Gegenwart], il quale esclude assolu- tamente tutto ciò che non è ancora presente e che non è più presente, per- ché, in ordine alla sua essenza, non ne ha bisogno" (Heidegger 1982, p. 105; trad. it. p. 229). Università di Roma "La Sapienza" E-mail: matteopietropaoliphd@gmail.com Bibliografia
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