The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law

The Yale Law Journal, 1996

1998

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

The Yale Law Journal, 1989

Journal Des Economistes Et Des Etudes Humaines, 1995

Professors Macey and Miller explore the relationship between deposit insurance and the mismatch in the term structure ofcommercial banks I assets and liabilities. After critiquing the traditional regulatory hypothesis, which posits that banks have incentives to.fund long-term assets with short-term liabilities because government-sponsored deposit insurance enhances bank credit and subsidizes short-term liabilities, they use public choice theory to argue that a modified version of the regulatory hypothesis is the best explanation for the mismatch in the term structure of banks I assets and liabilities. Finally, they argue that embracing the regulatory hypothesis does not imply acceptance of the government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme as it exists in the U. S. today.

2000

N recent years, the United States utility industry, faced with the massive restructuring of traditional natural monopolies such as telecommunications, natural gas, and electricity, has raised a novel argument in takings jurisprudence. With the onslaught of competition many United States infrastructure firms claim to have suffered

Harvard Law Review, 1994

2000