Psychologism and Description in Husserl’s Phenomenology

THE TURNING POINTS OF THE NEW PHENOMENOLOGICAL ERA
Husserl Research - Drawing upon the Full Extent of His Development

BOOK 1
Phenomenology in the World
Fifty Years after the Death of
Edmund Husserl

Edited by
ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
The World Phenomenology Institute

Published under the auspices of
The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
A-T. Tymieniecka, President

SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Turning points of the new phenomenological era : Husserl research drawing upon the full extent of his development / edited by Anna -Teresa Tymieniecka.
p. cm. – (Analecta Husserliana ; v. 34) (Phenomenology in the world fifty years after the death of Husserl ; bk. 1)

English, French, and German.
Chiefly papers from the First World Congress of Phenomenology held in Santiago de Compostela, Spain, Sept. 26-Oct. 1, 1988.
“Published under the auspices of the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning.”

Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-94-010-5533-8 ISBN 978-94-011-3464-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4

1. Phenomenology–Congresses. 2. Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938–Congresses. I. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. II. World Congress of Phenomenology (1st : 1988 : Santiago de Compostela, Spain)

III. Series. IV. Series. Phenomenology in the world fifty years after the death of Husserl ; bk. 1.
B3279.H94A129 vol. 34
[B829.5]
$142^{\prime} .7 \mathrm{~s}--\mathrm{dc} 20$
$\left[142^{\prime} .7\right]$
$91-774$
ISBN 978-94-010-5533-8
printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1991
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1991
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

PSYCHOLOGISM AND DESCRIPTION IN HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY

The evolution of Edmund Husserl’s views is a complicated tangle of psychologistic and antipsychologistic themes. With the main task of philosophy being considered by him to be that of laying the foundations for science, the founder of phenomenology was well aware of the closeness of his doctrine to psychology, and he was concerned with the elucidation of the nature of this closeness during the whole of his scholarly career.

Usually this closeness is investigated from the point of view of psychological and phenomenological reduction. Yet it is very interesting to look at it from the point of view of description. I shall try to show that reflection on the closeness of phenomenology and psychology led Husserl to a conception of description the very theoretical status of which may be understood as being different from the traditional status of description.

PHILOSOPHY AS FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE

It is a characteristic feature of the particular sciences that they are not concerned with their own foundations and do not raise the question of what it is that makes them sciences. Answering just that question is Husserl’s permanent task. Science exists objectively only in the form of scientific texts which express the meaning of some definite acts of individual persons, acts which are infinitely reproducible:

Objektiven Bestand hat die Wissenschaft nur in ihrer Literatur, nur in der Form von
Schriftwerken hat sie ein eigenes, wenn auch zu den Menschen und seinen intellektuellen Betätigungen beziehungsreiches Dasein; in dieser Form pflanzt sie sich durch die Jahrhunderte fort und überdauert die Individuen, Generationen und Nationen. Sie repräsentiert so eine Summe äusserer Veranstaltungen, die, wie sie aus Wissensakten vieler Einzelner hervorgegangen sind, wieder in eben solche Akte ungezählter Individuen übergehen können. ${ }^{1}$

Thus, in laying the foundations of science it is necessary to reconsider consciousness as the universal source of the basic concepts and principles of science and scientific research. The theoretical framework

which was treated in the classical tradition as a mathesis universalis should be brought down to the “lebendige Intentionen der Logiker,” and the intentionality that is manifested in the acts based on this framework should be investigated as to its real directedness. ${ }^{2}$

Since this kind of investigation must itself satisfy scientific demands, it is equally important to get a clear view of the status that theory should have in order to meet these demands.

Perhaps under the influence of Franz Brentano, Husserl accepted the point of view which holds that a theory of consciousness must be a descriptive one. But may simple description be regarded as lying at the foundations of science? Usually description is understood as being a preparatory stage for further investigations and as needing completion through demonstrations or explications. It seems, therefore, that description can not be regarded as a foundation of science. But phenomenological description is the description of a peculiar subject matter: of consciousness. Husserl was aware that the description of consciousness is different from the description of, let us say, the subject matter of physics:
verstehen wir unter Beschreibung den begrifflichen Ausdruck des Wahrgenommenen selbst, das im eigentlichen Sinne Erfahrenen, so bestimmt die psychologische Beschreibung das Seelische selbst, und es bestimmt die psychologische Beschreibung der Erlebnisse das Seelische selbst hinsichtlich seiner Zustände, auf die wir bei allen anderen psychologischen Beschreibungen offenbar zurückgeführt werden. Die naturwissenschaftliche Beschreibung bestimmt nur eine Erscheinung, nicht aber das selbst, das bestimmt werden soll. ${ }^{3}$

Thus, the subject matter of psychology is not merely an appearance of something but “das Seelische selbst.” Yet the question remains - what is the description itself? Is it merely the producing of a text in which “die Wissenschaft hat objektive Bestand,” or is it something else?

Therefore, in retracing the evolution of Husserl’s views it is convenient to concentrate on two interconnected themes: (1) the character of consciousness, which is what is being described, and (2) the status of the description itself.

THE PSYCHOLOGISM OF THE EARLY HUSSERL

In his first major study, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Husserl approached the problem of the foundations of science in the spirit of the then

widely held doctrine of “psychologism,” the position that psychology is the basic branch of philosophy. As Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch remarks:

Das Denken kann in doppelter Beziehung Gegenstand einer Wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung werden: einmal nämlich, sofern es eine Tätigkeit des Geistes ist, nach deren Bedingungen und Gesetzen geforscht werden kann; sodem aber, sofern es als Werkzeug zur Erwerbung mittelbaren Erkenntnis, das nicht nur einen richtigen, sondern auch einen fehlerhaften Gebrauch zulässt, in ersteren Falle zu wahren, in anderen zu falschen Ergebnisse führt. Es gibt daher sowohl Naturgesetze des Denkens als Normgesetze für dasselbe, Vorschriften (Normen), nach denen es sich zu richten hat, um zu wahren Ergebnissen zu führen. Die Erforschung der Naturgesetze des Denkens ist eine Aufgabe der Psychologie, die Feststellung seiner Normalgesetze aber die Aufgabe der Logik. ${ }^{4}$

It has been claimed on behalf of this point of view that scientific cognition is a particular kind of mental activity and that, consequently, in order to make this activity more efficient it is necessary to learn the laws governing the empirical psyche and, on their basis, to construct a system of criteria of logical correctness, analogous to the technological standards based on the known properties of material to be processed.

Husserl accepted this doctrine and held that philosophy should go the way of a non-speculative, empirical, i.e., experientially based, science. In Philosophie der Arithmetik he is concerned with the foundations of arithmetic and he sets himself the task of giving a psychological and logical account of the genesis of basic arithmetical concepts. Thus, he makes an attempt at giving a descriptive psychological account of the genesis of such concepts as “set,” “unity,” and “calculus.” At the end Husserl comes to the solution that the more basic concept of set is grounded in a particular kind of intellectual activity, viz., that of a “kollektive Einigung,” that constitutes the primary awareness of the “das Zusammen” of the elements in a set. An unmediated unification can only be carried out in relation to the units that are given in sense perception (e.g., a finite set of points). In the cases of more complex sets Husserl appeals to indirect “symbolic” association based in “figurale Momente” which are constitutive of the unity of the sensual manifold and which are identical with the “Gestaltqualitäten” of C. Ehrenfels. These moments are not reducible to the qualities of the elements in a set, though they are conceived together, e.g., a melody is not reducible to the qualities of the sounds that constitute it. Gestaltqualitäten are not perceptually given qualities of an object; they are rather a product of a particular kind of mental activity. Their character

and their properties are deducible from the character of our empirical psyche. ${ }^{5}$

Thus, we can say that the subject-matter of the descriptive-psychological analysis in Philosophie der Arithmetik is consciousness as empirical psyche, i.e., as a certain part of nature. Accordingly the description itself is to be defined as that description appropriate to empirical theory: the simple expression is a notion of the factual matters as they are. But is it possible to regard such a description as the foundation of science?

THE ANTIPSYCHOLOGISM OF THE EARLY HUSSERL

In Logische Untersuchungen Husserl subjected his former views to bitter criticism and made an attempt at constructing a doctrine of pure logic as an alternative to psychologism. He understood that psychologism leads ultimately to probabilism and therefore destroys the foundations of science:

Denkgesetze als Kausalgesetze, nach denen die Erkenntnisse im seelischen Zusammenhang werden, können nur in Form von Wahrscheinlichkeit gegeben sein. Demgemäss dürfte keine Behauptung als eine richtige mit Gewissheit beurteilt werden: denn Warscheinlichkeiten als Grundmasse aller richtigkeit müssen jeder Erkenntnis den Stempel der blossen Warscheinlichkeit aufprägen. So ständen wir vor dem extremsten Probabilismus. Auch die Behauptung, dass alles Wissen ein bloss wahrscheinliches sei, wäre nur wahrscheinlich gültig: dies neue Behauptung abermals und so in infinitum. ${ }^{6}$

It is clear that the empirical psyche belongs to the domain of factual existence. It is a particular being which exists at a particular temporal point, is of definite duration, and carries definite content. The essence of this being is such that it could equally be present at another temporal point and be of different duration and content. A factual being is a contingent being which might have existed in a different way or might not have existed at all. Although a factual being is subjected to some natural laws according to which a certain kind of being is necessarily followed by another being, these laws merely express a factual regularity which might well have been totally different. ${ }^{7}$ A question thus arises whether the concept of science based on empirical psychology is adequate to the idea of science as a system of knowledge distinguished by its universality and necessity.

THE IDEA OF PURE LOGIC: PHENOMENOLOGY WITHOUT ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS?

Any mental act takes place under some empirical conditions such as, e.g., concentration of attention, agility of mind, possession of some experience, etc. These conditions are studied by psychology and they are subsumable under some laws based on empirical generalizations. Because of their empirical nature these laws cannot claim absolute certainty. Yet apart from the empirical conditions of mental activity there are some “ideal conditions” that are expressive of a definite unity of meaning that provides for the possibility of some mental acts to the exclusion of some others. For example, an actual experience of the certain truth of a mathematical proposition not only entails that a proper mental condition has been met, it also entails the truth of the proposition as the content of the experience.

Pure logic does not deal with mental acts of judgment; it deals with their content, i.e., their ideal meanings, not with real facts. In this way linkage between ideal meanings does not depend on psychological laws. Psychology is concerned with mental acts as they are subject to natural determination, to casual law. But ideal connections constitute an autonomous domain that is governed exclusively by its own laws. The elements of this domain are not empirical units, they are a peculiar kind of object: pure essences, species, eidoi. ${ }^{8}$

PHENOMENOLOGY AS GEISTESWISSENSCHAFT AND THE ALLEGED RETURN TO PSYCHOLOGISM

The admission of the ideality of eidoi has prompted unjustified accusations against Husserl for alleged Platonism. Such an accusation would be apt only if Husserl had acknowledged the existence of eidoi as self-subsistent beings, as it were, alongside individual things, that is, if he had attributed ontological status to their specific nature. In fact, the eidos is considered here only in its relation to consciousness, that is, as an intentional object.

One and the same thing may be considered both as an object of sensual perception and as the basis for the intention of an essence. In my intuition of, e.g., a red object I can abstract from the actual presence of this object and consider only its colour, “redness” as such. In this

case the directedness of my consciousness is not a “sensual perception,” it is an act of ideation, a Wesensschau. ${ }^{9}$

Phenomenology as a theory of knowledge brings clarity and distinctness to the pure forms and laws of cognition by going back to the adequately fulfilled intuition, to the evidence in the strict sense. In this respect it constitutes the phenomenology of cognition, the subject matter of which is the essential structures of pure experiences and their correlative networks of meaning. In this way phenomenology goes back to the analysis of consciousness:
“Akte” sollen die Erlebnisse des Bedeutens sein, und das Bedeutungsmässige im jeweiligen Einzelakte soll gerade im Akterlebnis und nicht im Gegenstande liegen, was ihn zu einem “intentionelen”, auf Gegenstände “gerichtetch” Erlebnis macht. Ebenso liegt das Wesen der erfüllenden Anschauung in gewissen Akten: Denken und Anschauen sollen also Akte verschieden sein. Und natürlich soll das sich Erfüllen selbst eine speziell zu den Aktcharakteren gehörige Beziehung sein. ${ }^{10}$

A phenomenological description goes back to the “sources” of the basic concepts and laws of pure logic so that by retracing their origination clara et distincta perceptio may be brought into the epistemological purview.

Yet phenomenology provides no explanations on the model of usual theoretical explanation. It is not concerned with an elaboration of deductive systems or with the discovery of inductive laws. Phenomenology as a theory of knowledge
will nicht die Erkenntnis des faktischen Ereignis in der objektiven Natur, in psychologischem oder psychophysischem Sinn erklären, sondern die Idee der Erkenntnis nach ihren konstitutiven Elementen, bzw. Gesetzen aufklären; … den idealen Sinn der spezifischen Zusammenhänge, in welchen sich die Objektivität der Erkenntnis dokumentiert, verstehen. ${ }^{11}$

This almost Diltheyan saying allows us to suppose that the phenomenological description in Logische Untersuchungen belongs to the sphere of the Geisteswissenschaften rather than to that of the natural sciences.

Its task is not that of giving an explanation (Erklärung) of its subject matter, it is rather that of giving an explication (Aufklären) of the very idea of scientific knowledge, that of making intelligible (Verstehen) the meaning of those specific connections that constitute science as science.

Thus, one may say that judging from its status the description in Logische Untersuchungen is a description belonging to the Geisteswissenschaften that are likewise concerned with meanings and not with things. The texts of this description intend clarification and intelligibility, rather than on explanation. As to the character of consciousness that underlies the intentionality of this structure of meaning, it is much less definite here. To be sure, in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen phenomenology is called descriptive psychology and thus it must be the empirical psyche that is meant by “consciousness.” Many of Husserl’s readers have understood this as a return to psychologism. Yet as we have seen the acts of consciousness, as described by the phenomenologist, are not treated as natural phenomena. The subject matter of phenomenological description is transcendental consciousness. But how is this consciousness related to the empirical psyche? Are they quite different or are they connected somehow?

Husserl spent much effort on resolving this question and in clarifying the character of transcendental consciousness. In particular his investigations on the distinction between the empirical psyche and transcendental consciousness have resulted in the rise of the concept of “pure psychology” in which the ambiguity of the text of phenomenological description came to light.

PURE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE AMBIGUITY OF THE TEXT OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION

According to Husserl pure psychology is concerned with “pure psyche,” that is, it abstracts from such questions as the relationship between the psyche and the physical or the physiological basis of mental acts. On the other hand, pure psychology is distinguished from an empirical psychology by its concern with essences, not facts. It abstracts from the connection of acts considered in their particular place in space and time and studies them as pure structures of meaning. Husserl conceives the task of pure psychology as that of making explicit the a priori typology without which there can be no conception of the psyche as such, and he equates its relation to empirical psychology with the relation of mathematics to natural science. ${ }^{12}$

The eidetic investigation of pure psychology is to lay the ground for the introduction of basic psychological concepts expressing the funda-

mental determinations of mental phenomena. Starting from those definitions empirical psychology can, according to Husserl, inquire into the psyche as a definite aspect of the psychophysical unity of the human person. ${ }^{13}$

Yet pure psychology is not only the a priori foundation for empirical psychology; it is also a possible step in the direction of transcendental phenomenology. There is a path leading from the domain of the pure psyche to the field of transcendental subjectivity, since it is constitutive of the being of anything that can be possibly grasped by the subject, i.e., the being of transcendence in the wide sense. ${ }^{14}$

In contrast to the psychological attitude, where reflection grasps experiences as something given and passively perceived, the transcendental attitude requires a sense-generating activity. The relation between the subject is not here treated as an objectual structure which might, in turn, be considered as another object, but rather as a relation that a subject stands in as an absolute pole and that is viewed exclusively from this pole. Transcendental consciousness is related to the world as the totality of meanings, as the product of its sense-generating activity. Psychology treats its subject matter as something given, as existing independently of consciousness of it. In transcendental phenomenology this very consciousness is the observer’s own consciousness which is not given but is rather posited (gesetzt) by him. ${ }^{15}$

While a psychological reduction reduces any object to the modes of awareness corresponding to the kind of object it is, the subject of awareness, the Ego, is, nonetheless, treated as a particular being within the world, as a kind of self-contained datum. Thus, a transition to the transcendental attitude is effected by way of a corresponding reduction that eliminates the Ego from within the world. In the transcendental attitude the Ego turns into the absolute basis for any constitution of being, that is, the transcendental Ego figures as the source of any meaning, and it is only in this role that it can be conceived. ${ }^{16}$

One would think that we are able to distinguish quite definitely: (1) phenomenological psychology as a kind of Geistewissenschaft which investigates the eidetics of the empirical psyche and (2) transcendental phenomenology which is concerned with the “lebenserfahrende Subjektivität.” Yet this appears to be a merely abstract distinction. When we attempted to legitimate this distinction in the description of concrete experience or as Husserl said “in Kleingeld auszutauschen”, the texts of both descriptions turned out to be almost identical. For example, there

is this quote of a small portion of Husserl’s lectures on phenomenological psychology:

Freilich, um die Welt als Erfahrungs gegenstand zu erfassen, müssen wir vorher Einzelrealitäten der Welt erfasst haben. In gewisser Weise, geht also die Einzelerfahrung der Welterfahrung . . . vorher . . . . Aber eben damit ist auch gesagt, dass, während irgendein einzelnes Reales gegeben ist, immer und notwendig auch seine Umwelt bzw. die es umfassende Welt mit vorgegeben ist. ${ }^{17}$

Are we able to establish what kind of description is found here: transcendental phenomenological or psychological? In pure psychology the eidetics of the empirical psyche as a certain part of the world is described where transcendental phenomenology describes transcendental consciousness as the constitutive ground of the world as whole. Why then are the texts of both descriptions uniform?

To my mind the answer to this question is to be found in an ancient image: microcosm and macrocosm. The empirical psyche is to transcendental consciousness as microcosm is to macrocosm. Transcendental consciousness is the field of transcendental self-perception taken in all its concreteness which, at any moment, can be transformed by a simple shift in attitude into a psychological self-perception, and vice versa, although in the text of the description this transformation is still not reflected.

According to the same text on description the different levels of the activity of consciousness, as described in the transcendentally phenomenological attitude, can also be considered as particular levels of psychological description. The activity of sense-generating which, in the transcendental attitude, is the basis of the whole objective universe of meanings turns out to be, in the psychological attitude, a process of the mental life of an individual psyche.

This kind of infratextual intertranslatability of a transcendental phenomenology and psychological description shows that at the textual level transcendental consciousness and the empirical psyche are likewise indistinguishable. ${ }^{18}$

May one say that it is impossible to define the character of consciousness that is the subject matter of transcendental phenomenology? It seems not. To my mind the indefiniteness can be removed, if an account is taken of the specificity of the status of the phenomenological description itself.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION AS A PROCESS IN WHICH WE PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE

A radically posed question on the structures of meaning shows that meaning is no “automaton” which, once started, can be objectively described as to its functioning. The transcendental Ego therefore is no “homunculus” the sense-generative acts of which can be externally observed and to which we can delegate all our rights and duties in sense-generating. The question concerning the fundamental structures of meaning requires for its solution the direct participation of the questioner himself.

In his singling out of intentionality as the fundamental property of consciousness Husserl draws a principal distinction between the structures of consciousness and the structures of objects. I, as the Ego of perception, of thought, or of action am related to an object in a way that is different from the way the various objects within my field of sight are related to each other. It is in the later case only that I can consider both members of the relation, e.g., cause and effect. In the case of consciousness there is no such possibility: the directedness of consciousness to an object is at the same time directedness of consciousness away from itself. This is why an adequate description of consciousness cannot be obtained in the ordinary manner of objectification when the object described is considered as something given in its relation to something else and its description is seen as a textual “reproduction” of this given.

So, an adequate description of meaning structures is only possible in an actually functioning consciousness of my own (i.e., of the describer’s) - which takes in the empirical level. And it is only here that a distinction can be drawn between transcendental subjectivity and the empirical psyche: as a transcendental Ego, I am experiencing myself not as a subject of natural laws but as the free subject of “I can.”

As for the text of phenomenological description, it will remain ambiguous: first, it is a description of the empirical psyche as a certain part of the world; second, it is a meta-description of the living structure of phenomenological description as a personal act, i.e., as the actual functioning of the my own consciousness.

The foundation of our knowledge cannot be some impersonal structures of meanings as they are written about in books and papers but only our living sense-generating acts, i.e., our personal creativity. ${ }^{19}$

Therefore phenomenological description does not produce the text but transforms or converts my own (that of the author or reader of this text) empirical psyche: inducing and keeping a peculiar state which might be compared with meditation or other altered states of consciousness. I think Husserl’s strange habit of recording his own thoughts in shorthand might be explained in this way: the writing of the text was for him merely a means for disciplining the welterfahrende Leben which he has lived in the moment of description.

It seems that this interpretation does not contradict Husserl’s intention, for how could one otherwise understand his claim:

Ist . . . das transzendentale Arbeitsfeld als der totalen und universalen Subjektivität erreicht, dann ergibt sich im Rückgang in die natürliche, obschon jetzt nicht naive Einstellung das Merkwürdige, dass die Seelen der Menschen mit dem Fortschritt der phänomenologischen Forschung in eine merkwürdige Bewegung ihres eigenen seelischen Gehaltes geraten. Denn jede neue transzendentale Erkenntnis verwandelt sich in Wesensnotwendigkeit zu einer Bereicherung des Gehaltes der menschlichen Seele. Ich bin ja als transzendentales Ich dasselbe, das in der Weltlichkeit menschliches Ich ist. ${ }^{20}$

NOTES

${ }^{1}$ E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. 1 (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1922). p. 12.
${ }^{2}$ E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1929), p. 9.
${ }^{3}$ E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, Drittes Buch, Husserliana 5 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1952), p. 68.
${ }^{4}$ Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. 1., op. cit., p. 36.
${ }^{5}$ E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Bd. 1 (Halle: 1891), p. 16.
${ }^{6}$ Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. 1, op. cit., p. 65.
${ }^{7}$ Husserl, Ideen I (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1913), p. 9.
${ }^{8}$ Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. 1, op. cit., p. 240.
${ }^{9}$ Ibid., pp. 108-109.
${ }^{10}$ Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. 1, T. 1, op. cit., p. 344.
${ }^{11}$ Ibid., p. 21.
${ }^{12}$ Husserl, Ideen III, op. cit., p. 42.
${ }^{13}$ E. Husserl, Phänomenologische Philosophie, Husserliana 9 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 312-313.
${ }^{14}$ E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana 6 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1954), p. 258.
${ }^{15}$ Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie . . . , op. cit., pp. 335-336.
${ }^{16}$ Husserl, Die Krisis . . . , op. cit., pp. 259-260.
${ }^{17}$ Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie . . . , op. cit., p. 96.
${ }^{18}$ It seems that just this indistinguishability led to the controversy between Ingarden

and Husserl. Cf. my paper, “The Ingarden - Husserl Controversy: The Methodological Status of Consciousness in Phenomenology and the Limits of the Human Condition” Analecta Husserliana. Vol. XXVII, pp. 209-221.
${ }^{19}$ Cf. A-T. Tymieniecka, Logos and Life, Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), p. 6.
${ }^{20}$ Husserl, Die Krisis . . . op. cit., pp. 267-268.