Encryption and Signing with GPG. Using of Gpg4win package

2014 20th IEEE International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS), 2014

As a result of high-tech companies such as Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft offering free email services, email has become a primary channel of communication. However, email service providers have traditionally offered little in the way of message privacy protection. This has made emails, of which billions are sent around the world on any day, an attractive data source for personal identity information thieves. Google was one of the first companies to provide substantial email privacy protection when they began using the HTTPS always-on option to encrypt messages sent through their email service, Gmail. Unfortunately, Gmail's encryption option does not offer true point-to-point encryption since the encrypted emails are decrypted and stored in plaintext form on Google's servers. This type of approach poses a security vulnerability which is unacceptable to security-minded users such as highly sensitive government agencies and private companies. For these users, true point-to-point encryption is needed. This paper introduces an identity-based one-way group key agreement protocol and describes a point-to-point email encryption scheme based on the protocol. Both the security proofs and the efficiency analysis, with experimental results, of the new scheme are provided.

in this study, has shown how to design key exchange algorithm based on the features of crossover and mutation operations of genetic algorithm (GA) and asymmetric key encryption. The number of the crossover points together with number of mutation points dictate the length of the secret key and hence the strength of the algorithm. The algorithm is further strengthened by making it difficult to break by permuting the key by a random permutation factor; the randomness together with permutation makes the algorithm robust and hard to break. The proposed algorithm solves the problem of storing and distribution of the secret key over the network; the various examples and implementation of the algorithm proves that it exchanges the keys over the channel successfully.

International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology, 2016

Key Management in symmetric cryptography is to securely share a secret key between the two communicating individuals. The popular solution to this key management issue is to use public key cryptography schemes. The key management techniques are broadly classified into Key Distribution protocols and Key Agreement protocols. This paper presents the detailed classification of Key Agreement protocols and provides some of the existing ECC based protocols in each category. Recently much work has been carried out in Identity Based Cryptography IBC, Certificateless Public Key Cryptography CLPKC and Pairing Based Cryptography PBC based techniques for key agreement. This paper also presents the comparison of two-party key agreement protocols under these areas based on the computational cost calculated in the key agreement phase.

1987

We are going to devote most of our attention in this talk to the RSA Public Key Cryptosystem because it not only remains unbroken but it has some other useful features for digital signatures and authentication. We will briefly mention some other methods which have been compromised to some degree, and one, McEliece's which has not, but which are still valid when both keys are kept secret and some have other features which may be useful.

International Journal of Pure and Apllied Mathematics, 2017

Securing network traffic has always been a must requirement for any network application that employs insecure communication channel. The reason is to provide protection for the transmitted data over the network against unauthorized disclosure and modification of the messages between communicating parties. A Key exchange protocol is the cryptographic primitive that can establish a secure communication. The first Key exchange protocol was introduced by Diffie-Hellman. The purpose of the Diffie-Hellman protocol is to enable two parties to securely exchange a session key which can then be used for next symmetric encryption of messages. However, Diffie-Hellman itself does not authenticate the communicating entities. In this paper, we study on Diffie-Hellman Key exchange protocol. Subsequently describe authenticated key exchange protocol and One-pass key exchange protocol, which are the variants of Diffie-Hellman protocol.

SIGSAM bulletin, 1987

The RSA method is used for the interchange of secret messages via insecure channels. It is elegant in theory and fast and reliable in practice. Applications are in the field of communication networks. The method is initialized by choosing some suitable large prime numbers. Encrypting and decrypting of a message are done by modular arithmetic. The modulus is a large integer (e.g. 200 decimal digits). Any attempt to break the system amounts to factoring the modulus.

2012

For the security porpoise in the internet cryptography is one of the most important subjects nowadays. Designing a cypher for data exchange between two nodes or receiver and sender deals with one of the troubleshoot jobs. In our proposed algorithm we try to introduce a new technique in the field of cryptography. We are hopeful that this new technique will sure reduces the overhead of data or key exchange between nodes. Here we will discuss the symmetric key exchange between nodes.

Cryptography is a technique in which a data is transmitted through the medium without being hampered. It is not new subject. It was used far ago. This technique deals with many steps, such as: key generation, key transmission, key storage and key deletion. The most difficult part of the cryptography is the design of cipher; i.e. designing of the algorithm used to encrypt and decrypt plain text and cipher text respectively. A problem generally noticed is man-in-the-middle attack. We will try to eliminate or reduce the chance to occur this problem.

Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '82, 1982

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2001

We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.