Challenging the Law of Non-Contradiction
2020, Eternity & Contradiction. Journal of Fundamental Ontology
https://doi.org/10.7346/E&C-022020-06Abstract
In my paper ‘Elenchos Come Petitio Principii’, I argued that Severino’s elenctic argument does not work against a dialetheist position such as the one defended by Graham Priest. In the present paper, I will focus on some fundamental aspects of the dialetheist’s challenge to the Law of Non Contradiction that have raised many doubts, such as the claim that a true contradiction is at the same time false, or the fact that the dialetheist’s metatheory should be as inconsistent as the object theory. Moreover, I shall exploit such clarifications to reexpose some of the key passages of my critique of the elenctic strategy, in particular those regarding the second figure of elenchos. Finally, I shall reply to the objection that accuses both dialetheism and my own view of not providing incontrovertible grounds to their respective claims.
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