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277. Anscombe, E. 106n9
278. Anti-Cartesian principle 8n7 anticipation of immediate future 84 Anticipations of Perception 96
279. Anti-End-of-the-World Principle, the 279 anti-realism, causal 260, 285, 289n47 A Priori Argument Logic, the, a.k.a. the APA Logic 249-253, 279-282, 284, 304, 322, 330, 335, 338, 353-354, 379-380 Arbib, M. 20n3 arc of reflex action, see reflex action, arc of Aristotelian hylomorphism 345 Aristotle 5, 13-15, 22, 345 arm-raising 10, 15, 101-103, 109, 156-157, 177-179, 196-197, 200, 212-213, 257, 293, 309-310, 352, 370-386 vs. arm-rising 10, 101-103, 173, 196-197 Arpaly, N. 381n46 A series and B series, McTaggart's 83 see also: McTaggart, J. M. E. aspectual shape 66
280. Aspectual Shape Thesis, the, see aspectual shape asymmetry 351 see also thermodynamic asymmetry irreversibility of time, the ATLiens 383 attention 22, 28, 41, 61, 63, 87-88, 92-96, 202, 220, 231, 234, 253
281. Audi, R. 153n82, 175n19
282. Augustine's Confessions 198
283. Austen, J. 234-235
284. Austin, J. L. 155n84 authenticity 137, 147, 151, 200 automatism 28, 92, 204 autonomy 105, 110-111, 136-137, 273 see also mental causation Awakenings 85
285. Baier, A. 225
286. Baker, L. 346
287. Banks, W. B. 191n44
288. Barbara, who is angry at Ben's comments 220
289. Bass, S. 321
290. Bayne, T. 191n44
291. Bealer, G. 353
292. Beckermann, A. 356n19 Behaviorism 132, 170, 202, 206-207, 214-215, 242 being-towards-death 368 belief-desire pairs, see action, Davidson's theory of Ben, who makes certain comments to Barbara 220
293. Bergson, H. 86n54
294. Bermúdez, J. 73n34 Bernanos, G. 29
295. Bickhard, M. 365n31
296. Big Bang, the 117, 120-121, 261, 264, 268, 369 and General Relativity 261 Big Boi 341 Billy Pilgrim 85 Biofeedback 40 biological conception of the mind 13-14, 16, 305, 317, 322, 327, 343, 345-347, 352, 356, 371 biology as a basic natural science 22, 308, 318-319
297. Blackburn, S. 110n13 black holes 117, 120-121, 261, 264, 268 and General Relativity 261
298. Bladerunner 280, 282 see also Scott, R. see also Bladerunner Argument, the Bladerunner Argument, the 280-282
299. Blakesee, S. 50n48, 355n14 blindsight 62-63 superblindsight vs. superduperblindsight 62
300. Block, N. 48n43, 271n19, 277, 353n13 Bob the Zero, a.k.a. Bob the Z, a.k.a. Bob the Zed 252-254 bodily self-consciousness lo or self-reflection 43, 68-69, 81, 89
301. ''body,'' concept of , and the physical world 3-4, 22-23 body image 43, 69, 71-72, 81, 89 see also body schema body movements 63, 65, 69, 71-72, 120-125, 129, 159-194 passim, 370-386 and emotions 197-222 passim and empathic mirroring 77 covert vs. overt 102 intentional 3, 10-11, 15-16, 121-122 pre-reflective or spontaneous 32-33, 116-152 passim aimless 172-174, 191 impulsive 172-174, 191 purposive 161-162, six varieties in minded animals 174 unintentional 105, 133, 154-156 Body Problem, the 302, 306 body schema 69, 70-73, 82, 88-91 see also body image Bogardus, B. viii Boghossian, P. 332n29
302. Bohm, D. 365 bottle opener 48 see also multiple embodiability vs. multiple realization Bovens, L. viii boy named 'clyde', the 225
303. Brading, K. 359n21 brain 35-36, 38-41, 49-50 embedded vs. envatted 49 brain-body-world nexus, the 349 see also Embodied Cognition Theory Brasil-Neto, J. 191n46
304. Bratman, M. 128
305. Brentano, F. 91, 223
306. Bresson, R. ix, 29 Bridge on the River Kwai 178
307. Brown, D. 52n49
308. Bruntrup, G. 365n33 brute necessity 328 see also necessity Bub, J. 304n11 Buddhist meditation 91, 244
309. Buffalo Trace Kentucky Straight Bourbon Whisky 232
310. Buridan's Ass 231
311. Campbell, D. 365n31
312. Campbell, J. 189n40 capacity, disposition, or power for consciousness like ours, a.k.a. consciousness lo 28 see also consciousness like ours, a.k.a. consciousness lo , natural matrix of care and caring 195, 204-205 see also emotions see also Cogito, Essentially Embodied Cartesian Materialism 49
313. Cartesian Mistakes, the 50-58
314. Castellani, E. 365n22 cat named 'otis', the 225 Causal Closure of the Physical a.k.a. CCP 258, 272-275, 284-285, 287-289, 296-299, 306-308, 311-313 causal-dynamic coupling 36 causal exclusion problems, Kim's 286-313 Causal Failure of the Mental a.k.a CFM 272, 311-312 causal laws 104, 108, 112, 117-122, 182, 260-263, 268-269, 276, 288, 290-291, 293-294, 313, 317, 319, 324, 352, 361, 379 causal overdetermination 265, 267, 285, 287, 288-290, 292-294, 299, 308-310 Causal Physicality of the Mental a.k.a CPM 272, 289n47, 311 causal theory of action, see action, causal theory of causation 257-271 causal efficacy vs. causal relevance 270-271 circular, see circular reciprocal causality efficient material vs. structuring 343, 366, 369, 372 mental, see mental causation simultaneous and continuous 162, 265-266 synchronous, in intentional action 103, 107, 109, 124-125, 156-157, 162-163, 167, 173, 175, 183-187, 192-193, 308, 311, 326, 375-377, 384-385 see also Amazingly Hard Problem, the Center for Consciousness Studies viii Chalmers, D. 7n5, 7n6, 8n7, 24, 45n37, 53, 54n54, 55n55, 61, 76, 248n68, 275n22, 277, 278n29, 278n34, 284n43, 301, 329n24, 329n25, 332, 337n34, 337n35, 337n36, 350n12 see also Zombie Argument, the change-blindness or difference-blindness 188 chemistry as a basic natural science 22-23, 308, 322
315. Chief Executive Officer, a.k.a., CEO, analogy with causal role of brain 39
316. Chisholm, R. 103n4
317. Chomsky, N. 301
318. Churchland, Patricia 8n9
319. Ginet, C. 106, 177n25
320. Gleason, C. 190n41 God 85 Godfrey-smith, P. 327
321. Goldie, P. 203-204, 210n19, 211, 212, 213n25, 220n39, 232-233
322. Gorsuch, W. viii Goya, F. 239
323. Grahek, N. 77n43 Great apes 143
324. Green, O. H. 177n24
325. Greenspan, P. 218, 220n39 guidance 107, 110, 122, 124-126, 154-157, 159-193 passim, 196-199, 201-202, 204, 206, 233, 241, 245, 254, 308, 311, 371, 375-377, 385
326. Gunther, Y. 91n60 gut reactions 79 see also emotions, Prinz's theory of
327. Haack, S. 248n70
328. Haggard, P. 190n41
329. Haken, H. 323n19
330. Hammett, D. 148n71, 216
331. Harrison, R. viii Hawthorne, J. 332n29 Heal, J. viii Heidegger, M. 15, 50n48, 195, 204, 216n28, 223, 368
332. Heinämaa, S. viii Helen Keller 79
333. Hellman, L. 148
334. Hempel's Dilemma 302 hierarchical desire theories of emotion, practical reasons, and the will 139, 141, 143, 184, 201
335. Hitchcock, A. 314
336. Hobson's Choice 10
337. Horgan, T. 43-45
338. Hornsby, J. 176n21 Howry, A. viii Huemer, M. 162n9, 266n14
339. Hume, D. 96-97, 110, 131, 138, 146-147, 149, 151, 209, 239
340. Humphrey, N. 46n40
341. Humphreys, P. 12n14, 303
342. Hurley, S. 73n34, 355
343. Hursthouse, R. 130, 132n49, 133
344. Husserl, E. 15, 60n4, 84, 97 hylomorphism, neo-Aristotelian see neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism hyperbolic or Lobachevskian world, the 304 ''I am here now'' 72-73, 82 ''I am my world'' 81 Idealism 12 Identity 7n6, 8, 9n11, 12n15, 24, 49, 54-56, 84-85, 87, 107-109, 111, 248, 250, 253, 275, 277, 281, 286, 288, 290, 304-306, 328, 337-339, 344, 348, 377
345. ''Identity and Necessity'' 55 ''I desire, therefore I am'' see also Cogito, Essentially Embodied ''I effectively desire, therefore I am simultaneously moving my body'' see also Cogito, Causal-Intentional I lo P lo Thesis, the, see Intentionality lo of Phenomenology lo Thesis, the immanent reflexivity 68 Indeterminism 117, 119, 120-122, 139, 260, 261-262, 263-264, 268, 378-379 see also Determinism see also Open Future Rule, the insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient cause, a.k.a. INUS cause 267 integrated trousers-upholding system, a.k.a. ITUS 287 integrity, see authenticity, moral intentional action 1, 10, 101-158 passim, 159-194 passim, 197-223, 255-256, 257-258, 268, 272-273, 295, 298, 308, 311, 313, 334, 370-385
346. Intentional Causation Thesis, the 16, 371-372, 378 intentionality and intentionality like ours, a.k.a. intentionality lo 1, 3-4, 43-45, 60, 65-68, 74-75, 89-93, 223-238 Intentionality of Phenomenology Thesis, the, a.k.a. the IP Thesis 43
347. Intentionality lo of Phenomenology lo Thesis, the, a.k.a. the I lo P lo Thesis 44 Internalism about reasons see also Desire-Overriding Internalism Intrinsic Structural Properties Argument, the 280, 283-284 INUS cause, see insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient cause, a.k.a. INUS cause Invasion of the Body Snatchers, The 252 see also Siegel, D. Inverted Qualia Argument, the 247, 275, 277-278, 283-284
348. Ivy, D. viii Jackendoff, R. 30, 31n14
349. Jackson, F. 46n41, 270n17, 277, 278n34, 279, 291-292, 294n56
350. Jacques le Fataliste et son Maître ix James, W. 203
351. Jane, the doughnut eater 110
352. Jane, the photograph defacer 211-213
353. Jantsch, E. 325n20 Jastrow duck-rabbit phenomenon 231
354. Jean-Paul 382 je-m'en-foutisme 204
355. Jimmy the sailor 85
356. John, my next door neighbor who wears suspenders 260
357. Johnson-Laird, P. 336
358. Johnston, M. 189n40
359. Juarrero, A. 295, 298, 323n19
360. Judy, who did not win the award that John won 218
361. Judson, H. F. 325n20
362. Kafka, F 30.
363. Kane, R. 10n13
364. Kant, I. 15, 59-60, 87-88, 96-97, 99, 136-137, 138n63, 149, 151, 265, 288, 330, 336-339, 345, 368n36
365. Karl, who is jealous of Kevin and Kate 246
366. Kauffman, S. A. 325n20
367. Kelso, J. S. 324n19
368. Ken, who falsely believes he loves Karen 226
369. Kenny, A. 224
370. Keysers, C. 207n17
371. Kihlstrom, J. 34n20
372. Kim, J. 7n6, 8n7, 9n11, 45n37, 48n43, 48n44, 89n57, 114, 170n16, 197, 256, 258, 265, 274-275, 278n30, 281n37, 286-291, 293, 295-297, 307-308, 315, 359, 362-263
373. Kim's causal exclusion problems 114, 197, 265, 286-294, 298-312
374. Kirk, G. 55n56 kiss, friendly vs. lovers' 228 knowing the dancer from the dance 103, 109, 200 see also Yeats, W. B. Knowledge Argument, the 247, 275, 277-279, 283 see also Jackson, F. Korman, D. viii Korsgaard, C. 150n75
375. Koslicki, K. 23n9
376. Kovitz, B. 162n9, 266n14
377. Kripke, S. 53, 55, 56n57, 247, 277, 298, 329, 331-332, 337-338 see also Modal Argument, the Kubrick, S. 10
378. Kuehn, M. 338
379. Langton, R. 23n10
380. Laurence, S. 170n17 laws, see causal laws Layered World, the 303, 315-317, 320, 326, 360, 362, 364
381. Lazarus, P. 236
382. Lean, D. 178 learning how to play a flute, and causal relevance 292 learning how to walk again, after a serious leg injury 91
383. LeBel, R. viii Leibniz, G. W. F. 23
384. Levin, D. 188n38
385. Levine, J. 279n33 Lewis, D. 23n10, 258n8 Liberal Naturalism 11, 312-313
386. Libet, B. 190, 191n44, 192-193 loop-the-loop, metaphysical and causal-dynamic 14
387. life viii, 3, 5, 13, 15, 20, 22, 28, 47, 59, 64-65, 68, 79, 86-89, 93, 97, 117, 122, 134, 148, 182, 185, 196, 198, 203, 215-216, 246, 252-254 little bangs 369
388. Living Body Functionalism, see Functionalism, Living Body locked-in syndrome 87, 242, logic 248-251, 328-338 logical possibility and conceivability, see conceivability and possibility index 413
389. Los Caprichos 239 see also Goya, F. Louise, the party hostess 138
390. Lowe, E. J. 6n3
391. Lyons, W. 206n11, 219, 225, 229
392. Macdonald, C. 290-292
393. Macdonald, G. 290-292 machine-in-the-machine, the 9-11, 343 see also ghost-in-the-machine, the
394. Magritte, R. 170
395. Malle, B. 191n44 Manchurian Candidate, The 380 March of Time newsreels 87 marathon runner 123, 128-129
396. Margolis, E. 170n17
397. Mary, the beer drinker 111, 114-116
398. Mary, the co-worker of Mike 210, 218
399. Materialism ix, 6n4, 7-12, 49, 57, 265, 276, 281, 285-286, 289-290, 296, 301-302, 305, 308-310, 313, 316-318, 326, 344, 353
400. McCulloch, G. 350n11
401. McGeever, J. 364n30 McGinn, C. McLaughlin, B. 356n17
402. McTaggart, J. M. E. 83
403. Meditation VI 37, 53, 59 Meditations on First Philosophy 6, 37, 51, 59
404. Mele, A. 191n44 Memento 85 mental causation 255-294 passim and the Amazingly Hard Problem 295-313, 370-385 mental modelling 335-337, 339 mental-physical property fusion see also Mind-Body Animalism mental world see ''mind,'' concept of, and the mental world Merleau-Ponty, M. 15, 72, 241
405. Mike, the co-worker of Mary 210, 218 ''mind'', concept of, and the mental world 3-4, 26-27 Mind: A Brief Introduction 74 see also Searle, J. Mind & Cognition Research Group viii Mind-Body Animalism 11, 12n15, 13, 16, 52, 57, 342, 343-356, 371
406. Mind-Body Animalism Thesis, the 161 mind-body problem, the 1-18 minded animals, definition of 19-20 Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind vii see also Thompson, E. mind-in-life thesis, the 327-328 minds like ours, a.k.a., minds lo , definition of 1-2 minds lo -in-life thesis, the 327, 345
407. Mind-Mind Problem, the 30-31 minimal physical duplicate 293 Möbius strip 368 Modal Argument, the 53, 275, 277, 283 see also Kripke, S. Modal Dualism vs. Modal Monism 53-55, 303, 328-340
408. Moffett, M. viii Monism 112, 279, 301, 321, 361-362
409. Montague, R. 53n53
410. Montero, B. 283n40, 302
411. Monty Python's Flying Circus 382
412. Moore, G. E. 81
413. Penfield, W. 171, 373 perception 68-69, 90, 94, 97, 180, 186-187, 189, 193, 199n6, 205, 220, 225-228, 233, 245
414. Pereboom, D. 290, 292, 294
415. Perry, J. 283n42 personhood 142
416. Phaedrus, The 239 see also Plato phantom limb illusion 42, 89 phenomenal character 64, 66, 76-81, 91-92, 97-100 phenomenology, see neurophenomenology Phenomenology of Intentionality Thesis, the, a.k.a. the PI Thesis 45 Phenomenology lo of Intentionality lo Thesis, the, a.k.a. the P lo I lo Thesis 45 Phenomenology of Perception, The 241 see also Merleau-Ponty, M. Philosophical Investigations, The 132 see also Wittgenstein, L. philosophy of mind, as classical philosophical reasoning plus cognitive neuroscience plus phenomenology 26-27 see also Science of Minds lo Philosophy of Mind Discussion Group viii Philosophy of Mind Group viii physical world, see ''body,'' concept of, and the physical world Physicalism, see materialism Physics, The 345 see also Aristotle physics, as a basic natural science 22 see also biology as a basic natural science see also chemistry as a basic natural science picture, in the philosophical sense 132-133, 207-208, 211-213, 215, 251
417. Plato 239 plumping, see akrasia, impulsiveness of the will vs. weakness of the will Pockett, S. 191n44
418. Port, R. F. 324n19
419. Post-Fundamentalism 297, 300-301, 303, 312, 321 post-functionalist philosophy of mind 48 see also Functionalism Potter, M. viii Powell, M. 47
420. Pred, R. 44n34 Pride and Prejudice 234 see also Austen, J. Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, the 104, 112, 275-276, 278, 288 see also mental causation Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical, a.k.a. CCP 271-194 passim Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality, the 112 see also mental causation Priest, G. 248n70
421. Prigogine, I. 118n25, 118n26, 323n19 primitive bodily awareness 4, 32-33, 35, 42, 61, 68-69, 71-73, 75, 77-82, 88-92, 97-100
422. Principles of Philosophy, The 300 see also Descartes, R. Prinz, J. 40n27, 235-238 problem of action, the 1, 10, 47 ''The Problem of Action'' 160 see also Frankfurt, H. properties 23-26 emergent 356-370 fusion of 12, 14, 16, 341-342, 344-345, 354, 356, 364, 371, 377, 384
423. Property-Dualism-Without-Substance- Dualism 6-7 Proprioception 4 Prosopagnosia 30 Prosthesis 355
424. Putnam, H. 22, 36, 48n43, 215, 248n69, 249n71, 277, 281, 353n13 qualia 76-78 qualia eliminativism 76 quantum entanglement 304, 364 quantum field theory 364-365
425. Quine, W. V. O. 330
426. Ramachandran, V. S. 50n48, 355n14
427. Randy, who is afraid of spiders 220
428. Rasmussen, J. viii Rationality 111, 126, 130-131, 133, 136-137, 142, 147n69, 150n77, 200, 205, 209, 219, 239-241, 249
429. Raymond, who is very shy 233 ''Raymond, why don't you play a little solitaire?'' 380 reading as an intentional act 254 readiness potential of the brain, a.k.a. RP 190-194 reasons 112-153 passim Rediscovery of the Mind, The 74 see also Searle, J. Red Shoes, The 47 reduction, see non-reductive arguments, the reflex action 28, 40 reflexivity of desires see also hierarchical desire theory of will, the Renée, who feels guilty for no good reason 220
430. Rensink, R. 188n38 Republic, The 239 see also Plato respect, Kantian (Achtung) 149 reverse-engineering, as a method in the philosophy of mind 11 right out to the skin, see essential embodiment, the
431. Rizzolatti, G. 21n3
432. Robb, D. viii Robby I, Robby II, Robby III, Robby III * , Robby IV, Robby IV * , Robby V * , Robby VI, Robby VI * 372-381
433. Roberts, R. 220n38, 221n40, 227
434. Robinson, B. viii Robinson, J. 219
435. Rockwell, Teed, a.k.a. Rockwell, W. T. 41, 49n46, 51n48, 349n9
436. Rosenberg, G. 301, 312
437. Rosenthal, D. 63n13
438. Ross, P. 191n44
439. Rowlands, M. 349n10
440. Roy, J.-M. viii Royce, J. 320 Royce's definition of ''idealism'' 320
441. Rupert, R. viii Russell, B. 301
442. Rutherford-Bohr atomic theory of matter 316
443. Ryle, G. 9 Sacks, O. 50n48, 85, 91n63
444. Sam, who is in love with Sarah 231
445. Sarah, who is in love with Sam 226
446. Sartre, J.-P. 81, 137n61, 223
447. Savitt, S. 359n21
448. Schiller, F. ix Schneider 72
449. Scholasticism, bad Schopenhauer, A. 239
450. Schrödinger, E. 327n23
451. Schutz, A. 60n6 Science of Minded Animals, see Science of Minds lo Science of Minds lo 26
452. Scientific Essentialism 329, 334, 337-339 Scientific Image, the 22
453. Scott, R. 280n35
454. Scream, The 208 see also Munch, E.
455. Searle, J. 43n32, 48n45, 50n48, 65-66, 68n22, 74-76, 79, 87, 91, 94, 99, 116-117, 123, 129, 131n47, 137-140, 149, 151, 178
456. Seeing and Knowing 225 see also Dretske, F. seeing red 46-47 self-determinism 121-126 self-organizing thermodynamic systems, see dynamic systems theory, a.k.a. DST Sellers, P. 10 semi-determinism and semi-indeterminism 121-122
457. Seminar in the Epistemology of the Cognitive Sciences viii separable noûs, in Aristotle's metaphysics 345
458. Shadow, Eliot's 116-117, 123 see also Gap, Searle's Shakespeare, W. 17 short-term memory of immediate past, see temporal consciousness lo Shylock 17
459. Siegel, D. 252
460. Silberstein, M. 364n30
461. Simeon Stylites 147 Simone 382
462. Simons, D. 188n38
463. Shapiro, L. 48n45