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Outline

Title
Abstract
Chapter 2: The Background of Moral Intuition
Summary of Intuitive Moral Feelings
What is Wrong with the Methodology?
Etiolated Cases and the Isolation Technique
The Relevance of Experimental Philosophy
Summary
References
All Topics
Philosophy
Ethics

Moral intuitions: what they are and how we should use them

Profile image of Chloë FitzGeraldChloë FitzGerald

Abstract

My account of moral intuition is inspired by recent philosophical and psychological work on emotion and intuitive thinking. Conceived for practical purposes in applied ethics, my account is compatible with a variety of views in metaethics. Along the way, I criticise some of the leading figures from philosophy and psychology who have been working on moral intuition in recent decades, including Frances Kamm, Peter Singer, Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Greene and Marc Hauser. Chapter 1 sets the scene, looking at the use of moral intuitions in normative ethics and moral psychology, and introduces my approach to the subject. My five main claims are to be found in the five remaining chapters and they can be briefly summarised as follows: 1. Our moral intuitions are best understood through examining our individual value structures, which are made up of evaluative dispositions, including emotional dispositions. Drawing on recent developments in philosophy and psychology, I show in Chapter 2 how our value structures are partially opaque to us and characteristically involve conflicting and incompatible elements. 2. Moral intuitions are not a unitary phenomenon. They can include a suite of heterogeneous responses, which may co-occur and be connected in interesting ways. In Chapter 3, I present my broad definition of moral intuition, according to which, to be intuitive, a suite of responses must involve either an emotional feeling or an intuitive moral feeling. I introduce the notion of intuitive moral feelings as pre-cognitive promptings to judge. 3. Emotions are more than simple flashes of affect, as they are often taken to be by empirical researchers such as Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Greene and Marc Hauser, whom I criticise in Chapter 4. I put forward a philosophically and psychologically more sophisticated and subtle account of emotion and its connections to moral intuition. 4. It is a mistake to treat intuitive responses to imaginary cases as ‘data’ to be accommodated by moral principles, as exemplified in the practice of normative ethicists such as Frances Kamm. In Chapter 5, I argue that these responses should be taken as providing data about ourselves; I also claim that the type of imaginary case used does not fully engage our evaluative capacities. Instead, ethicists should consider the full gamut of responses they experience to a wide range of cases drawn from real life and literature. 5. ‘’Know thyself!’ Ethical reflection is enriched by self-scrutiny and moral intuitions should be used partly for self-interpretation. In Chapter 6, I recommend that normative ethicists reflect on their shared and conflicting responses with full awareness of the murkiness of their underlying dispositions. Rather than ‘I know where you’re coming from’, the aim should be greater self-knowledge: ‘I know where I’m coming from’. The causal historical reasons for one’s intuitions can be illuminating, providing self-knowledge which helps to guard against prejudice and self-deception.

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