Forestalling an Anti-Satellite Arms Race With China

Defense One, 2024

As the Pentagon builds huge constellations to shrug off conventional ASAT weapons, potential adversaries are taking things to a terrifying new level. Nearly six decades after the Outer Space Treaty banned military activities in space, its norms appear to be losing their power. In May, U.S. officials from the Defense and State Departments disclosed the possibility of Russia deploying a nuclear-detonation device into space, and that a suspected testbed satellite had already been in orbit for two years. China, meanwhile, has embarked on a campaign to expand its strategic nuclear forces beyond the numbers required for “minimum deterrence” and develop new delivery platforms, including a fractional orbital bombardment system.

Naval War College Review, 2009

hina's pursuit of an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) has been called a potential "game changer," a weapon that could single-handedly shift the strategic balance with the United States. A retired U.S. Navy rear admiral asserted as early as 2005 that an ASBM capability could represent "the strategic equivalent of China's acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964." 1 Whether or not this is accurate, an effective ASBM capability would undoubtedly constitute a formidable antiaccess weapon against the U.S. Navy in the western Pacifi c, particularly during a confl ict over Taiwan. 2 However, as the Chinese literature demonstrates, it would mean more than that. Fully operational ASBM capability along with essential C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) support would be a barometer of China's greater military modernization effort, a potential instrument for regional strategic ambitions, and perhaps an important element in tipping the long-term maritime strategic balance with respect to the United States. Given China's overall inferiority in long-range air and naval power, an ASBM would afford a powerful asymmetric means that could help deter the U.S. forces on their way to a zone of confl ict near China's littoral borders. However, the ASBM represents more than just a single weapon platform. Rather, it is seen as "a system of systems" and a key step in achieving high-tech and information war capabilities. 3 This is because the ability to launch a land-based ballistic missile at a moving target thousands of kilometers

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Contemporary Security Policy

Russia has recently tested several anti-satellite weapons. The Russian military literature reveals hedging and offsetting strategies behind these actions. First, Russians cast their weapons as a mirror response to American experiments. Russians fear a technological surprise and suggest that their experimentation hedges against significant advantages that may accrue to the United States from dominating space. Second, Russians perceive satellites providing vital targeting and navigation information as crucial enablers of U.S. and NATO aerospace precision strike weapons. Therefore, dependence on space-based assets is a vulnerability that Russia cannot fail to take advantage of in a crisis to offset U.S. and NATO military superiority. Some unilateral measures such as deploying cheaper and distributed small satellite constellations can reduce U.S. and allied vulnerabilities. Bilateral behavioral norms can offer reassurances to both the United States and Russia. However, deeper regulation and limits on emerging strategic aerospace weaponry may also be required.

Space Education & Strategic Applications, 2024

Spacefaring has emerged as a critical element of global security and strategic intelligence, playing a significant role in all aspects of national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME). China's 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test ushered in a new era in spacefaring. China conducted a devastating direct ascent ASAT test that destroyed a weather satellite, resulting in over 3000 pieces of space debris. The unexpected nature of this test caught the international spacefaring community off guard, and gave rise to immediate concerns among spacefaring powers, prompting questions about China's intention. This was a stark reminder of the multifaceted dimensions of power associated with space exploration, encompassing all the DIME soft and hard power components. These were crucial in motivating China's decision to conduct the test and shaping the responses of other spacefaring nations. The United States and China have been competitors in space for decades. However, China's recent advancements in space and acts of aggression like the ASAT test have raised concerns with the spacefaring community. The ASAT test and other potentially disruptive activities also present a thorny warning intelligence problem, as many of these activities span national power elements. Using the theoretical framework of realism, this paper assesses the significance of China's ASAT test through the lens of DIME components to shed light on its implications on global security and propose a set of intelligence recommendations intended to prevent strategic surprises in the future.

1988

OVER THE LAST 25 years the United States has become increasingly dependent on space-based systems to support its military forces, and this trend is likely to continue for some time. Satellite systems have become an integral part of nuclear deterrence by providing strategic warning of an attack, tactical warning of missile launches, reliable communications between command authorities and nuclear forces, and nuclear explosion detection. Satellites also aid in conventional war-fighting by providing accurate reconnaissance, intelligence, weather, and navigation information. Current and future anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon technologies are capable of preventing many of our space systems from carrying out their missions, thereby possibly decreasing the stability of nuclear deterrence and weakening the effectiveness of conventional forces. This paper evaluates a broad range of policy options that could help to protect our space assets. It is found that although unilateral measures could go a long way toward safeguarding satellite systems, bilateral agreements are also necessary if we are to guard against the full range of ASAT threats without generating dangerous instabilities. WHICH SATELLITES TO PROTECT? Not all satellites are equally important to our national security. The United States currently performs four basic types of military missions with satellites that are of interest here: i Communications. About a dozen satellites, grouped in four satellite systems, are used for military and diplomatic communications. Except for two satellites that relay messages to the polar regions, all U.S. military communication satellites are in geostationary orbit (GSO) 36,000 km above the surface of the earth. ii In addition to the systems already in use, an advanced, inter-service satellite communications system called MILSTAR Navigation. The U.S. has two military navigation satellite systems: Transit and NAVSTAR. Transit, which travels in low earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of about 1,000 km, was developed to aid in the navigation of Polaris submarines. The much newer NAVSTAR system, when complete, will consist of 18 satellites 20,000 km above the earth. Radio signals emitted from the navigation satellites can be used by special receivers on the earth to obtain very accurate position and velocity information. Meteorology. Two DMSP (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program) satellites in LEO process visible and infrared images of the earth to provide information on cloud cover, temperature, and precipitation worldwide. Reconnaissance and surveillance. Under this broad category are grouped several systems that observe electromagnetic signals reflected or emitted from objects on earth. These systems serve different missions: attack warning, nuclear burst detection, photoreconnaissance, and electronic surveillance. Attack warning is provided by three DSP (Defense Support Program) satellites in GSO that detect the infrared emissions of missiles as they are launched. Sensors on two dozen satellites, including those in the NAVSTAR system, can detect and locate nuclear explosions. Photoreconnaissance and electronic surveillance are highly classified programs, but it can be said that a small number of photoreconnaissance satellites travel in LEO, sometimes at altitudes less than 200 km, to obtain high-resolution photographs for use in treaty verification and intelligence. The Soviet Union uses satellites to perform the same missions, but there are three important differences between U.S. and Soviet satellite systems that should be noted here: (a) Soviet satellites have shorter lifetimes, (b) the U.S.S.R. has more single-purpose satellites, and (c) the Soviets have a large number of satellites in Molniya (highly-elliptical) orbits instead of in GSO. The first two factors combine to give the U.S.S.R. a launch rate five times greater iii and a total constellation size nearly twice as great iv as the U.S. This does not mean, however, that the U.S.S.R. has an advantage over the U.S. in space capability. Although it may be true that the Soviets can reconstitute satellite systems more quickly in the event of their destruction by ASATs, it is not clear how valuable this would be in an actual conflict (see below).

Global Security Review, 2025

The US must pursue a multi-layered strategy to deter and defeat adversary actions in space. Resilient architectures, credible counterspace capabilities, strong alliances, superior space domain awareness, and well-defined military operations are essential to ensuring freedom of action in space and securing national security interests. As space becomes increasingly contested, the ability to deter, detect, and defeat threats will determine whether the US maintains its strategic advantage beyond the atmosphere.

Survival, 2008

In the autumn 2007 issue of Survival, Ashley J. Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that China's recent anti-satellite weapons test was part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States, and that 'the United States has no choice but to run an offence-defence arms race, and win'. The article stimulated a large number of responses, and Survival invited a selection of the correspondents, and some other experts, to elaborate on their views.

Roczniki Nauk Społecznych

This article will describe three closely intertwined aspects of space rivalry between the U.S. and China against the background of their general relationship. The first refers to strategic considerations related to the military as a tool of global influence. The second covers the process of securitisation of the Chinese advancement in space applications in the United States. And finally, we will address the competition for international prestige, which is one of the essential factors of Sino-American relations.

Space Policy, 2011

Preventing the weaponization of outer space is one of the most relevant issues of the current space law debate. In recent years discussions on this issue have significantly increased in international fora, such as the UN Conference on Disarmament and the COPUOS. While it has not been possible to arrive at an agreed solution on how to efficiently deal with the problem of possible weaponization of outer space so far, several valuable proposals have been put forward. China and Russia, on the one side, and the European Union, on the other, have taken the lead in this respect. While the former have submitted a proposal for a draft treaty on the demilitarization of outer space, known as the PPWT, the latter has issued a Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Despite the differences between the two proposals, this paper proposes the development of a Chinese, Russian and European common approach aimed at preventing the weaponization of outer space. Although such a goal is undoubtedly challenging, some political and legal factors may enable such cooperation in the not-too-distant future.