Universal Language

Bulletin of the South Ural State University. Ser. Computer Technologies, Automatic Control & Radioelectronics, 2018

Universals (from Latin "universalis"-general)-general concepts-are a subject matter of logicians since the ancient times. The question of universals represents the eternal issues. The nature of universals was thoroughly studied the philosophers of the Middle Ages. In IX-XIV centuries the scholastics continued the discussion about the essence of universals: do they really exist or are they certain names? The supporters of realism claimed that universals really existed and preceded the emergence of singular objects. Nominalists (from the Latin word 'nomen'-name) defended the contrary view point. In the article we emphasize the linguistic aspect. Mathematical linguistics develops methods of learning natural and formal languages. Linguistics, logic and mathematics are closely connected. Besides, there exists psycholinguistics as well. In our paper we consider current difficult sections: logic and linguistics of non-formalized and even non-formalizable concepts, the topic closely adjacent with the one discussed in the book by T.K. Kerimov of the same name. These sections broaden the opportunities of studying complex systems of logic and linguistics. As it was noted by the authors of "Mathematical linguistics" (R.G. Piotrovsky, K.B. Bektaev, A.A. Piotrovskaya) mathematics and a natural language represent semantic systems of information transfer. Moreover, there occurred a verbal analysis of mathematical problems solution. Language universal, a feature common for all the languages, is a kind of generalization of the language concept. The existential assertion of universals gives the opportunity to formulate a more grounded theory and practice of linguistics. The language universal determination is based both on extrapolation and empirical matter.

Language Universals, 2009

Erkenntnis, 1999

We prove that four theses commonly associated with coherentism are incompatible with the representation of a belief state as a logically closed set of sentences. The result is applied to the conventional coherence interpretation of the AGM theory of belief revision, which appears not to be tenable. Our argument also counts against the coherentistic acceptability of a certain form of propositional holism. We argue that the problems arise as an effect of ignoring the distinction between derived and non-derived beliefs, and we suggest that the kind of coherence relevant to epistemic justification is the coherence of non-derived beliefs.

Section 1 is an extended commentary on Edward Sapir's formulation nearly a century ago of what he considered two fundamental properties of human language, first that each one is a formally complete system of reference to experience and second that each one is formally distinct from every other. Section 2 considers some aspects of the development of these formulations, noting that they have been considered separately and not integrated as fully fleshed out systems of reference, as Sapir envisioned. Section 3 examines more closely what such an integration looks like in a case involving simple arithmetic. Section 4 begins with a brief review of the accomplishments of Greco-Roman logic and more recent developments in the theory of logic, leading to a consideration of what may be needed to fulfill Sapir's program. Section 5 summarizes some of my own recent research on extending first-order logic by replacing the unordered set of individuals with a specific ordering of a set of sets of individuals that is isomorphic to an ordering of a set of sets of numbers that contain no pairs of divisible numbers, which was investigated by Richard Dedekind shortly before the turn of the twentieth century.

A History of Modern Translation Knowledge. Sources, concepts, effects, 2018

This chapter surveys the various kinds of universal language that have existed throughout history and their relationship with translation. Up to and beyond the Early Modern period, debates on the subject tended to be couched in mystical or religious terms, and were concerned primarily with rediscovering languages postulated as original or perfect, considered to be embodiments of God’s creation. Then from the 17th century, attention turned to the need for a global language that could serve as a vehicle for science, trade and education, and foster world peace. This led to the development of, first, philosophical languages, such as those proposed by Dalgarno, Wilkins and Leibniz, which involved the a priori construction of philosophical grammars of supposedly universal concepts that were then used to generate a range of invented terms; and then to the International Auxiliary Languages of the 19th and 20th centuries (e.g Volapük, Esperanto and Ido), based on natural languages rather than created from scratch. Today, discussions tend to centre around perennial questions relating to linguistic universals and/or political and practical matters arising from the role of English as lingua franca of the globalized world.

Tábano, 2024

Throughout a variety of texts, Merleau-Ponty criticized the Husserlian project which he alternatively called a "universal grammar" and an "eidetics of language", and to which he associated a series of consequences: the claim that universal grammar entails (I) the prior knowability of universal "forms" with respect to natural languages; (II) the univocity with which words in natural languages would be related to their meanings, and the transparency which this univocal relation would present to consciousness; (III) the secondariness of language with respect to thought, and (IV) universal intertranslatability. The French author rejects these consequences and therefore questions the plausibility of the universalistic project in question. However, it is not clear that these alleged consequences are actually entailed by the proposal Merleau-Ponty is discussing, or that, if obtained, they take the specific form necessary for the criticism to succeed. We will try to show that such a criticism ultimately fails.

Studies in Language, 1991

Journal of Linguistics, 1992

When we speak of "universal languages" without at least roughly defining the intended concept, we find ourselves on various slanted planes, sliding from one error into another. The plane, for example, on which music exists as a "universal language," is slanted in relation to the planes where the universal languages "Esperanto" and "symbolic logic" are to be found, where these two planes intersect each other. However, if one tries to avoid this slide into errors by roughly outlining the concept of "universal language" (for example, asking what is meant by the word "language," and for which society a language is "universal"), then one runs the risk of losing grasp of the concrete problem that was originally meant by the word "universal language." This is an unpleasant situation. The situation is uncomfortable because the concrete problem is about to push previously invisible aspects to the foreground, becoming urgent (not to say flammable). Before our eyes, a whole series of codes is about to become universal languages (traffic codes, codes of fashion, gestures, nutrition, etc.), and it is beginning to show that universal languages not only serve to facilitate understanding between different language groups but also contribute to the dissolution of these groups. Therefore, it is more important than ever not to lose grasp of the concrete problem hidden behind the words "language" and "universality," which becomes the problem of massification when these two words are combined. As soon as one steps back from the question of universal languages to see them in the current, concrete context, it becomes apparent that, in this respect (as in so many others), we are in an end time in the apocalyptic sense of the word. The confusion of languages imposed on us in Babel is about to be overcome, and nothing stands in the way of the

Axiomathes, 2006

What is common to all languages is notation, so Universal Grammar can be understood as a system of notational types. Given that infants acquire language, it can be assumed to arise from some a priori mental structure. Viewing language as having the two layers of calculus and protocol, we can set aside the communicative habits of speakers. Accordingly, an analysis of notation results in the three types of Identifier, Modifier and Connective. Modifiers are further interpreted as Quantifiers and Qualifiers. The resulting four notational types constitute the categories of Universal Grammar. Its ontology is argued to consist in the underlying cognitive schema of Essence, Quantity, Quality and Relation. The four categories of Universal Grammar are structured as polysemous fields and are each constituted as a radial network centred on some root concept which, however, need not be lexicalized. The branches spread out along troponymic vectors and together map out all possible lexemes. The notational typology of Universal Grammar is applied in a linguistic analysis of the ‘parts of speech’ using the English language. The analysis constitutes a ‘proof of concept’ in (1) showing how the schema of Universal Grammar is capable of classifying the so-called ‘parts of speech’, (2) presenting a coherent analysis of the verb, and (3) showing how the underlying cognitive schema allows for a sub-classification of the auxiliaries.