Beyond Explication: Meaning and Habit-Change in Peirce's Pragmatism

Peircean pragmatism, by the familiar picture of it, is a logical doctrine or maxim based on the contention that beliefs have the nature of habits: they are rules or dispositions of conduct under some conceivable circumstances. Any genuine belief or change of belief would influence one's conduct under certain conditions. If there is no change in conduct that would ensue from the acceptance of a proposition, the proposition is devoid of content or meaningless (in the relevant sense). And if two propositions, despite differences in their verbal manifestations, would have the same influence on our conduct, they are the same proposition.

1998

Ochs' book, originally published in hardback in 1998, is an extensive survey of the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce. It is addressed not only to Peirce scholars or professional philosophers, but also to audiences within other fields of research, such a literary studies and theology, with the goal to 'contribute to their practice of reading Peirce, rather than to the specialized scholarship on Peirce.' (11) Its guiding thought is that pragmatism should be understood not as a break with modern philosophy in the broadly Cartesian-Kantian vein which prevails in Anglo-Saxon philosophy, but rather as a corrective to this tradition's tendency to treat its problems in overly abstract ways. To take Peirce's message to heart involves learning how to read texts (and traditions) correctively, and in that process explicate, draw on, and possibly revise a philosophical tradition's rules for correcting itself. Ochs thus stresses the continuity between Peirce's thought and the philosophers he criticizes more than is common among most Peirce scholars. [2] Focussing on Peirce's four series of writings on pragmatism and pragmaticism (1867-8, 1877-8, 1902-3 and 1905-6), Ochs makes two important claims: first, the already mentioned continuity with his philosophical predecessors, and second, that Peirce's development itself can be viewed as a process of continuous correction of his own earlier standpoints, culminating in his pragmaticism of 1905-6. [3] To carry out his task, Ochs spends considerable time on the development of a method of how to read texts in general, and Peirce's writings in particular. This is understandable, because for Ochs, it is not only a method suitable for understanding Peirce's development, but also a method that helps clarify Peirce's relation and contributions to the Cartesian-Kantian tradition which he criticizes, but nevertheless is part of. First of all, a text should be read as it wants to be read: this means that the primary task of the reader is to grasp what is really there, in the explicit text, a task which, although it does require knowledge of the tradition it belongs to, is nevertheless relatively straightforward. However, any text will always contain openness to interpretation, obscure passages and inconsistencies, something that calls for a pragmatic reading, which is 'a method for discovering an implicit text within the explicit text.' (24) Ochs here draws a parallel to Paul Grice's concept conversational implicature and develops a parallel concept of textual

Pragmatics and Cognition, 2020

Although most contemporary philosophers of language hold that semantics and pragmatics require separate study, there is surprisingly little agreement on where exactly the line should be drawn between these two areas, and why. In this paper I suggest that this lack of clarity is at least partly caused by a certain historical obfuscation of the roots of the founding three-way distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics in Charles Peirce's pragmatist philosophy of language. I then argue for recovering and revisiting these original roots, taking indexicality as a case-study of how certain questions connected with the distinction which are currently considered complex and difficult may be clarified by a 'properly pragmatist pragmatics'. Such a view, I shall argue, upends a certain priority usually accorded to semantics over pragmatics, teaching that we do not work out what terms mean in some abstract overall sense and then work out to what use they are being put; rather, we must understand to what use terms are being put in order to understand what they mean.

Philosophica, 1977

American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, 2021

Language and Semiotic Studies, 2024

In 1904, Peirce described to Lady Welby a six-division typology composed of the sign, two objects, and a trio of interpretants for which he subsequently proposed numerous denominations. Of the three, the final interpretant was particularly problematic, and over the years Peirce experimented with at least eight different identifying terms such as "final," "rational," "normal," "eventual," etc. One group of interpretants is especially interesting as it only occurs in a single manuscript but has attracted considerable critical attention, namely the emotional, energetic, and logical interpretant series in a projected article of 1907. The paper examines the description of these, paying particular attention to the logical interpretant, and suggests how important aspects of the logic determining how Peirce defined them may have been neglected or ignored by researchers. It first shows how the group was presented, how the logical interpretant related to Peirce's purpose in the article, how it related to a restricted conception of the dynamic object in the manuscript, and explains through an analysis of its logical complications why Peirce was led to abandon it. These considerations suggest that much of the critical attention that the logical interpretant in particular has generated might be incomplete or, more seriously, nonsense.

Cognitio-Estudos: revista eletrônica de filosofia

Interpretations of Peirce's frequent references to a proof of his brand of pragmatism vary, ranging from its impossibility to its substantive completion. This paper takes seriously Peirce's claim that a philosophical argument should be composed of multiple fibers and suggests a relatively neglected perspective that connects much of Peirce's thought. This additional fiber is Peirce's account of memory, often only intimated. The importance of this account arises from Peirce's claim that the practically indubitable existence of memory is a strong argument for synechism, the doctrine of continuity. Indeed, the nature of memory relates to several of Peirce's philosophical commitments, including fallibilism and realism. As an opening to inquiry, this paper will explore the role of memory in Peirce's account of cognition and its bearing on many of his philosophical positions. Working roughly chronologically, we will look at the implications concerning memory in Peirce's denial of intuition in 1868, his revision of the Kantian mental faculties in 1887, his account of perception, claims about pragmatism and abduction in 1903, and some brief remarks about memory within his mature semeiotic. By covering so much material, I intend only to show the pervasive and richly suggestive theme of memory in Peirce's thought. Accordingly, I raise more questions than I answer. Nonetheless, a probationary conclusion is that Peirce's pragmatism, considered as the logic of abduction, concerns the self-control of memory. Alternatively, under this perspective much of Peirce's philosophy is an attempt to account for knowledge based upon only fallible memory, rather than intuition.

the pluralist, 2012

This research aims to examine the ontological foundation in the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce as the originator of pragmatism. The method used is qualitative with a library research approach, analyzing various written works such as journals and books on Peirce's thought. The main findings of the study show that Peirce's pragmatic ontology is built on three fundamental concepts-belief, inquiry, and meaning-that form the framework for understanding reality as something that has practical consequences. Peirce proposed a dynamic ontological view through the categories of trichotomy (Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness) that bridged the gap between idealism and materialism. Peirce's ontological dimension is also seen in his role in reformulating metaphysics and his emphasis on the communal aspect of the determination of reality. In conclusion, Peirce's pragmatism is not just a method of thinking, but rather a comprehensive ontological system that transforms the understanding of reality, truth, and meaning through pragmatic verification that emphasizes the relationship between belief, inquiry, and practical consequences.

Special Issue on Robert Brandom, 2015

This essay discusses two edges of the pragmatistic tradition in philosophy in its broad and strict versions. On the one hand the operationalist edge explains that the pragmatic maxim has a particular interpretation of the concept of " practical bearing ". On the other hand the inferentialist edge discloses the importance of our commitments to inferences derived from our inferential practices. Both aspects of pragmatism are explored in key representatives such as the founder Charles Peirce and the contemporary philosopher Robert Brandom. The author proposes a detailed study of the maxim as a strategy to find the right balance between the two aforementioned edges of pragmatism.