(2010) The Knowledge Argument (to beginners)

Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2004

Dialogue, 1995

Philosophia, 2023

One compelling argument challenging the tenability of physicalism, which sees reality as fundamentally comprised of physical facts, is Jackson's knowledge argument. Through a powerful thought experiment involving the case of Mary, the super neuroscientist, the argument demonstrates how knowledge of phenomenal facts cannot be deduced from knowledge of physical facts. For allegedly leaving out phenomenal facts in its account of reality, physicalism is shown to be incomplete and hence mistaken. Physicalists respond to this argument in a variety of ways, challenging, in turn, some aspects of the knowledge argument. This paper focuses on the replies of the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, which respectively try to block the two crucial moves in the knowledge argument: the establishment of an epistemic gap and the inference from the occurrence of this gap to the existence of an ontological gap. The paper critically examines how proponents of these two replies to the knowledge argument respond to some objections to maintain the viability of physicalism.

Organon F, 2004

The article examines the viability of so-called 'the knowledge argu­ ment' that was designed to prove the irreducibility of the subjective, phenomenal aspect of experience to the physical. It is argued that this argument can successfully be defended against its criticism. Its critics are represented here by two physicalist approaches: the mode of pre­ sentation hypothesis (here Paul Churchland), and the ability hypothesis (here David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow). The defense of the gene­ ral soundness of the knowledge argument is based on some important insights on the issue m question of Frank Jackson and Howard Robinson. It is argued that the physicalist counterarguments to the knowledge argument seem inadequate. The article concludes that it appears that the knowledge argument has still kept a significant amount of its initial force.

What RoboDennett Still Doesn’t Know, 2005

Erkenntnis, 2012

Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson's knowledge argument from the ''inconsistency objection.'' The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa's argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains.

This paper attempts to argue for a defense of Frank Jackson's seminal Knowledge Argument against metaphysical materialism. By first presenting the argument and then directly responding to notable objections from philosophical academia, I seek to demonstrate not that Jackson's argument is certainly sound in its refutation of materialism, but that the degree of confidence with which his premises imply his conclusion ultimately establish a form of property dualism as more philosophically tenable and likely than any variant of materialism.

According to Frank Jackson's famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been removed, Mary can know the relevant truths. If we give Mary the epistemological capabilities necessary to draw metaphysical conclusions about physicalism, she will, while trapped in the black and white room, be able to know every truth about phenomenal experience. Keywords Concepts Á Concept possession Á Conceptual mastery Á Knowledge argument Á Phenomenal concept Á Physicalism Á Phenomenal concept strategy Á Dualism Á Modal rationalism Á Consciousness Á Phenomenal experience