Extending Everything with Nothing

This paper takes a look at the concept nothingness through the Early Modern Era and the refutations against these arguments. This paper evaluates the preconceived notions of upholding the rejection of nothingness for two centuries until the 1990's came about with the school of Metaphysical Nihilists. In 2000's this school of thought was refuted against and was seen to be brought down. I come up with a new theory about the world being made out of infinitesimals by using radical Pythagorean theory, in which nothing could maybe exist in the end run if the universe is an ultrafilter.

The subject of this thesis is a position in the philosophy of mathematics—defended by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright—known variously as neo-Fregeanism, neo-Logicism or abstractionism, and which claims that knowledge of mathematical objects can be based on principles—known as abstraction principles—which are in important respects like definitions of mathematical language. In the thesis, I make a distinction between two ways in which the abstractionist programme might be carried out. These are the standardly defended static view, according to which abstraction principles can used to discover previously unrecognised objects lying within some fixed domain of quantification. The second is an expansionist view, according to which abstraction principles allow one to introduce new quantificational vocabulary, and thus expand one's domain of quantification to one containing referents of mathematical terms. There are then two main aims. The first is to examine the static position, so as to identify the components of that view which make it committed to a standard domain, and to argue against the view. My main argument against the view concerns what has become known as the bad company problem. I argue that there is an epistemological component to the bad company problem which can not be avoided by the static abstractionist. The second aim of the thesis is to argue for and defend the expansionist view. In particular, I will claim that the expansionist view avoids the bad company problem, and that the expansionist view allows for an abstractionist foundation for set theory—an aim which (or so I will argue) has so far eluded the static view.

This paper introduces a formal separation between zero and absence within the framework of CAT'S Theory: Reality = Pattern × Intent × Presence. The term "nothing" is rejected as structurally incoherent, having historically conflated two distinct ontological states. By distinguishing numerical potentiality zero from the measurable lack of presence absence, the model eliminates semantic ambiguity and strengthens its metaphysical and mathematical foundations.

Dialogue: Official Journal of Phi Sigma Tau, 2014

In this paper, I refute Giuseppe Ferraro’s attack against the Semantic Interpretation of emptiness not by considering each of his (numerous!) objections in turn, but instead by arguing against what I consider to be elementary misunderstandings of both Madhyamaka philosophy and methodology that consistently underpin all of his objections. First, I argue that Ferraro has misapplied the Semantic Interpretation to the two-truths rather than to its intended target, emptiness. From here, I proceed to illustrate that Nāgārjuna is not concerned with questioning the existence of objects per se, but in questioning how we perceive these objects to exist when we uncritically engage with and erroneously assign essential intrinsic existence to them. I then attempt to explain how the Mādhyamika can account for the existence of empirical objects Conventionally without referring to any Ultimate grounding and without clinging to any metaphysical views: emptiness and its relation to the Ultimate Truth is thus discussed as a principle to be of use to the unenlightened mind, but abandoned by the awakened. I conclude that the Semantic Interpretation subsequently has emptiness as a means to calm mental propensities to attachment rather than a metaphysical doctrine concerned with ontological possibilities, and that as a consequence, any idea of Ultimate Truths are to be jettisoned as views that propagate attachment.

Absolute Nothingness is Impossible, 3rd Edition, 2025

The Logical Necessity of an Absolute Existence as the Source of the Universe It is both rational and scientifically coherent to propose that the origin of the Universe is rooted in a Necessary and Absolute Existence—one that is not contingent upon any preceding phenomenon or external cause. The undeniable reality that ‘something’ exists in the present moment fundamentally rules out the possibility of a prior state of Absolute Nothingness, as this would directly contradict established conservation laws governing energy, matter, and existence. Moreover, if we accept the logical premise that an Absolute Existence underpins the Universe — an existence that is, by definition, eternal — then the concept of Absolute Nothingness is not only irrational but categorically impossible. This framework aligns with both philosophical reasoning and scientific principles, reinforcing the necessity of an eternal, uncaused source as the foundational reality of all that exists.

Organon F , 2014 21(4): pp. 458-470

In this paper I argue that the acceptance of an absolutely unrestricted quantification implies the existence of an absolutely empty possible world. This result could be relevant because David Lewis both admits an absolutely unrestricted quantification (for example in "Parts of classes") and rejects the existence of an absolutely empty possible world (in "On the plurality of worlds"). In order to vindicate my thesis, I propose two strategies. The first is based on the assumption that the phrase 'nothing' cannot be always reduced to a quantifier phrase, as Graham Priest and Alex Oliver with Timothy Smiley have argued. This strategy consists in a paraphrase of the notion of everything that constrains us to admit an empty possible world. The second strategy mainly consists in the use of an “idealistic” principle (say «every determination is negation») and its consequences

2019

Abstract: Exploration of the philosophical necessity in Fundamental Ontology of the concept of Nothingness as seen in the philosophies of Bergson, Kojeve, Sartre in relation to the Divided Line which is the Core of the Western worldview and the philosophy of Differance by Derrida and Being (crossed out) by Heidegger. -- Key Words: In-itself, For-itself, Sartre, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, Ontology, Being, Nothingness, Consciousness, Clouds, Aristophanes, Orthogonal Centering Dialectic, Special Systems, Emergent Meta-system,

2

2025

This article critically examines the concept of "Absolute Nothingness" from a rigorous logical-metaphysical perspective. It is argued that Nothingness, as a negation of Being, cannot subsist as a primary, autonomous or positively articulable concept without incurring in a performative contradiction. Based on the thesis that Being is a necessary metaphysical-ontological condition of every proposition (S((T)(φ))), it is demonstrated that every attempt to enunciate absolute Nothingness inevitably converts it into linguistic or conceptual positivity, betraying its own definition. The text critically examines authors such as Heidegger, Hegel, Sartre, Graham Priest, and Alain Badiou, showing that any effort to positivize absolute Nothingness, whether ontologically, logically, or phenomenologically, collapses when it depends on Being itself for its formulation. It is concluded that absolute Nothingness is not ontologically thinkable, logically consistent, or linguistically referenceable, being only a negative limit that demarcates the impossibility of thought outside Being.

Eternity and Contradiction, 2021

In recent years, in the analytic philosophical community various people have focused their attention again on (the) Nothing, in order to say that, pace Carnap (1932/1959) and pro Heidegger (1929/1977), there are occurrences of the corresponding phrase “(the) Nothing” in which it works as a singular term, not as a quantified expression (e.g. Casati‐Fujikawa 2015, 2019, Costantini 2020, Jacquette 2013, 2015, Oliver‐Smiley 2013, Priest 2014a,b, Simionato 2017, Voltolini 2015). First of all, I will stress again that, if those occurrences are referentially successful, as most of the previous people proposes, they denote an object that is paradoxical. For it is inconsistent because of its contradictory behavior with respect to a certain universal first‐order property, what I call the genuine existential property, i.e., Russell’s (1903) being. After reviewing and assessing such proposals, I will moreover try to show why the antecedent of the above conditional is false. In a nutshell, there cannot, even impossibly, be such a thing as (the) Nothing, not because this would make the overall totality of beings contradictory as well (by both including and not including (the) Nothing), but because (as Twardowski 1892/1977 somehow intuited) it would prevent that totality from being determined at all and (pace Costantini 2020) once for all. Finally, therefore, the only things that there legitimately are à propos of (the) Nothing are significant propositions, depending on the fact that the phrase “(the) Nothing” yields a contextually meaningful contribution to them qua Russellean definite description, even though it does not denote at all. Possibly, this position is similar to what Severino (1957, 2013) maintained on this subject.