Notes towards a Theory of Traditions

il s'agit du point irréductible extrême où le geste est un corps, un espace, une figure. l'extrême irréductible de tel point est son obscénité: ce point-là n'est ni physique ni géométrique; il est la mémoire de ce qu'est le mouvement dans tout corps. Mais ce dernier est aussi bien affecté de cette mémoire inverse: le corps est une limite dans le mouvement. Cette réversion est infinie.

C]onscience,'" Nietzsche suggests early in Essay Two of On the Genealogy of Morals, "has a long history and variety of forms behind it" (II.3). Glossing over the explicit equivocity and irony of such statements, most commentators presume that the primary ambition of GM is to reconstruct the emergence and in so doing denaturalize and denounce the reign of conscience, which is treated as equivalent to both bad conscience and slave morality. Such presumption has obscured the central claims, operations, and stakes of the text, indeed of Nietzsche's late work generally. Although they are intertwined, Nietzsche's genealogy of conscience is textually, substantively, and strategically distinct from his genealogy of bad conscience, which in turn is involved in but distinct from his genealogy of slave morality. Textually, it is not until Essay Two, section four of On the Genealogy of Morals that Nietzsche begins to ask after the emergence and psychosocial ("physiological") consequences of bad conscience, while the genealogy of conscience proceeds from the first essay. Substantively, the three genealogies are concerned with manifestly disparate objects. Strategically, the addressees of the three genealogies are diverse, thus are their modes of address: genealogy cannot be reduced to a uniform method.

"Incidentally, I despise everything which merely instructs me without increasing or immediately enlivening my activity." These are Goethe's words. With them, as with a heartfelt expression of Ceterum censeo [I judge otherwise], our consideration of the worth and the worthlessness of history may begin. For this work is to set down why, in the spirit of Goethe's saying, we must seriously despise instruction without vitality, knowledge which enervates activity, and history as an expensive surplus of knowledge and a luxury, because we lack what is still most essential to us and because what is superfluous is hostile to what is essential. To be sure, we need history. But we need it in a manner different from the way in which the spoilt idler in the garden of knowledge uses it, no matter how elegantly he may look down on our coarse and graceless needs and distresses. That is, we need it for life and action, not for a comfortable turning away from life and action or merely for glossing over the egotistical life and the cowardly bad act. We wish to use history only insofar as it serves living. But there is a degree of doing history and a valuing of it through which life atrophies and degenerates. To bring this phenomenon to light as a remarkable symptom of our time is every bit as necessary as it may be painful.

The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 2018

2010

In this essay the dangers of an overconsumption of history are investigated, and concerns are raised over the nature of philosophy and its role as a central part of man. Using material from Friedrich Nietzsche an argument is built, showing how we today suffer from a disease ...

MLQ 67.4 (2006): 506-25

Jurnal Filsafat, 2023

The core of Nietzsche's philosophy is typically articulated comprehensively by contentists through key concepts such as the will to power, the eternal return, and the overman. Unfortunately, such goals are frequently arbitrary and lack rigorous textual support. Textists, on the other hand, tend to prioritize a historical-contextual approach in interpreting Nietzsche's texts in order to overcome this weakness. The textists' approach is distinguished by the genetic and literary analysis of the critical editions of Nietzsche's texts compiled by Colli/Montinari. As a result, this article begins with a brief topography of the critical editions, focusing on the role of KGW IX in genetic analysis. Furthermore, the style of genetic and literary analysis applied to aphorism 36 of BGE becomes a case study to demonstrate how the interpretation differs from that of the contentists. Textists show Nietzsche's creativity as the author of the aphorism that makes parody, irony, and satire of will-causality and moral demands in scientific explanations, whereas contentists interpret the will to power hypothesis as the essence of reality. For textists, the principle of the will to power in BGE 36 is framed in suppositional language, implying that the proposition of the will to power is also unreal.

2011

Unless otherwise cited, all translations are my own. The translation information will always follow that of KGW. 2 One can see this in the following passage from Alexander Nehamas's otherwise excellent book: "When I claim that we must pay attention to Nietzsche's style, I am claiming only that his changing styles convey 'literary' aspects of his work but that in addition to presenting his views, Nietzsche's varying, self-conscious writing enables the practiced reader always to be aware of who it is whose views are being presented, what personality these views express and constitute." From Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge,