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Outline

A multi-layered dual-process approach to conditional reasoning

2010, Cognition and ConditionalsProbability and Logic in Human Thinking

https://doi.org/10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199233298.003.0019

Abstract

Any theory that tries to describe human reasoning with one single-layered theory is doomed to be incomplete. In this chapter we argue that the understanding of human reasoning requires a multi-layered approach, where every layer is guided by at least one process. A full account of the human reasoning system will incorporate a multi-phase experience and context driven application of top-down driven reasoning principles and tactics operating on bottom-up knowledge and principles, acquired from everyday interactions. This chapter aims to advance this more comprehensive approach to the human reasoning system.

FAQs

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What explains the difference between heuristic and analytic reasoning processes?add

The findings reveal that heuristic reasoning is fast, low in cognitive cost, while analytic processing is slow, effortful, and requires higher working memory involvement.

How do background knowledge and context influence conditional reasoning?add

Research indicates that reasoning performance is significantly impacted by contextualization versus decontextualization, with contextualization typically leading to more accurate conclusions.

What are the characteristics of distinct counterexample retrieval types?add

Counterexamples are categorized into three types: Type 1, semantically close to premises; Type 2, requiring strategic retrieval; and Type 3, producing low-quality responses.

When do people prefer to use analytical versus heuristic reasoning?add

Participants tend to favor analytic reasoning when time and cognitive resources permit, especially when counterexamples can be rapidly retrieved.

How does working memory capacity affect reasoning types?add

Higher working memory capacity correlates with increased use of strategic counterexamples, while lower capacity mainly results in heuristic reasoning.

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