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Philosophy
Logic

An Approach to Human-level Commonsense Reasoning

Profile image of Michael AndersonMichael Anderson
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7_12
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Abstract

Commonsense reasoning has proven exceedingly difficult both to model and to implement in artificial reasoning systems. This paper discusses some of the features of human reasoning that may account for this difficulty, surveys a number of reasoning systems and formalisms, and offers an outline of active logic, a non-classical paraconsistent logic that may be of some use in implementing commonsense reasoning.

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Preface vi vii thank Alison Conway of the Fields Institute for her help in organizing all of these functions. We also thank the Centre for Quantum Computation and Intelligent Systems at the University of Technology, Sydney, for its generous support of student travel; and the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center for partly subsidizing the travel of one of the winners of the Commonsense-2009 Outstanding Student Paper Award. This symposium is held in cooperation with AAAI, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. We thank them for their help in promoting this symposium.

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Related topics

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computational Logic
  • Non-Classical Logic
  • Paraconsistent logic
  • Commonsense Reasoning
  • Non-Classical Logics
  • Commonsense Knowledgebase
  • Active logic
  • Semantics for active logic
  • Logical formalism
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