SCEPTICISM AND EPISTEMIC ANGST, REDUX

Skepsis

In this paper, I present and criticize three influential anti-skeptical proposals inspired by Wittgenstein´s On Certainty. I argue that these proposals are either ineffective anti-skeptical strategies or, more importantly, might lead us to another, subtle form of skepticism

A certain interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certaintyadvanced by such figures as Hilary Putnam, Peter Strawson, Avrum Stroll and Crispin Wrighthas become common currency in the recent literature. In particular, this reading focuses upon the supposed anti-sceptical import of the Wittgensteinian notion of a "hinge" proposition. In this paper it is argued that this interpretation is flawed both on the grounds that there is insufficient textual support for this reading and that, in any case, it leads to unpalatable philosophical problems. Moreover, it is claimed that the popularity of this construal of On Certainty in the contemporary debate reflects an implicit commitment to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism. Nevertheless, it is argued that, suitably modified along the epistemologically externalist lines suggested by Michael Williams, one might be able to resurrect a viable anti-sceptical hinge proposition thesis. Furthermore, it is claimed that such a conception of the notion also receives some, albeit inconclusive, textual support from On Certainty.

Philosophical Investigations, 2018

TOPOI, 2018

Deep disagreements concern our most basic and fundamental commitments. Such disagreements seem to be problematic because they appear to manifest epistemic incommensurability in our epistemic systems, and thereby lead to epistemic relativism. This problem is confronted via consideration of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. On the face of it, this proposal exacerbates the problem of deep disagreements by granting that our most fundamental commitments are essentially arationally held. It is argued, however, that a hinge epistemology, properly understood, does not licence epistemic incommensurability or epistemic relativism at all. On the contrary, such an epistemology in fact shows us how to rationally respond to deep disagreements. It is claimed that if we can resist these consequences even from the perspective of a hinge epistemology, then we should be very suspicious of the idea that deep disagreements in general are as epistemologically problematic as has been widely supposed.

Action, Decision-Making and Forms of Life, 2000

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2018

In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge-commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard's version of non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge-commitments (NBT). One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fairs at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain kinds of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge-commitments.

2021

'Hinge Epistemology' consists on the thought that Wittgenstein's notion of hinge propositions can be the core of a plausible epistemological theory. The very idea of what a hinge is, though, is highly controversial. There are different interpretations of hinges in the scholarship of " On Certainty " resulting in differing theories of their role in knowledge. In this work, I contemplate Moyal-Sharrock's anti-epistemic reading of hinges and argue that it is unclear what role they play in epistemic endeavours. This is due to her claim that hinges do not do any work in the language-game, as they do not have any meaning in them. Rather, the role of hinges is foundational; they support the language-game from "outside" , in a non-epistemic fashion; hinges are what we need to trust or believe in in order to have knowledge. I criticise her foundationalist reading, as it is not clear on close inspection that there are two different spheres identifiable with ground and grounded, something I take to be the minimal requirement for any kind of foundationalism. If the idea of foundationalist hinges is rightly rejected, I fail to see why they may have a role in epistemological considerations.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Although Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally more known for his works on logic and on the nature of language, but throughout his philosophical journey he reflected extensively also on epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, doubt, and certainty. This interest is more evident in his final notebook, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC), where he offers a sustained and, at least apparently, fragmentary treatment of epistemological issues. Given the ambiguity and obscurity of this work, written under the direct influence of G. E. Moore’s A Defense of Commonsense (1925, henceforth DCS) and Proof of an External World (1939, henceforth PEW), in the recent literature on the subject, we can find a number of competing interpretations of OC; at first, this article presents the uncontentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s views on skepticism, that is, his criticisms against Moore’s use of the expression “to know” and his reflections on the artificial nature of the skeptical challenge. Then it introduces the elusive concept of “hinges,” central to Wittgenstein’s epistemology and his views on skepticism; and it offers an overview of the dominant “Wittgenstein-inspired” anti-skeptical strategies along with the main objections raised against these proposals. Finally, it briefly sketches the recent applications of Wittgenstein’s epistemology in the contemporary debate on skepticism.

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Springer, 2019

Scott Soames argues that consideration of the practice of legal judgement gives us good reason to favor the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory of vagueness against the epistemic theory. Despite the fact that the value of power-delegation through vagueness is evidenced in practice, Soames says, the epistemic theory cannot account for it theoretically, while the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory is capable of it. In this paper, I examine the two possible arguments against the epistemic theory that can be extracted from Soames's account: (i) an argument based on unknown obligations, and (ii) an argument based on power-delegation through vagueness. The first argument tries to convince us that, as based on the epistemic theory, the law has already decided the borderline cases, so that judges have obligatory decisions even in such cases: therefore the epistemic theory is inconsistent with the discretion of judges in borderline cases. I show that even if we sympathize with Soames's intuitions concerning the legal practice, the argument he offers is not conclusive since it is either invalid or paradoxical. The second argument holds that only the gaps which the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory predicts give judges the possibility of lawmaking in borderline cases. However, by categorizing the vague laws as imperfect laws, the judges can claim the right of lawmaking without any need to refer to gaps in the law. By neutralizing these arguments, I argue that the epistemic theory is able to explain the phenomena just as well as the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory.