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Evolution and Ethics: An Overview

Profile image of Catherine WilsonCatherine Wilson

Abstract

Chapter 21 of The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy, ed. Richard Joyce (2017)

FAQs

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What explains the relationship between evolutionary traits and moral sentiments in humans?add

The paper reveals that moral sentiments, such as sympathy and concern for welfare, emerged as adaptations promoting group living, influenced by human evolution and social contexts since the 18th century.

How does evolutionary ethics address the concept of altruism and cooperation in humans?add

The study demonstrates that altruism involves behaviors that incur costs to donors, enriching group survival, while cooperation accounts for costly behavior that benefits others, both observed in species like chimps and humans.

What role do dominance hierarchies play in social behavior among mammals?add

Research indicates that dominance hierarchies arise from individuals adapting to avoid conflict, with dominant individuals benefitting from increased reproductive opportunities, yet this behavior is relational rather than heritable.

When did Darwin's ideas on morality influence modern evolutionary ethics?add

Darwin's 'Descent of Man' published in 1871 posits that moral senses may arise in animals with social instincts, shaping current inquiries into the evolutionary basis of ethical behavior.

What are the implications of evolutionary perspectives on coercion and control in human societies?add

The paper suggests that the drive to obey authority and the mechanisms of control in human societies evolved through adaptations to larger, complex social structures and technological advancements.

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