Lerner on Husserl on Foundation, Person, and Rationality

HORIZON. STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY, 8(2) 2019, pp. 409-441, 2019

Th e problem of passive constitution in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is worthy of particular attention, since it is passive constitution, rather than active conscious constitution, which can be considered to be one of the focal points of 20th century philosophy. Thematisation of the sphere of passivity is related to resolving the problem of intersubjectivity. The elaboration of the problem of intersubjectivity is not so much a response to an externally cast reproach ‘in solipsism’ as an internal theme of phenomenology itself. Husserl aspired to establish phenomenological science as being of universal significance to everybody, but in order to make this discipline significant, i.e. in order to make it necessary for everyone else, it was primarily necessary to prove the existence of these other Selves or of the transcendental subjects. I will elaborate on the history of the consideration which Husserl gave to the problem of intersubjectivity, in order to clarify how his attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity, based on the activity of the Self, led to an egocentric model, and in turn how the need to overcome this model led to the thematisation of the genesis of subjectivity, and the detection of passivity as the very basis of such genesis. According to my working hypothesis, it was largely the demand for thematisation of the genesis of the sense of ‘the Other’ which infl uenced the modification of the phenomenological method. Finally, I will turn to the concept of primary subjectivity, or Ur-Ich, in order to bring into focus the methodological signifi cance of distinguishing the proto-Self for the substantiation of intersubjectivity, since only in its ‘context’ does the ultimate level of the foundation of the individual Self appear to be not merely a deeper level of consciousness, or the history of a universal subject, but the absolute subjectivity, as a fi eld of intersubjective interaction in which the individual subject is awakened (individualized) to self-constitution in the world. Only then can we reconsider the constitution of the individual Self as being primarily passive, as being permeated by the primordial passive, independent from the Self, aiming for the co-constitution of the intersubjective world.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2005

Husserl Studies, 2008

In this work, Kenneth Liberman explores the reflective enterprise that we call phenomenology. His goal is to further develop the potential of thinking reason. While he recognizes the importance of Husserl's reflexive rigor in advancing this field, he argues that Garfinkel's ethnomethodological rigor can give new momentum to the phenomenological critique of reason, a critique on which the future of freedom depends (p. xv).

META, 2023

Husserl's analysis of reflection leads to the discovery of the anonymous character of functioning subjectivity, which is further developed through an examination of the living-present (Lebendige Gegenwart) in the context of his genetic account of time-constitution. Given phenomenology's reliance on firstpersonal access and evidence, the anonymity of the flow brings about certain questions regarding how to account for it and if it is indeed a part of my experience. In this paper, I reflect on the problem of accessing and accounting for the primal I in phenomenological reflection. Taking from Ronald Bruzina and László Tengelyi's readings, I claim that genetic analyses lead to an absolute Faktum in which the existence of Ego and World coincide. This brings me to consider whether the primacy of the primal-I (Ur-Ich) as the ultimate source of temporalization that is often displayed in Husserl's work can be considered a necessary result of the analysis of temporality or rather a theoretical gesture or choice in favor of maintaining the strong first-personal character of phenomenological inquiry. Against this view, a French-inspired interpretation that focuses on the equi-primordiality of primal-I and primal-Hyle can be seen as a rival reading that opens up a new path in the tradition.

The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and …, 2012

Husserl and othe Phenomenologists , 2016

This article addresses a basic question: what elements in Husserl’s phenomenology can account for the variety of post-Husserlian phenomenologies? The answer, I suggest, is that Husserl’s idea of reality, particularly his notion of givenness vis-à-vis self-givenness, facilitated the work of his followers by offering them at once a firm ground and a point of departure for their inquiries. However, adopting Husserl’s phenomenology as their starting point did not prevent his followers from developing their own independent phenomenological theory. Moreover, despite the elusive particulars that shape one’s individual experience of the world, so it transpires, Husserl’s thinking which was different and beyond their own observations and actual experiences, namely, transcendent, appears to have been a genuine guide along their path to achieve meaning. This interpretation thus gives precedence to a metaphysical point of departure, that is, to Husserl’s idea of reality as ‘givenness’, in launching phenomenological investigation—over any specific aspect of his work—as that which continues to sustain phenomenological discourse. (This article appears in a special issue "Husserl and other Phenomenologists" which i edited for The European Legacy: Towards New Paradigms, 21, 5-6, 2016)

Husserl Studies, 2006

Springer Verlag, 2023

This text examines the many transformations in Husserl’s phenomenology that his discoveries of the nature of appearing lead to. It offers a comprehensive look at the Logical Investigations’ delimitation of the phenomenological field, and continues with Husserl’s account of our consciousness of time. This volume examines Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism and the problems this raises for our recognition of other subjects. It details Husserl’s account of embodiment and examines his theory of the instincts. Drawing from his published and unpublished manuscripts, it outlines his treatment of our mortality and the teleological character of our existence. The result is a genetic account of our selfhood, one that unifies Husserl’s different claims about who and what we are.

Human Studies, 2010

Human Studies, 2017

In Husserl's Ethics and Practical Intentionality Susi Ferrarello has performed a great service for both the world of Husserl studies and for phenomenology in general by making clear the centrality of a social and ethical problematic in Husserl's life-work. After clarifying early in her book that ''we name as 'ethical' all that entails willing'' (p. 38), Ferrarello quotes from a letter from Husserl to Arnold Metzger the claim that ''intellect is servant of the will'' (p. 215). As surprising as this might be for some of us to hear from Husserl, Ferrarello convincingly reveals that phenomenological practice is servant to a larger ethical call. Indeed, once the content of several as yet untranslated works by Husserl are fully considered by Ferrarello, it becomes clear that the project of phenomenology itself is part of a larger ethical and social telos and it is from this ethical perspective that we might come to understand the ultimate purpose of phenomenology. Much of the early part of Ferrarello's book is dedicated to laying the necessary groundwork to understand Husserl's work on ethics and its connection to teleology and theology. The rich and challenging early chapters address such important topics as Husserl's material apriori, his concept of parallelism and its connection to axiology, and his approach to normativity. These topics come together in Husserl's lifelong battle against the collapse of philosophy, and specifically phenomenology, into psychologism. This discussion reaches is climax in a confrontation with Steven Crowell's argument that the main topic of Husserl's phenomenology is the investigation of the ''space of meaning''. I will briefly trace the contours of some of this ground, which dominates the first three chapters of the book, in order to then be able to present the exciting figure of Husserl the Ethicist. Ferrarello presents Husserl as committed to a parallelism between logic, ethics and axiology. Roughly speaking, logic is the science committed to the realm of