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Philosophy

Semiosis and the elusive final interpretant of understanding

Profile image of Göran SonessonGöran Sonesson

2010, Semiotica

https://doi.org/10.1515/SEMI.2010.023
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115 pages

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Abstract

While the conceptual history of the sign, as recounted by John Deely in Four ages of understanding, is immensely enlightening, history is never enough. If, before Augustine, it had occurred to no one that such diverse phenomena as are covered by this term had something in common, and if, in the time of Aquinas, Fonseca, and Poinsot, di¤erent usages of the term were in competition, the reason is not simply intellectual confusion, but rather that meaning is of many kinds. In this essay, I have shifted the terrain from socio-history to phylogeny and ontogeny, suggesting that, in the child, as well as in the human species, perception is the primary type of meaning, whereas true signs are acquired much later, followed by signs systems and organism-independent artifacts. The whole point of having a semiotic theory, it is argued, is to be able to account for the di¤erences, and not only the similarities, of di¤erent kinds of meaning.

Key takeaways
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  1. Meaning encompasses diverse forms, including perception, signs, and artifacts, reflecting multiple ages of understanding.
  2. The essay critiques John Deely's interpretation of semiotic history, emphasizing the need for clarity in sign definitions.
  3. Children's development stages highlight how perception precedes signs, establishing a foundation for semiotic understanding.
  4. Signs serve as memory devices, allowing accumulation and transfer of meaning across time and space.
  5. The text argues for a broader understanding of meaning beyond signs, incorporating intentional relationships and cultural contexts.
Figures (8)
be done by combining what Husserl says about appresentation (some- thing that is directly present but not thematic refers to something that is indirectly present but thematic) and what Piaget says about the semiotic function (there is a differentiation between the latter two instances, in the double sense, I take it, that they do not go over into each other in time and/or space, and that they are perceived to be of different nature; cf. Fig- ure 1).
be done by combining what Husserl says about appresentation (some- thing that is directly present but not thematic refers to something that is indirectly present but thematic) and what Piaget says about the semiotic function (there is a differentiation between the latter two instances, in the double sense, I take it, that they do not go over into each other in time and/or space, and that they are perceived to be of different nature; cf. Fig- ure 1).
something that is entirely self-contained, with no relation to anything else. Firstness is not only the first element appearing but it is also in itself without any further parts or connections. Secondness, however, in this sense, is both the second element introduced, in relation to a first element which already exists, and also something which consists of two parts, one of which connects to an element of Firstness, while the other is the con- nection itself. Thirdness, then is the third element coming to the fore, but at the same time it has three parts, two of which connects to the two ear- lier elements, and the third presenting something new (cf. Figure 4). This explains that Peirce has described Thirdness as ‘“‘branching” (manuscript quoted by Parmentier 1985: 36-37). If, in the end, Peirce’s complete sys- tem may be described by a triangle, it is not because the latter connects three points, as in the Ogden and Richards version, but because Firstness is a point, Secondness is a line with a hook, and Thirdness is a fork.?> Understood as Firstness, the ground is simply a (set of) point(s). It is the correlate, which is Secondness, which brings about the point of view that transforms the list of properties into a selective series of properties. Tec ticle waxcandoost Dhilta «<nenaxce fhe dhwm awmwannedxem Ga amleo Haband ome eau
something that is entirely self-contained, with no relation to anything else. Firstness is not only the first element appearing but it is also in itself without any further parts or connections. Secondness, however, in this sense, is both the second element introduced, in relation to a first element which already exists, and also something which consists of two parts, one of which connects to an element of Firstness, while the other is the con- nection itself. Thirdness, then is the third element coming to the fore, but at the same time it has three parts, two of which connects to the two ear- lier elements, and the third presenting something new (cf. Figure 4). This explains that Peirce has described Thirdness as ‘“‘branching” (manuscript quoted by Parmentier 1985: 36-37). If, in the end, Peirce’s complete sys- tem may be described by a triangle, it is not because the latter connects three points, as in the Ogden and Richards version, but because Firstness is a point, Secondness is a line with a hook, and Thirdness is a fork.?> Understood as Firstness, the ground is simply a (set of) point(s). It is the correlate, which is Secondness, which brings about the point of view that transforms the list of properties into a selective series of properties. Tec ticle waxcandoost Dhilta «<nenaxce fhe dhwm awmwannedxem Ga amleo Haband ome eau
and the features that it impresses on it (Wirkwelt), which together form a functional circle (Funktionskreis). According to a by now classical exam- ple, the tick hangs motionless on a bush branch until it perceives the smell of butyric acid emitted by the skin glands of a mammal (Merkzeichen), which sends a message to its legs to let go (Wirkzeichen), so that it drops onto the mammal’s body. This starts a new cycle, because the tactile cue of hitting the mammal’s hair incites the tick to move around in order to find its host’s skin. Finally, a third circle is initiated when the heat of the mammal’s skin triggers the boring response allowing the tick to drink the blood of its host. Together, these different circles consisting of perceptual and operational cue bearers make up the interdependent wholes of the subject, corresponding to the organism, and the Umwelt, which is the world as it is defined for the subject in question. fe ae Le, eT i, a ee me ee ee ey ee ee ne: On, ee ea eee 5 ae
and the features that it impresses on it (Wirkwelt), which together form a functional circle (Funktionskreis). According to a by now classical exam- ple, the tick hangs motionless on a bush branch until it perceives the smell of butyric acid emitted by the skin glands of a mammal (Merkzeichen), which sends a message to its legs to let go (Wirkzeichen), so that it drops onto the mammal’s body. This starts a new cycle, because the tactile cue of hitting the mammal’s hair incites the tick to move around in order to find its host’s skin. Finally, a third circle is initiated when the heat of the mammal’s skin triggers the boring response allowing the tick to drink the blood of its host. Together, these different circles consisting of perceptual and operational cue bearers make up the interdependent wholes of the subject, corresponding to the organism, and the Umwelt, which is the world as it is defined for the subject in question. fe ae Le, eT i, a ee me ee ee ey ee ee ne: On, ee ea eee 5 ae
Figure 6. Donald’s model of evolution related to the notion of sign function
Figure 6. Donald’s model of evolution related to the notion of sign function
Figure 7. Comparison of the similarities and differences between the early Peirce (in terms of pronouns) and the late Cassirer (numbered terms)
Figure 7. Comparison of the similarities and differences between the early Peirce (in terms of pronouns) and the late Cassirer (numbered terms)

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